Think Forward.

L’ombre du nihilisme dans le discours politique marocain 1067

Suite à mon article précédent paru dans l’ODJ, sur le nihilisme ambiant au Maroc et ses conséquences désastreuses, un ami m’a fait remarquer que je n’avais pas suffisamment illustré comment le langage politique pouvait nourrir et entretenir une ambiance délétère, une ambiance de malaise, voire de mal être. Je viens donc ici m’exercer à combler cette lacune en proposant un exemple concret et risquer une analyse plus approfondie. Le langage politique nihiliste a une véritable histoire au Maroc. Dans les années 1960 et 1970, une gauche marocaine subversive exploitait un vocabulaire puissant pour dénoncer ce qu’elle appelait : la « corruption », la « dictature » et l'« istibdad » (الاستبداد, « tyrannie »). Ces mots cristallisaient une profonde rupture entre l’État et une partie de la population, instaurant un climat de méfiance et de rejet. L’enrichissement personnel et l’entrepreneuriat étaient alors perçus négativement, associés à l’exploitation des travailleurs. L’enrichissement était systématiquement assimilé au vol et au détournement de fonds publics devant revenir à tous. Dans les années 1990, ce discours a été remplacé sur le terrain par celui de l’islam politique. Les islamistes ont introduit une morale religieuse « stricte » qu’ils présentent habilement comme salutaire, comme nouveau standard, dénonçant la corruption et les maux sociaux par le terme générique « alfassad » (الفساد). Ce vocable vague, mais lourd de connotations négatives, est utilisé pour condamner sans nuance toute manifestation jugée déviante au sens de la morale islamiste, installant un climat général de suspicion et de peur. Ils n’hésitent pas à convoquer des mythes invérifiables sur les comportements d’ancêtres, auxquels ils accordent toutes les vertus. En réalité, ils cherchent à se positionner comme leur réincarnation. Nombreux sont les exemples contemporains de langage nihiliste dans le discours politique marocain utilisant des expressions vagues mais à très fort impact politique et social. Le regard décrypté sur le langage politique marocain contemporain montre comment certains termes et expressions contribuent à ancrer un nihilisme destructeur. Dans le débat public actuel, ce vocabulaire persiste, alimentant le fatalisme. Par exemple, certains responsables politiques insistent sur une hypothétique faiblesse structurelle du pays en utilisant un discours centré sur la « faillite » économique, la « corruption envahissante » et un « système bloqué ». Ces expressions, sans nuance, réduisent le Maroc à un échec chronique, occultant les progrès réels et les avancées plus que palpables. On retrouve ce style dans les critiques répétées concernant les services publics de santé ou l’éducation notamment, perçus comme des «catastrophes » ou des « terrains d’échec systémique », alors que les données montrent une amélioration significative malgré les faiblesses. En fait, il n’y a pas un seul exemple dans le monde où les gens sont à 100% satisfaits d’un quelconque système de santé. Un exemple est le discours populiste islamiste des années 2010-2020, qui s’est souvent présenté comme le « sauveur » moral face à la « corruption » généralisée, utilisant la peur et la stigmatisation pour mobiliser. C'est ou "nous" ou la débâcle. Ce discours, bien qu’émotionnellement fort, a fini par exacerber la crise politique en alimentant la défiance généralisée, envers toutes les institutions politiques. Le terme « alfassad » (الفساد) était omniprésent dans ce lexique, utilisé pour qualifier tout opposant ou acteur social dans des termes négatifs non spécifiques, renforçant un sentiment d’impuissance collective. En filigrane, il allait jusqu'à désigner les institutions pour responsables. Ce langage n’est pas sans conséquences. Ce type d’usage du langage politique produit un cercle vicieux. En stigmatisant sans proposer de solutions concrètes, en calant les oppositions dans des catégories morales polarisantes, il mine la confiance des citoyens dans leurs institutions. La jeunesse se désengage désemparée, tandis que l’entrepreneuriat et l’investissement pâtissent d’un climat méfiant. Est alors arrivée la Constitution de 2011 comme point de rupture avec une époque révolue. On pouvait penser et surtout espérer que le langage allait évoluer et qu’enfin on allait aussi changer de lexique. Le parti arrivé en tête des élections en 2011 a eu dix ans de gouvernement mais n’a pu se détacher de ses réflexes anciens. Le chef de gouvernement lui-même n’est pas parvenu à se dégager d’un certain langage d’opposant. L’approche radicale consistant à réduire le Maroc à un État « en faillite », à un système « corrompu jusqu’à la moelle » ou à une société « désabusée » détourne l’attention des marges de progrès et d’innovations réelles. Cela favorise la résignation et la paralysie collectives, caractéristique majeure d’un nihilisme politique qui avance masqué, derrière un vocabulaire anxiogène. Un tel langage séduit et cristallise facilement les esprits. La sortie de la génération Z est là pour responsabiliser les hommes politiques marocains. Plutôt que d’exploiter la grogne et jouer aux héros, comme tentent de le faire certains, il convient de se comporter en hommes et femmes responsables. L’urgence est d’aller vers un autre langage politique véritablement responsable et constructif. Seule une évolution vers un discours lucide mais positif peut espérer inverser cette tendance lourde. Pour dépasser ce nihilisme, il est crucial que les élites politiques abandonnent le vocabulaire de la stigmatisation et adoptent un discours plus équilibré. Ils se doivent de reconnaître les difficultés sans annihiler l’espoir, valoriser les avancées et proposer des solutions concrètes aux insuffisances, voilà le chemin pour rétablir la confiance. Le Maroc a besoin d’un langage politique responsable, constructif et mobilisateur, capable de réconcilier la population avec l’État et de stimuler l’engagement citoyen dans le cadre constitutionnel et dans le respect des institutions. C’est cela aussi l’État de droit où chacun s’acquitte de ses responsabilités, les citoyens en tête, car finalement les institutions et les partis politiques sont aussi constitués de citoyens.
Aziz Daouda Aziz Daouda

