Think Forward.

DRACULA - CHAPTER I JONATHAN HARKER’S JOURNAL [1/5] 2469

Bluwr X Commons: Bram Stoker, 2 y.
4 min read.
(Kept in shorthand.) 3 May. Bistritz.—Left Munich at 8:35 P. M., on 1st May, arriving at Vienna early next morning; should have arrived at 6:46, but train was an hour late. Buda-Pesth seems a wonderful place, from the glimpse which I got of it from the train and the little I could walk through the streets. I feared to go very far from the station, as we had arrived late and would start as near the correct time as possible. The impression I had was that we were leaving the West and entering the East; the most western of splendid bridges over the Danube, which is here of noble width and depth, took us among the traditions of Turkish rule. We left in pretty good time, and came after nightfall to Klausenburgh. Here I stopped for the night at the Hotel Royale. I had for dinner, or rather supper, a chicken done up some way with red pepper, which was very good but thirsty. (Mem., get recipe for Mina.) I asked the waiter, and he said it was called “paprika hendl,” and that, as it was a national dish, I should be able to get it anywhere along the Carpathians. I found my smattering of German very useful here; indeed, I don’t know how I should be able to get on without it. Having had some time at my disposal when in London, I had visited the British Museum, and made search among the books and maps in the library regarding Transylvania; it had struck me that some foreknowledge of the country could hardly fail to have some importance in dealing with a nobleman of that country. I find that the district he named is in the extreme east of the country, just on the borders of three states, Transylvania, Moldavia and Bukovina, in the midst of the Carpathian mountains; one of the wildest and least known portions of Europe. I was not able to light on any map or work giving the exact locality of the Castle Dracula, as there are no maps of this country as yet to compare with our own Ordnance Survey maps; but I found that Bistritz, the post town named by Count Dracula, is a fairly well-known place. I shall enter here some of my notes, as they may refresh my memory when I talk over my travels with Mina. In the population of Transylvania there are four distinct nationalities: Saxons in the South, and mixed with them the Wallachs, who are the descendants of the Dacians; Magyars in the West, and Szekelys in the East and North. I am going among the latter, who claim to be descended from Attila and the Huns. This may be so, for when the Magyars conquered the country in the eleventh century they found the Huns settled in it. I read that every known superstition in the world is gathered into the horseshoe of the Carpathians, as if it were the centre of some sort of imaginative whirlpool; if so my stay may be very interesting. (Mem., I must ask the Count all about them.) I did not sleep well, though my bed was comfortable enough, for I had all sorts of queer dreams. There was a dog howling all night under my window, which may have had something to do with it; or it may have been the paprika, for I had to drink up all the water in my carafe, and was still thirsty. Towards morning I slept and was wakened by the continuous knocking at my door, so I guess I must have been sleeping soundly then. I had for breakfast more paprika, and a sort of porridge of maize flour which they said was “mamaliga,” and egg-plant stuffed with forcemeat, a very excellent dish, which they call “impletata.” (Mem., get recipe for this also.) I