Think Forward.

World Politics

South Africa: twilight of a model and recomposition of African leadership? 519

Aziz Daouda, 3 d.
- World Politics - Business -
2.9 min read.
For three decades, South Africa embodied the image of a modern, industrialized Africa reconciled with its history. The end of apartheid in 1994 raised immense hope. With Nelson Mandela, the country seemed to demonstrate that a peaceful transition between communities long opposed was possible. The assessment is now more nuanced. The country is going through a period of deep economic, social and institutional turbulence that calls into question its ability to retain its status as the continent’s leading power. The difficulties are not due simply to an unfavorable economic conjuncture, but reflect structural weaknesses that have gradually accumulated over the years. The economy, long considered the most developed in Africa, is struggling to regain its dynamism. Growth remains weak while unemployment reaches alarming levels. Statistics South Africa reports 32% for the overall rate and 45% among youth in 2025, fueling social frustrations and a sense of downward mobility. Added to this are persistent failures of infrastructure. Power cuts, difficulties in the rail network, deterioration of public services as well as governance problems in state-owned companies weigh heavily on the competitiveness of the economy. The country’s attractiveness to investors, who for a long time considered South Africa the natural gateway to the continent, is strongly affected. Economic indicators are not, however, sufficient to measure the scale of the current challenges. The security question constitutes one of the main concerns. With more than 27,000 homicides each year, or nearly 76 murders per day, it is one of the most violent countries. In Johannesburg, Pretoria or Durban, security is a real concern. Neighborhoods protected by sophisticated security systems are multiplying; Orania is the archetype. Companies devote large budgets to private security, hence a general climate of distrust further weakening national cohesion. Tensions also manifest themselves in recurring xenophobic violence. Migrants are accused of being the actors of insecurity and become the scapegoats of a social frustration fueled by economic difficulties. At the same time, a part of the white population expresses a growing feeling of marginalization. Debates around affirmative action policies, land reform and economic redistribution feed perceptions of injustice and exclusion. The country struggles to build a durable balance between historical redress, social justice and national cohesion. For many years, the African National Congress (ANC) benefited from immense political capital inherited from the struggle against apartheid. This historical credit has eroded. Corruption scandals have deeply marked public opinion. The work of the Zondo commission on "state capture" highlighted the extent of networks of influence that affected the functioning of the state and several strategic public companies. More and more South Africans now consider that the country’s current difficulties can no longer be explained solely by the legacy of the past. Questions of governance, administrative efficiency and public management now occupy a central place in the national debate. Recent electoral results, which forced the ANC to govern within a coalition, illustrate this progressive loss of political hegemony. For several decades, South Africa largely dominated the continent on industrial, financial and technological levels. Today, new growth poles are emerging. Morocco is the most significant example of this evolution. Thanks to a coherent industrial strategy, the Kingdom has established itself as a major player in the automotive, aeronautics, renewable energies and logistics sectors. The Tanger Med port is the leading port platform in Africa and the Mediterranean, linking the Kingdom to more than 180 international ports. Moroccan automobile exports have reached record levels. The country is now the most industrialized on the continent. This hurts Pretoria. This progress does not mean the replacement of South Africa. The two economies have different structures and many complementary strengths. It nevertheless illustrates a gradual rebalancing of the continent’s economic centers of gravity. South Africa’s difficulties raise a strategic question rarely addressed: where will capital, skills and talent seeking more stable environments go? Economic history shows that transition periods are often accompanied by movements of capital, know-how and investments toward economies offering the best prospects. In this context, Morocco has considerable assets: institutional stability, modern infrastructure, proximity to European markets, free trade agreements, an attractive regulatory framework and a long-term economic vision. The challenge for Rabat is not to take advantage of Pretoria’s difficulties but to position itself as the major platform of African growth in the twenty-first century. It would be premature to announce the irreversible decline of South Africa. The country retains considerable assets: a diversified economy, leading universities, a sophisticated financial sector, significant industrial infrastructure and remarkable human capital. However, the experience recalls a fundamental reality: no leadership is permanently acquired. Economic power does not rely only on past achievements; it depends on the quality of governance, security, innovation capacity and the confidence a country inspires in its own citizens as well as foreign investors. South Africa remains an essential actor on the continent, but the rise of Morocco and other emerging poles in West Africa shows that African leadership is entering a new phase. The question is not who will dominate the continent, but which countries will best meet the demands of competitiveness, stability and innovation to be the leaders of tomorrow. In this regard, Morocco appears as one of the main beneficiaries of the ongoing geoeconomic recompositions, progressively confirming its ambition to become the strategic center of African development in the twenty-first century. Better informed about the Kingdom, many South Africans would be tempted to undertake and, why not, settle there. Large companies are already present.