Aziz Daouda

Directeur Technique et du Développement de la Confédération Africaine d'Athlétisme. Passionné du Maroc, passionné d'Afrique. Concerné par ce qui se passe, formulant mon point de vue quand j'en ai un. Humaniste, j'essaye de l'être, humain je veux l'être. Mon histoire est intimement liée à l'athlétisme marocain et mondial. J'ai eu le privilège de participer à la gloire de mon pays .


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THE ENCHIRIDION - I 3433

There are things which are within our power, and there are things which are beyond our power. Within our power are opinion, aim, desire, aversion, and, in one word, whatever affairs are our own. Beyond our power are body, property, reputation, office, and, in one word, whatever are not properly our own affairs. Now the things within our power are by nature free, unrestricted, unhindered; but those beyond our power are weak, dependent, restricted, alien. Remember, then, that if you attribute freedom to things by nature dependent and take what belongs to others for your own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will find fault both with gods and men. But if you take for your own only that which is your own and view what belongs to others just as it really is, then no one will ever compel you, no one will restrict you; you will find fault with no one, you will accuse no one, you will do nothing against your will; no one will hurt you, you will not have an enemy, nor will you suffer any harm. Aiming, therefore, at such great things, remember that you must not allow yourself any inclination, however slight, toward the attainment of the others; but that you must entirely quit some of them, and for the present postpone the rest. But if you would have these, and possess power and wealth likewise, you may miss the latter in seeking the former; and you will certainly fail of that by which alone happiness and freedom are procured. Seek at once, therefore, to be able to say to every unpleasing semblance, “You are but a semblance and by no means the real thing.” And then examine it by those rules which you have; and first and chiefly by this: whether it concerns the things which are within our own power or those which are not; and if it concerns anything beyond our power, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you.

THE ADVENTURES OF TOM SAWYER - PREFACE 3587

Most of the adventures recorded in this book really occurred; one or two were experiences of my own, the rest those of boys who were schoolmates of mine. Huck Finn is drawn from life; Tom Sawyer also, but not from an individual—he is a combination of the characteristics of three boys whom I knew, and therefore belongs to the composite order of architecture. The odd superstitions touched upon were all prevalent among children and slaves in the West at the period of this story—that is to say, thirty or forty years ago. Although my book is intended mainly for the entertainment of boys and girls, I hope it will not be shunned by men and women on that account, for part of my plan has been to try to pleasantly remind adults of what they once were themselves, and of how they felt and thought and talked, and what queer enterprises they sometimes engaged in. THE AUTHOR. HARTFORD, 1876.