had to hurry breakfast, for the train started a little before eight, or rather it ought to have done so, for after rushing to the station at 7:30 I had to sit in the carriage for more than an hour before we began to move. It seems to me that the further east you go the more unpunctual are the trains. What ought they to be in China? All day long we seemed to dawdle through a country which was full of beauty of every kind. Sometimes we saw little towns or castles on the top of steep hills such as we see in old missals; sometimes we ran by rivers and streams which seemed from the wide stony margin on each side of them to be subject to great floods. It takes a lot of water, and running strong, to sweep the outside edge of a river clear. At every station there were groups of people, sometimes crowds, and in all sorts of attire. Some of them were just like the peasants at home or those I saw coming through France and Germany, with short jackets and round hats and home-made trousers; but others were very picturesque. The women looked pretty, except when you got near them, but they were very clumsy about the waist. They had all full white sleeves of some kind or other, and most of them had big belts with a lot of strips of something fluttering from them like the dresses in a ballet, but of course there were petticoats under them. The strangest figures we saw were the Slovaks, who were more barbarian than the rest, with their big cow-boy hats, great baggy dirty-white trousers, white linen shirts, and enormous heavy leather belts, nearly a foot wide, all studded over with brass nails. They wore high boots, with their trousers tucked into them, and had long black hair and heavy black moustaches. They are very picturesque, but do not look prepossessing. On the stage they would be set down at once as some old Oriental band of brigands. They are, however, I am told, very harmless and rather wanting in natural self-assertion. It was on the dark side of twilight when we got to Bistritz, which is a very interesting old place. Being practically on the frontier—for the Borgo Pass leads from it into Bukovina—it has had a very stormy existence, and it certainly shows marks of it. Fifty years ago a series of great fires took place, which made terrible havoc on five separate occasions. At the very beginning of the seventeenth century it underwent a siege of three weeks and lost 13,000 people, the casualties of war proper being assisted by famine and disease. Count Dracula had directed me to go to the Golden Krone Hotel, which I found, to my great delight, to be thoroughly old-fashioned, for of course I wanted to see all I could of the ways of the country. I was evidently expected, for when I got near the door I faced a cheery-looking elderly woman in the usual peasant dress—white undergarment with long double apron, front, and back, of coloured stuff fitting almost too tight for modesty. When I came close she bowed and said, “The Herr Englishman?” “Yes,” I said, “Jonathan Harker.” She smiled, and gave some message to an elderly man in white shirt-sleeves, who had followed her to the door. He went, but immediately returned with a letter:— “My Friend.—Welcome to the Carpathians. I am anxiously expecting you. Sleep well to-night. At three to-morrow the diligence will start for Bukovina; a place on it is kept for you. At the Borgo Pass my carriage will await you and will bring you to me. I trust that your journey from London has been a happy one, and that you will enjoy your stay in my beautiful land.
Bluwr X Commons: Bram Stoker