U.S.–Iran Agreement: A Ray of Hope in a Middle East Worn Out by War... 1115

Aziz Daouda, 7 d.
- World Politics -
2.5 min read.
The announcement of an agreement between Washington and Tehran is undoubtedly one of the most significant diplomatic developments in the Middle East in recent years. It is not, to be sure, a final settlement. The most sensitive questions remain unresolved, and the coming weeks will be decisive in turning this step into the durable framework of stability so widely hoped for. Nevertheless, the mere fact that both parties chose negotiation over escalation already constitutes a victory for reason. Reason is badly needed these days. In a region where crises seem to follow one another without pause, this development brings a breath of hope to populations exhausted by decades of tension, conflict, and uncertainty. Beyond strategic considerations, ordinary citizens always pay the heaviest price of geopolitical confrontations: inflation, economic slowdown, generalized insecurity and a loss of confidence in the future. Donald Trump, who made the denunciation of the 2015 nuclear deal a hallmark of his foreign policy, can now claim a significant diplomatic advance. Both his critics and his supporters acknowledge that opening a channel of dialogue with Iran had become necessary to avert the risk of regional conflagration. If this preliminary agreement leads to a broader settlement, it will be one of the major achievements of his return to the White House. But every diplomatic progress also creates winners and losers. Among the latter is undoubtedly Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. For several years his singular political strategy has relied heavily on the perception of a permanent existential threat that justifies ever‑harsher security policies. A détente between Washington and Tehran would substantially weaken that narrative. After the tragedies experienced in Gaza, the regional tensions and the growing fractures within Israeli society itself, Netanyahu’s political record may be judged harshly by his fellow citizens. Tens of thousands of victims, massive destruction and collective trauma will leave deep scars for generations. The fundamental question remains: what will be left of these wars once the ideological narratives that fueled them have faded? Another question is whether Israel is actually more secure after so much death and destruction in the region. Recent Middle Eastern history shows that military victories are often short‑lived while the human consequences endure. Hatred begets hatred. Attacks lead to reprisals. Bombings provoke counter‑bombings. Today’s humiliations become tomorrow’s conflicts. As long as extremists on all sides continue to impose their logic of confrontation, peace will remain fragile. Faced with this reality, Morocco has for decades offered a particularly relevant counter‑model. Under the leadership of His Majesty King Mohammed VI, the Kingdom has consistently preferred diplomacy, interfaith dialogue and negotiated solutions to regional crises. Whether through support for the Middle East peace process, chairing the Al‑Quds Committee, or the numerous initiatives that foster rapprochement between peoples, Morocco has persistently promoted moderation and coexistence. This Moroccan vision rests on a simple conviction: no lasting peace can be imposed by force alone. True security arises from dialogue, economic development, mutual respect and recognition of the dignity of all peoples. In an increasingly polarized international environment, this approach seems more relevant than ever. For more than fifty years Morocco has endured a permanently belligerent climate at its borders, yet it has not lost its composure nor ceased to call for dialogue. This is not a sign of weakness but rather an expression of steady and enduring strength. The U.S.–Iran agreement, imperfect as it may be, recalls a fundamental truth: when weapons fall silent, even temporarily, hope is reborn. Young generations across the Middle East — Iranian, Israeli, Palestinian, Lebanese and others — primarily aspire to live, study, work and build a better future. They cannot remain forever hostage to the political calculations of leaders who profit from division. For the moment, the world can breathe. Perhaps sleep a little easier. But the real question remains: for how long? The future will depend on the ability of the region’s peoples to favor builders of peace over merchants of war. Beyond national interests and strategic rivalries, one truth stands out: the Middle East finally deserves to turn the page on endless conflict. Faithful to its diplomatic tradition and its commitment to peace, Morocco will doubtless continue to remind the world of a truth some sometimes forget: no victory is greater than the one that allows peoples to live together in stability, security and dignity. For now, let us all take a breath and pray. Today everyone asks why these wars happen and what they truly change on the ground or in history… Past wars certainly changed things; whether today’s will, remains uncertain.

