Lumières sur un mode alternatif de règlement de différends : l’arbitrage 3213

N Benhaddou2, 2 y.

- Business -

2.1 min read.

Il est constaté, la mention sur certains contrats, d’une « clause d’arbitrage » en tant que disposition contractuelle destinée à déterminer la compétence juridictionnelle en cas d’éventuel conflit concernant l’interprétation du contrat ou son exécution. En vertu de la clause d’arbitrage, les parties conviennent, à soumettre les litiges naissant du contrat, à un tribunal d’arbitrage, au lieu et à la place des tribunaux étatiques. Il s’agit donc, d’un mode alternatif de règlement de litiges, qui se substitue comme choix des parties au contrat, à la piste juridictionnelle classique. Toutefois, la pratique démontre que la majorité des personnes ayant fait partie à un contrat, ignore la notion d’arbitrage, malgré qu’il s’agisse d’individus ou de groupes ayant exprimé leur volonté d’accepter la clause compromissoire, en procédant à la conclusion du contrat qui la porte. Ceci étant, s’impose l’utilité d’écarter les zones d’ombre qui limitent la visibilité des justiciables à l’égard de cette notion juridique. Pour ce faire, nous mettrons en relief, les caractéristiques de l’arbitrage puis ses avantages, avant de traiter sa mise en œuvre. Seront également traitées les règles spécifiques à l’arbitrage international. Tout cela sera effectué en se référant au cadre légal régissant la matière 1-Caractéristiques de l’arbitrage En vertu de l’article 2 de la loi 95-17 relative à l’arbitrage et à la médiation conventionnelle, « L’arbitrage a pour objet de faire trancher un litige par un tribunal arbitral qui reçoit des parties, la mission de juger, en vertu d’une convention d’arbitrage ». Il s’avère à travers cette définition que ce sont les parties au contrat qui choisissent l’arbitrage comme voie de règlement de leurs éventuels litiges. S’impose donc l’intérêt de s’interroger sur les éléments incitateurs du choix de l’arbitrage, au moment où existe la voie habituelle du recours à la justice, à savoir les tribunaux étatiques. 1-1-L’arbitrage : une procédure consensuelle : L'arbitrage ne peut avoir lieu que si les deux parties y ont consenti. Le tribunal arbitral reçoit, des parties, la mission de juger en vertu d'une convention d'arbitrage ». S'agissant de litiges futurs découlant d'un contrat, les parties insèrent une clause d'arbitrage dans le contrat. Dans ce cas, on se trouve face à une « clause compromissoire ». Aussi, un litige naissant d’un contrat qui ne comporte pas de clause compromissoire, peut également être porté devant un tribunal d’arbitrage, suite à une convention d’arbitrage sous forme de « compromis » conclu entre les parties, d’une manière apostériori. 1-2-La liberté de choix des arbitres Conformément aux dispositions de la loi 95-17, relative à l’arbitrage et à la médiation conventionnelle, les parties au contrat peuvent choisir d'un commun accord un arbitre unique. Si elles optent pour un tribunal arbitral composé de trois membres, chaque partie désigne l'un des deux arbitres appelés ultérieurement à nommer l'arbitre qui présidera le tribunal arbitral . Le Centre d’arbitrage concerné peut aussi recommander des arbitres possédant les compétences nécessaires ou nommer directement les membres du tribunal arbitral. 1-3-La neutralité la procédure de l’arbitrage est neutre dans la mesure où les parties peuvent choisir des arbitres neutres de la nationalité appropriée. Les parties peuvent décider d'éléments aussi importants que la législation applicable, la langue et le lieu de la procédure. Cela leur permet de s'assurer qu'aucune partie ne bénéficie d'un avantage lié au déroulement de la procédure dans son pays. 1-4-La décision du tribunal arbitral est définitive Selon l’article 58 de la loi relative à l’arbitrage et à la médiation conventionnelle, la sentence arbitrale n'est susceptible d'aucun recours. Les parties conviennent d'exécuter la décision du tribunal arbitral sans délai. Toutefois et en cas de réticence de la part de l’une des parties, la sentence arbitrale ne sera susceptible d'exécution forcée qu'en vertu d'une ordonnance d'exequatur du président de la juridiction dans le ressort de laquelle la sentence a été rendue.

THE MEDITATIONS - Book I.[1/3] 5943

Bluwr X Commons: Marcus Aurelius, 2 y.

3.7 min read.