Bluwr X Commons: Bram Stoker

Abraham Stoker (8 November 1847 – 20 April 1912) was an Irish author, his novel ‘Dracula’ is regarded as one of the most recognizable works of English literature.


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Jacob Zuma’s Visit to Morocco Sparks Diplomatic Shake-up Over Moroccan Sahara Conflict 104

Aziz Daouda, 4 h.
The visit of Jacob Zuma to the Kingdom of Morocco triggered a desperate diplomatic response from the Polisario Front in South Africa, marking a significant political upheaval around the Moroccan Sahara conflict. Since then, the Polisario and its patron have shown nervousness reflecting a loss of influence even in African regions previously aligned with separatist positions. But who is this man whose words have caused such turmoil and dismay? Jacob Zuma is a South African statesman. He is a former anti-apartheid fighter imprisoned for ten years on the notorious Robben Island. Supported by the African National Congress (ANC), he rose through political ranks to become Vice-President of South Africa from 1999 to 2005, then President from 2009 to 2018, succeeding Thabo Mbeki. Zuma also served as ANC president from 2007 to 2017. Despite legal troubles and leaving the presidency, he maintains serious political weight, notably through the uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) party he now leads, which became the third-largest political force in South Africa after the May 2024 elections. Therefore, Zuma is not just any South African speaking on such an important issue for the continent and world. On July 15, 2025, in Rabat, on behalf of himself and the MK party, Zuma took an unambiguous stance supporting Morocco, breaking with Pretoria's relatively recent official line. He called Morocco's autonomy proposal a "pragmatic and balanced solution," guaranteeing Moroccan sovereignty over its southern provinces while offering substantial local governance to the populations. This position, officially supported by MK, represents a dramatic turnaround in South Africa and the region. Until now, South Africa backed the puppet Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and the Polisario Front, framed as pan-African solidarity against colonization, consistent with Algeria's ideological stance. The argument for separatism artificially tied to Morocco's southern provinces ignores that Spanish colonization in this integral part of the Cherifian Empire lasted about 91 years (1884–1975), when Spain declared a protectorate over the Western Sahara region and governed it until its 1975 withdrawal under the Madrid Agreement with Morocco. Since Nelson Mandela's death, South Africa had quickly sided with Algeria's vision of an independent state between Mauritania and Morocco, overlooking Morocco's historic support for South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle. In reaction to Zuma's recent statements in Rabat, where he explicitly supported Morocco's autonomy plan for Western Sahara, the Polisario swiftly sent its Foreign Minister Mohamed Yeslem Beissat to Pretoria. This move comes amid tense diplomacy and a major shift in South African policy on the formerly Spanish Sahara. Until then, all political forces in the country were aligned with the government’s position. Panicked, the Polisario dispatched a delegation led by Beissat, who knows the field well after years representing the entity, officially invited by the ANC under Cyril Ramaphosa to attend a "liberation movements summit" in Pretoria from July 25 to 28. This summit, themed "Defending liberation gains, promoting integrated socio-economic development, and strengthening solidarity for a better Africa," also gathers other supporters of similar causes like Palestinian Jebril Rajoub, allied with Algeria and Polisario. The event, organized by the South African embassy in Algiers, aims solely to back separatist positions and offer support. The ANC quickly condemned Zuma's support for Western Sahara's Moroccan sovereignty on principle, accusing him of betrayal and dissidence after his split from the party. However, not all ANC factions still adhere strictly to Ramaphosa's official line. Many ANC leaders now recognize that siding with Algeria’s unproductive position has been a significant loss for their country. The influence of Zuma, a powerful political figure, has forced the Polisario and its patron to coordinate their response amid the new diplomatic dynamics intensified by his backing of Morocco. This diplomatic earthquake happens as several African states have progressively withdrawn recognition of the SADR in favor of the Moroccan plan, potentially further isolating the Polisario and Algeria continentally. During his visit, Zuma reminded the historical role Morocco played in the anti-apartheid struggle, seemingly lamenting his country's unexpected post-Mandela shift. He advocated for a strategic alliance based on respecting African states' territorial integrity, moving away from separatist support—a pragmatic stance shared by many South African officials. A rapprochement between Morocco and South Africa, the only African countries with truly industrial and diversified economies, could benefit both powers and the continent as a whole. The era of imported ideologies serving as democratic facades for military dictatorships is over and no longer effective. Thus, the Polisario minister’s visit to Pretoria appears a desperate attempt to limit the impact of a shift that could deeply transform political balances in Southern Africa and accelerate Morocco’s strengthening continental and international position

Between Ideology and Pragmatism: The Spanish Radical Left's Controversial Stance on Moroccan Sahara... 455