Reward or Rehabilitation? Ban Ki‑moon Receives an Honour in Algiers That Raises Questions... 1115

Aziz Daouda, 7 d.
- World Politics -
2 min read.
The gesture spoke as loudly as the medal. When Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune presented a “prestigious medal,” one of the nation’s highest distinctions, to Mr. Ban Ki‑moon, former UN secretary‑general, it was not merely a ceremonial protocol. It was a political message, heavy with intent. The question is to whom that message was addressed, why, and why now. On substance, the gesture is therefore troubling. Ban Ki‑moon, whose UN tenure remains associated with sensitive episodes in the Sahara dossier, was being honoured by a government that continues to fuel regional tensions and sustain a conflict whose contours are highly politicized. More than the medal itself, it was the media reception, the diplomatic embraces, the chosen silences that revealed the strategy behind the move: offering moral and international endorsement capable of whitewashing a once‑contested posture. Is this recognition, even belated, for services rendered? The recipient did not merely accept the distinction; he went further, lavishing praise on President Tebboune, commending his “leadership” and his action for “world peace.” Those words — “WORLD PEACE” — echoed loudly. Local media rejoiced. Beyond their courteous tone, these remarks raise a legitimate question: what motivates a former international official to be thus associated with a regime engaged in continuous confrontational diplomacy? Is it an acceptance of a symbolic role, political ambiguity, or a simple personal opportunity? The answer deserves scrutiny. From the Algerian side, the operation appears explicitly calculated. In international politics, nothing is free. A decoration is an image instrument, an attempt at symbolic rehabilitation. Algiers seems intent on multiplying visible supports — international figures, media, ceremonies — to contest the isolation of a diplomatic discourse losing traction. The choice of Ban Ki‑moon, given his UN past and past tensions with Rabat, is therefore far from innocent. It rather feeds the idea of a political or ideological closeness that some observers had already whispered about. This sequence above all highlights a strategic weakness: a diplomacy more oriented toward staging than toward concrete crisis resolution. While Morocco consolidates its partnerships, develops its Southern provinces and accumulates international recognitions of its sovereignty, Algiers appears to invest in symbols and image operations — practices inherited from an era when influence was measured in protocol and grand declarations rather than deeds. But the world has changed. Public opinion and governments now judge states on their ability to build, stabilize and produce prosperity, not on their capacity to hand out decorations. Algeria’s strategy, based on recycling former international actors and seeking diplomatic varnish, seems outdated in the face of concrete development and regional integration challenges. The most acute question remains: why now? Why does Tebboune honour Ban Ki‑moon at this precise moment — to revive a diplomatic narrative, to send a signal to Morocco, to address the UN, or simply as a domestic PR operation intended to mask internal difficulties? The most likely hypothesis is that it is a mix of all three, an attempt at international display to compensate for a deficit of real influence. In any case, these symbolic gestures neither promote peace in North Africa nor foster the emergence of a shared regional future. Worse, they risk cementing sterile polarization: a diplomacy of stagecraft versus a diplomacy of action. And perhaps that is ultimately the most worrying aspect. Algiers does not seem to be changing, even when cornered by international pressure. It remains faithful to its passivity and lack of initiative and hides behind symbols — here a decoration that tastes more like a belated reward, but a reward nonetheless. Ban Ki‑moon shows here that he was not neutral in the Sahara affair... The question that remains is: who will be the next to be decorated?