1. I learned from my grandfather, Verus, to use good manners, and to put restraint on anger. 2. In the famous memory of my father I had a pattern of modesty and manliness. 3. Of my mother I learned to be pious and generous; to keep myself not only from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and to live with a simplicity which is far from customary among the rich. 4. I owe it to my great-grandfather that I did not attend public lectures and discussions, but had good and able teachers at home; and I owe him also the knowledge that for things of this nature a man should count no expense too great. 5. My tutor taught me not to favour either green or blue at the chariot races, nor, in the contests of gladiators, to be a supporter either of light or heavy armed. He taught me also to endure labour; not to need many things; to serve myself without troubling others; not to intermeddle in the affairs of others, and not easily to listen to slanders against them. 6. Of Diognetus I had the lesson not to busy myself about vain things; not to credit the great professions of such as pretend to work wonders, or of sorcerers about their charms, and their expelling of Demons and the like; not to keep quails (for fighting or divination), nor to run after such things; to suffer freedom of speech in others, and to apply myself heartily to philosophy. Him also I must thank for my hearing first Bacchius, then Tandasis and Marcianus; that I wrote dialogues in my youth, and took a liking to the philosopher’s pallet and skins, and to the other things which, by the Grecian discipline, belong to that profession. 7. To Rusticus I owe my first apprehensions that my nature needed reform and cure; and that I did not fall into the ambition of the common Sophists, either by composing speculative writings or by declaiming harangues of exhortation in public; further, that I never strove to be admired by ostentation of great patience in an ascetic life, or by display of activity and application; that I gave over the study of rhetoric, poetry, and the graces of language; and that I did not pace my house in my senatorial robes, or practise any similar affectation. I observed also the simplicity of style in his letters, particularly in that which he wrote to my mother from Sinuessa. I learned from him to be easily appeased, and to be readily reconciled with those who had displeased me or given cause of offence, so soon as they inclined to make their peace; to read with care; not to rest satisfied with a slight and superficial knowledge; nor quickly to assent to great talkers. I have him to thank that I met with the discourses of Epictetus, which he furnished me from his own library. 8. From Apollonius I learned true liberty, and tenacity of purpose; to regard nothing else, even in the smallest degree, but reason always; and always to remain unaltered in the agonies of pain, in the losses of children, or in long diseases. He afforded me a living example of how the same man can, upon occasion, be most yielding and most inflexible. He was patient in exposition; and, as might well be seen, esteemed his fine skill and ability in teaching others the principles of philosophy as the least of his endowments. It was from him that I learned how to receive from friends what are thought favours without seeming humbled by the giver or insensible to the gift. 9. Sextus was my pattern of a benign temper, and his family the model of a household governed by true paternal affection, and a steadfast purpose of living according to nature. Here I could learn to be grave without affectation, to observe sagaciously the several dispositions and inclinations of my friends, to tolerate the ignorant and those who follow current opinions without examination. His conversation showed how a man may accommodate himself to all men and to all companies; for though companionship with him was sweeter and more pleasing than any sort of flattery, yet he was at the same time highly respected and reverenced. No man was ever more happy than he in comprehending, finding out, and arranging in exact order the great maxims necessary for the conduct of life. His example taught me to suppress even the least appearance of anger or any other passion; but still, with all this perfect tranquillity, to possess the tenderest and most affectionate heart; to be apt to approve others yet without noise; to have much learning and little ostentation. 10. I learned from Alexander the Grammarian to avoid censuring others, to refrain from flouting them for a barbarism, solecism, or any false pronunciation. Rather was I dexterously to pronounce the words rightly in my answer, confining approval or objection to the matter itself, and avoiding discussion of the expression, or to use some other form of courteous suggestion. 11. Fronto made me sensible how much of envy, deceit and hypocrisy surrounds princes; and that generally those whom we account nobly born have somehow less natural affection. 12. I learned from Alexander the Platonist not often nor without great necessity to say, or write to any man in a letter, that I am not at leisure; nor thus, under pretext of urgent affairs, to make a practice of excusing myself from the duties which, according to our various ties, we owe to those with whom we live. 13. Of Catulus I learned not to condemn any friend’s expostulation even though it were unjust, but to try to recall him to his former disposition; to stint no praise in speaking of my masters, as is recounted of Domitius and Athenodorus; and to love my children with true affection. 14. Of Severus, my brother, I learned to love my kinsmen, to love truth, to love justice. Through him I came to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, and Brutus. He gave me my first conception of a Commonwealth founded upon equitable laws and administered with equality of right; and of a Monarchy whose chief concern is the freedom of its subjects. Of him I learned likewise a constant and harmonious devotion to Philosophy; to be ready to do good, to be generous with all my heart. He taught me to be of good hope and trustful of the affection of my friends. I observed in him candour in declaring what he condemned in the conduct of others; and so frank and open was his behaviour, that his friends might easily see without the trouble of conjecture what he liked or disliked.