Aziz Daouda, 3 d.
I confess here that it was the writings of Si Lahcen Hadad that pushed me to take a closer interest in this Spanish left, which positions itself in opposition to the Sánchez government, which is itself left-wing. Not reading Spanish, I am therefore somewhat less inclined to pay attention to the repeated ignominies of this left, sick from not being able to access power, sick from its aborted history, sick from what it actually is. So, to exist, it invented a cause. Too bad if it understands nothing about it, too bad if it harms Spain’s interests, too bad if it distorts history, ignores geography and demography, too bad if its reasoning, if it is reasoning at all, is far from logical, too bad if it lies outrageously. The important thing is to exist and to appear to the Spanish public as the defender of the causes of the most deprived... No matter if those people harmed the Spanish people; no matter if they have Spanish blood on their hands. Manifest bad faith. In Spain, therefore, a significant part of the radical left, mainly represented by formations such as Unidas Podemos, an alliance between Podemos, Izquierda Unida, and other minority groups, maintains a posture—let’s say critical, if not belligerent—towards the Kingdom of Morocco. This contradictory position is fed by a historical prism marked by colonial memory, “anti-imperialist” struggles, but also by the question of the Sahara, called the "Spanish Sahara" until 1975, as it was a former territory under Spanish domination until the Green March in 1975. This radical left considers Morocco a belligerent and threatening actor. The debate is not limited to territorial disputes: it fits into an ideological vision where the Moroccan state is often presented as an authoritarian and repressive regime, described as a neocolonial power. This is what underpins the repeated support for the artificial Sahrawi cause, presented as an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist fight. Support for the Polisario Front thus seems embedded in the DNA of these “gauchos,” regardless of developments. Historically, several components of the Spanish left have expressed clear support for the Polisario Front, founded in 1973, which was nevertheless supported by Gaddafi, then hosted, supplied, and armed by the Algerian regime with the aim of harming Morocco’s interests. This support manifests itself in various forms: - Filing parliamentary motions in defense of the right to self-determination for this small part of the Sahara alone; - Participation in international pro-Polisario forums and associative networks that blindly support it, regardless of reports on the embezzlement of aid, rapes, and flagrant human rights abuses in Tindouf; - Pressure on the Spanish government and European institutions to recognize the political status of the Sahara, neglecting to mention that it was formerly occupied by their country, as a territory to be decolonized, in opposition to Morocco’s historical sovereignty. Even the autonomy proposal, well known in Spain, does not seem to satisfy them. However, it should be noted that this support comes in a context of strong internal contestation in Spain. Since the socialist government of Pedro Sánchez expressed its support in 2022 for the Moroccan autonomy plan, this radical position has somewhat fractured. This change reflects a pragmatic adaptation by some to the geopolitical, economic, and migratory realities that closely link the two countries. Faced with challenges related to managing migratory flows through the occupied enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as security and economic cooperation with the Kingdom of Morocco, the Spanish government has refocused its diplomacy. This has led to a gradual distancing of the left—but not the radical left—from the Polisario, thus marginalizing its influence on official policy. In this context, some voices within the radical left still try to persuade European institutions to keep pressure on Morocco, demanding that the so-called Western Sahara remain central to priorities to resolve an “unresolved colonial conflict.” Parliamentary groups and “pro-Sahrawi” NGOs continue to denounce bilateral agreements between Madrid and Rabat, refusing that the issue be sidelined in favor of a more “pragmatic” diplomacy. Spanish and European institutions, the theater of these ideological tensions, thus see the radical left forces seeking to have the question of the so-called Western Sahara recognized as a “state matter.” They denounce Moroccan control over this dossier and strongly contest the diplomatic normalization policies carried out by Madrid. This line reflects a deep political fracture, where post-colonial idealism and outdated self-determination claims clash head-on with political realism marked by the search for regional strategic balances. Support for the so-called Sahrawi cause is not without controversy. Activists, commentators, and victims have recalled that the Polisario Front was, in the past, involved in violent operations in Spanish territorial waters, causing the death of Spanish fishermen. These painful episodes resonate in Spanish public opinion and fuel a virulent critique of radical positions that support a movement with a past combining political struggle and violent actions. This memory weighs heavily in contemporary debate and is exploited by political forces opposed to these radical left positions, notably the Spanish right. The question of the Sahara, a territory that was Spanish for a time, remains an important point in relations between Spain and Morocco. However, current political, economic, and security realities push for pragmatic Spanish diplomacy, favorable to strengthened cooperation with Rabat, thus marginalizing the radical stance on both governmental and international stages. The historical legacy is here perfectly exploited for contemporary necessities in managing Ibero-Moroccan relations. Today, after consulting numerous articles and writings recounting the positions of this left of another era, I understand a little better Si Lahcen Hadad's fight on the subject, and even more so his sharp responses to the remarks of a certain Ignacio Cembrero, whom I now see only as a bland neurotic. Thank you, Si Lahcen. One question remains: why is the Moroccan left not more inclined to take a stand and strongly denounce the alienated stance of their Spanish counterparts?