World Cup 2026: Sovereignty Reclaims Its Legitimate Rights... 1130

Aziz Daouda, 7 d.
A few days ago I published an article titled “World Cup 2026: when states remind FIFA who really calls the shots.” I tried there to explain why a country’s sovereign laws cannot be overridden by the rules of an international association. Sovereignty and security are attributes of states and only of states. That the United States, in this case, refused entry on its soil to people who were supposed to participate in the FIFA World Cup is a decision solely for that country to make. President Infantino, powerless, will acquiesce and be forced to acknowledge the supremacy of American domestic law. He will need to remember that if, in 2030, Spain, Portugal or Morocco decide to impose specific visas or quotas on nationals of certain countries, or to deny entry to certain individuals. This time I was tempted to title the piece “When the United States reminds FIFA that it is only an association.” In the end I chose the headline you see at the top. In practice, this edition of the Football World Cup has become one of questioning principles, practices and habits long considered definitive and non‑negotiable. For years FIFA grew accustomed to imposing its conditions on countries hosting major competitions: tax exemptions, special legal regimes, administrative privileges, customs facilitation. Almost systematically, candidate states for hosting a World Cup often agreed to set aside part of their sovereignty to meet Zurich’s demands. But the United States has just reminded us of a fundamental truth: no private association, however powerful, stands above the laws of a sovereign state. The signals have multiplied in recent weeks: the case of the Somali referee turned away, the difficulties some delegations encountered obtaining visas, restrictions targeting supporters of several nationalities, limits on travel and stays imposed on Iranians, and Senegalese players confronted with the strictness of U.S. immigration and border controls. Each time the same conclusion is clear: American laws prevail over FIFA’s regulations. Today a new episode confirms that reality. In the United States, FIFA will have to pay taxes on income generated during the 2026 World Cup. A small revolution. Until now, FIFA typically demanded near‑total exemptions from host countries for its revenues. The billions of dollars generated by broadcast rights, marketing, partnerships and merchandise were largely shielded from national taxation before being transferred to the organization’s accounts in Switzerland. This time the scenario is different, and we must measure the symbolic weight of that decision. It means the United States regards FIFA not as an international organization or supranational institution, but simply as a private association conducting economic activity on American soil. Even Gianni Infantino — whose rise to the FIFA presidency owes much to the geopolitical balances that favored his candidacy — is discovering the limits of his power when faced with the American administration and the political will of President Donald Trump. The message is clear: American laws are non‑negotiable. This lesson deserves reflection from future host countries, notably Morocco, which will co‑host the 2030 World Cup with Spain and Portugal. Why should a sovereign state renounce legitimate tax revenues in favor of an organization already among the richest on the planet? I do not know the status of negotiations with FIFA for 2030, but the United States has opened our eyes and challenged decision‑makers in Spain, Portugal and Morocco about what rights to grant FIFA. Moroccan companies, Moroccan merchants, Moroccan employees and Moroccan taxpayers all meet their fiscal obligations. Should FIFA be exempt while it will be engaged in profitable economic activity here? The question must be asked plainly. When an economic activity generates income on Moroccan territory, it must contribute to financing the infrastructure, public services and investments that make hosting an event of this magnitude possible. That is the very basis of the social contract. The American example thus recalls an essential democratic principle: the internal rules of an international sporting federation can never override laws passed by a parliament representing the popular will. For too long, some international sports organizations have cultivated the idea that they constitute a sort of superior authority capable of imposing their norms on states. The United States has demonstrated the opposite. The World Cup belongs to FIFA. Sovereignty belongs to nations. If the two collide, national laws must prevail. That may be the most important political lesson already taught by World Cup 2026.