THE MEDITATIONS - Book I.[1/3] 3701

1. I learned from my grandfather, Verus, to use good manners, and to put restraint on anger. 2. In the famous memory of my father I had a pattern of modesty and manliness. 3. Of my mother I learned to be pious and generous; to keep myself not only from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and to live with a simplicity which is far from customary among the rich. 4. I owe it to my great-grandfather that I did not attend public lectures and discussions, but had good and able teachers at home; and I owe him also the knowledge that for things of this nature a man should count no expense too great. 5. My tutor taught me not to favour either green or blue at the chariot races, nor, in the contests of gladiators, to be a supporter either of light or heavy armed. He taught me also to endure labour; not to need many things; to serve myself without troubling others; not to intermeddle in the affairs of others, and not easily to listen to slanders against them. 6. Of Diognetus I had the lesson not to busy myself about vain things; not to credit the great professions of such as pretend to work wonders, or of sorcerers about their charms, and their expelling of Demons and the like; not to keep quails (for fighting or divination), nor to run after such things; to suffer freedom of speech in others, and to apply myself heartily to philosophy. Him also I must thank for my hearing first Bacchius, then Tandasis and Marcianus; that I wrote dialogues in my youth, and took a liking to the philosopher’s pallet and skins, and to the other things which, by the Grecian discipline, belong to that profession. 7. To Rusticus I owe my first apprehensions that my nature needed reform and cure; and that I did not fall into the ambition of the common Sophists, either by composing speculative writings or by declaiming harangues of exhortation in public; further, that I never strove to be admired by ostentation of great patience in an ascetic life, or by display of activity and application; that I gave over the study of rhetoric, poetry, and the graces of language; and that I did not pace my house in my senatorial robes, or practise any similar affectation. I observed also the simplicity of style in his letters, particularly in that which he wrote to my mother from Sinuessa. I learned from him to be easily appeased, and to be readily reconciled with those who had displeased me or given cause of offence, so soon as they inclined to make their peace; to read with care; not to rest satisfied with a slight and superficial knowledge; nor quickly to assent to great talkers. I have him to thank that I met with the discourses of Epictetus, which he furnished me from his own library. 8. From Apollonius I learned true liberty, and tenacity of purpose; to regard nothing else, even in the smallest degree, but reason always; and always to remain unaltered in the agonies of pain, in the losses of children, or in long diseases. He afforded me a living example of how the same man can, upon occasion, be most yielding and most inflexible. He was patient in exposition; and, as might well be seen, esteemed his fine skill and ability in teaching others the principles of philosophy as the least of his endowments. It was from him that I learned how to receive from friends what are thought favours without seeming humbled by the giver or insensible to the gift. 9. Sextus was my pattern of a benign temper, and his family the model of a household governed by true paternal affection, and a steadfast purpose of living according to nature. Here I could learn to be grave without affectation, to observe sagaciously the several dispositions and inclinations of my friends, to tolerate the ignorant and those who follow current opinions without examination. His conversation showed how a man may accommodate himself to all men and to all companies; for though companionship with him was sweeter and more pleasing than any sort of flattery, yet he was at the same time highly respected and reverenced. No man was ever more happy than he in comprehending, finding out, and arranging in exact order the great maxims necessary for the conduct of life. His example taught me to suppress even the least appearance of anger or any other passion; but still, with all this perfect tranquillity, to possess the tenderest and most affectionate heart; to be apt to approve others yet without noise; to have much learning and little ostentation. 10. I learned from Alexander the Grammarian to avoid censuring others, to refrain from flouting them for a barbarism, solecism, or any false pronunciation. Rather was I dexterously to pronounce the words rightly in my answer, confining approval or objection to the matter itself, and avoiding discussion of the expression, or to use some other form of courteous suggestion. 11. Fronto made me sensible how much of envy, deceit and hypocrisy surrounds princes; and that generally those whom we account nobly born have somehow less natural affection. 12. I learned from Alexander the Platonist not often nor without great necessity to say, or write to any man in a letter, that I am not at leisure; nor thus, under pretext of urgent affairs, to make a practice of excusing myself from the duties which, according to our various ties, we owe to those with whom we live. 13. Of Catulus I learned not to condemn any friend’s expostulation even though it were unjust, but to try to recall him to his former disposition; to stint no praise in speaking of my masters, as is recounted of Domitius and Athenodorus; and to love my children with true affection. 14. Of Severus, my brother, I learned to love my kinsmen, to love truth, to love justice. Through him I came to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, and Brutus. He gave me my first conception of a Commonwealth founded upon equitable laws and administered with equality of right; and of a Monarchy whose chief concern is the freedom of its subjects. Of him I learned likewise a constant and harmonious devotion to Philosophy; to be ready to do good, to be generous with all my heart. He taught me to be of good hope and trustful of the affection of my friends. I observed in him candour in declaring what he condemned in the conduct of others; and so frank and open was his behaviour, that his friends might easily see without the trouble of conjecture what he liked or disliked.