De Mistura's Visit to Algiers: The Final Curtain of a Narrative? 1916

Aziz Daouda, 14 d.
The brief stop by UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy for the Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, in Algiers and then Tindouf, was far from a routine diplomatic visit. Behind the standard communiqués and diplomatic smiles, this tour reveals a geopolitical reality increasingly difficult to conceal: the Algerian regime is now cornered by the shifting international balance of power over the Sahara issue. The visit is first and foremost symbolic because of its timing. As the first significant tour since 2025, it unfolds in a context utterly different from that of previous decades. For years, Algiers successfully imposed its narrative on this conflict: that of a supposed decolonization struggle pitting a “Sahrawi people” against Morocco, which Algeria labels the “occupier.” Yet this narrative is gradually collapsing under the weight of diplomatic, historical, and geostrategic realities. It is important to remember that this visit follows meetings in Madrid and Washington, where the four involved countries—including Algeria, of course—sat at the same table under U.S. auspices. The Trump administration seeks to swiftly end this artificial conflict and move on. In Tindouf, De Mistura visited camps maintained for nearly half a century outside international refugee law standards—a unique anomaly worldwide. The populations living there have never been registered, despite repeated requests from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Why this permanent refusal to register them? Because it would expose an embarrassing truth for Algiers: the diverse origins of camp inhabitants and the political instrumentalization of their situation. Among these populations coexist a minority of committed separatists, families trapped for decades, as well as individuals from Mauritania, the Sahel, and even some regions of Algeria itself. Maintaining demographic ambiguity has always been Algiers’ strategic tool to artificially amplify the human and political dimension of the conflict. Today, however, the international context has changed. The main turning point is clearly American. Since the United States recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over its Sahara, global diplomacy has gradually adopted a new framework. This recognition was not merely a gesture by the Trump administration; it has become a lasting geopolitical fact, reinforced by U.S. strategic continuity and the growing support of several international powers for Morocco’s autonomy plan. This is precisely where Algeria’s stance becomes extremely difficult—explaining the inconsistency in the recent positions and rhetoric of Algeria’s president and top diplomat. Support for the Polisario Front has never been just a diplomatic issue for Algiers. It currently stands as one of the foundational pillars of the country’s entire policy. Since the 1970s, perhaps even since the nation’s creation on July 5, 1962, the Algerian regime has built part of its regional and ideological legitimacy on fierce opposition to the Kingdom of Morocco—sometimes covert, sometimes overt and declared, especially since the rise of the Chengriha–Tebboune tandem. For Algeria’s leadership, the Sahara conflict is an internal political asset, a tool for nationalist mobilization, and a geostrategic lever in its rivalry with Rabat. Abandoning this issue would mean the regime acknowledging fifty years of strategic errors, colossal financial investments, and diplomatic manipulations. More seriously, it would signal the collapse of a historical narrative that long served as the cement of Algeria’s military power. Yet Washington now pushes for a realistic, pragmatic, and definitive solution. This solution has a precise name: autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. Facing this new reality, Algiers appears to have no real room for maneuver. Its official discourse still claims it “is not a party to the conflict,” even though everything proves the opposite: financing, arming, diplomatic management, political control of the camps, and direct appointment of Polisario leaders. The whole world knows this. The contradiction is becoming increasingly difficult to defend before the international community. Meanwhile, Morocco is reaping success after success. Diplomatically, the massive opening of consulates in the Southern provinces and the expanding international support for the autonomy plan demonstrate growing triumph. Economically, Laâyoune and Dakhla are transforming into investment hubs and gateways for African connectivity. On the security front, the Kingdom is establishing itself as a credible and stable partner amid Sahelian turbulence. The contrast is striking. On one side, Morocco builds, invests, secures, and projects a continental strategic vision. On the other, Algeria remains trapped in a Cold War-era confrontation logic, even as it faces increasingly visible economic, social, and geopolitical fragilities. De Mistura’s visit thus illustrates less a revival of the political process than a phase of historical transition. Time now clearly favors Morocco. International balances have shifted. Today, major powers prioritize regional stability, counterterrorism, and concrete economic partnerships over old ideological frameworks. The international community is more convinced than ever that Algeria has offered nothing but perpetual confusion since the beginning. The real question is no longer whether the Sahara issue will evolve toward a solution under Moroccan sovereignty, but when Algiers will accept this reality and how the Algerian regime will politically manage this immense strategic retreat. This is the entire tragedy of Algeria’s leadership. It is almost impossible for it to exit a conflict it itself elevated to an identity and diplomatic foundation for nearly half a century—unless it undergoes radical changes at all levels, especially at the top of the military apparatus. It would require sacrificing an entire generation that knew only one doctrine: fuel an artificial conflict and make Morocco the classic enemy, the eternal enemy. Unfortunately for Algiers, it is now clear that this imaginary enemy has definitively won the game. Mr. Staffan de Mistura’s visit may well be the last of its kind in the region... The final curtain is imminent.

Un Security Council resolution 2797: a test of truth for Algeria... 2260

Aziz Daouda, 15 d.
Resolution 2797 of the UN Security Council has undeniably marked a turning point in the so‑called Sahara dossier. Morocco’s autonomy plan is no longer merely described as “serious and credible,” as in previous resolutions; it has become the central framework around which the international community now wishes to organize a political solution. This diplomatic shift is significant. It means that fifty years of Algeria’s strategy around the Polisario have reached a historical dead end. In a recent statement, Algeria’s foreign minister tried to present a near‑new narrative: Algeria as a peaceful country committed to dialogue and negotiations, while sidestepping his government’s core responsibility in this manufactured conflict. That new portrayal is surprising given the actual history of Moroccan‑Algerian relations since Algeria’s independence. For more than half a century Morocco has lived under constant security pressure on its eastern borders, forced to devote a substantial share of its resources to defense at the expense of many other sectors. The Sahara conflict has never been a simple confrontation between Rabat and the Polisario, as Attaf claims. In capitals around the world it is well known that the Polisario would not exist militarily, diplomatically, or financially without massive Algerian backing. The Tindouf camps are on Algerian soil, arms have historically come from Algiers, and Algerian diplomacy has made this file the cornerstone of its foreign policy since the 1970s. Recent UN resolutions implicitly acknowledge Algeria’s decisive role in the conflict by linking it directly to the political process. The history of relations between the two countries largely explains the distrust that animates Morocco. From the moment of Algerian independence, border tensions surfaced quickly despite the considerable support Morocco had earlier given to Algeria’s anticolonial struggle. Moroccan territory had served as a rear base for the FLN; Algerian leaders found refuge, funding, and logistical support there. Yet barely independent, Algeria — aligned with the region’s military regimes — triggered the Sand War with Morocco in 1963. The logic of confrontation was thus firmly established and the rivalry became structural. The Algerian regime, built around military power, sought to assert itself as the region’s dominant force in the Maghreb and Africa. In that logic, Morocco appeared as a historic and strategic rival to be contained. The Sahara then became the ideal lever: a costly, interminable conflict was activated to wear down Morocco economically, diplomatically, and militarily. For decades Algiers invested billions of dollars in this confrontation. Significant hydrocarbon revenues were mobilized to fund a global diplomatic war, arm the Polisario, secure political backers, and sustain an expensive propaganda apparatus. Meanwhile, the peoples of North Africa paid the price: closed borders, stalled economic integration, and paralysed exchanges. Resolution 2797 therefore deeply changes the parameters of the dossier. The Security Council now regards Moroccan autonomy as “the most realistic and viable solution.” Major Western powers explicitly support this orientation. Even the abstentions by Russia and China reflect a notable evolution: no major power wished to oppose this new dynamic outright. Above all, the resolution marks a major diplomatic and strategic shift that places the Moroccan plan at the centre of the political process. For Morocco, this development represents a considerable diplomatic victory won after decades of effort and patience. The Kingdom multiplied economic partnerships across Africa, strengthened its Western alliances, and rapidly developed the Southern provinces. Roads, ports, energy investments, sports infrastructure and industrial projects have transformed the region. This momentum gradually convinced many states that regional stability now requires a pragmatic solution founded on Moroccan sovereignty. Algeria, for its part, now appears to be seeking an honorable way out. But one question remains: can the page be turned so easily if Algeria does not acknowledge its historical responsibility in a conflict that has deeply destabilised the region? For many Moroccans the issue is not only territorial; it is also memorial and strategic. The wounds accumulated since the mass expulsions of Moroccans from Algeria in 1975, the permanent military tensions, the closed borders, the near‑daily insulting rhetoric in Algerian state media toward the Kingdom, and the relentless diplomatic war feed deep resentment. Debates therefore regularly return to the question of moral, political and territorial reparations: compensation for lives lost, for resources swallowed by an imposed confrontation, for decades wasted by the entire Maghreb. Moroccans have not forgotten territories expropriated in favour of French Algeria. This is documented and archived. Behind the Sahara conflict lies the historical failure of Maghreb integration. The future will now hinge on Algiers’ ability to recognise and assume its responsibilities and to accept the new regional balance of power. The world is changing. States today seek stability, trade corridors, energy security and strategic cooperation. The “revolutionary” and ideological logics inherited from the Cold War have lost their influence. Where they prevailed they brought only misfortune. Morocco increasingly appears as a stable regional actor, connected to Europe, Africa and the Atlantic world. The current diplomatic dynamic favours it. But durable peace in the Maghreb will require more than a diplomatic victory. It will demand a genuine change of political doctrine in Algiers: abandonment of the confrontation paradigm, acceptance of the principle of reparations, recognition of new geopolitical realities, and the establishment of regional cooperation built on the interests of the peoples rather than the reflexes of a military apparatus. Ultimately, the real stake goes beyond the Sahara. It is whether the Maghreb can finally emerge from half a century of sterile rivalries to become a space of prosperity and collective power. That now depends on the Algerian people.

Algiers’ reversal on the Moroccan Sahara: a diplomatic admission or an awkward strategic repositioning? 4455

Aziz Daouda, 29 d.
The recent statement by Algeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Attaf, did not go unnoticed. The tone is solemn, the delivery measured and deliberate, and the emphasis pronounced. The moment appears serious. By asserting from the outset that his country’s objective has always been to promote negotiations between “the parties concerned”, namely, in his view, Morocco and the Polisario, while portraying Algeria as merely a neighboring observer alongside Mauritania, Attaf is clearly attempting to redefine his country’s role in the Sahara issue. This narrative, likely aimed at the Algerian public, contradicts reality. Algeria is indeed involved as a party, just like Mauritania. This stance raises many questions, as it conflicts not only with the rest of the statement but, more importantly, with decades of Algeria’s political, military, diplomatic, and logistical involvement in this artificial regional conflict, an involvement that is difficult to deny given the tangible evidence. Since the 1970s, Algeria has been the Polisario’s main supporter, arguably its only real backer. The separatist movement has benefited on Algerian soil from a political and military sanctuary in Tindouf, a fallback territory, financial support, substantial weaponry, and consistent diplomatic backing in international organizations. Polisario leaders even travel aboard aircraft bearing Algeria’s official insignia, something not even government ministers routinely do. For a long time, Algiers framed this involvement as simple support for the “right of peoples to self-determination.” Yet historical facts point to a much deeper commitment. The clashes of Amgala in 1976 are a revealing episode. Morocco captured Algerian soldiers there, including the well-known Chengriha, who were directly engaged alongside Polisario fighters, triggering serious tensions between the two countries. The question remains: what were they doing in Amgala? Hassan II would later address the matter. In this context, the current attempt to reduce Algeria’s role to that of an “observer” lacks credibility. No serious observer of the issue ignores that the Polisario depends entirely on Algerian support for its political and military survival. The international context has evolved significantly, and Algeria is becoming painfully aware of it. If this statement is being made now, it is likely no coincidence. The diplomatic balance of power is shifting in Morocco’s favor. The United States’ recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara in 2020 marked a major turning point. Since then, several influential countries have adopted positions increasingly aligned with Morocco’s autonomy plan, which a growing number of capitals now view as the most realistic and pragmatic solution. In this context, Algiers appears to be seeking, perhaps desperately, to disengage from a conflict that has become costly both diplomatically and economically. The multiplication of regional crises in the Sahel, in which Algeria is often implicated, tensions with several international partners, and internal economic difficulties have further weakened its position. Algeria is indeed facing a persistent internal crisis, marked by a fragile social and economic situation. Despite its substantial gas resources, the country struggles to convert this wealth into sustainable development. Inflation, periodic shortages, youth unemployment, and declining trust in institutions are fueling deep unease. While the war in Ukraine temporarily strengthened Algeria’s energy leverage vis-à-vis Europe, this advantage has diminished as Europe diversified its supply sources. In this context, maintaining a frozen conflict for nearly half a century represents a political and financial burden that is increasingly difficult to sustain. Morocco, meanwhile, continues to register economic and diplomatic successes, particularly in its southern provinces. The issue of Tindouf has become sensitive, irritating, and particularly embarrassing for Algiers. The camps remain one of the most problematic aspects of the dossier. For years, international voices have called for a precise census of the populations living there, a demand regularly supported by Morocco and consistently rejected by Algeria. From a legal standpoint, Tindouf constitutes a form of sequestration. The populations there do not enjoy the rights typically afforded to refugees. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that a significant portion of the camp populations are not originally from the Moroccan Sahara but come from other regions of the Sahel and from Algeria itself. The continued absence of an official census fuels questions about the demographic and security realities within the camps. For Algiers, this issue is all the more delicate given the sharp deterioration of the security environment in the Sahel, marked by the proliferation of armed groups, cross-border trafficking, and terrorist networks. Some even accuse Algeria of playing an ambiguous role in certain regional dynamics, particularly in light of recent developments in Mali, where elements of the Polisario have reportedly been involved. The recent evolution in Algerian rhetoric may be interpreted as an attempt to prepare for a post-Polisario phase. By seeking to reposition itself as a mere “observer,” Algiers appears intent on reducing its direct responsibility in a conflict whose diplomatic outcome seems increasingly unfavorable to separatist positions. For its part, Morocco, confident and composed, continues to promote its autonomy plan under Moroccan sovereignty as the sole and definitive solution. This proposal is gaining ground internationally, supported by active diplomacy and the opening of numerous consulates in Laayoune and Dakhla. The Kingdom now considers that any realistic solution must fall within this framework, effectively ruling out the referendum option, which has become impractical on the ground. Ahmed Attaf’s statement may therefore signal less a rupture than a transition, an imposed adjustment of Algeria’s official discourse in response to a shifting geopolitical reality. After decades of confrontation over the Sahara, Algeria seems to be acknowledging that the status quo is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. It remains to be seen whether this evolution will lead to genuine regional de-escalation or whether it is merely a tactical maneuver aimed at preserving appearances, as Algiers has so far appeared to favor a strategy of postponement. One thing, however, seems clear: the Sahara issue is entering a new phase, in which international power dynamics, regional security imperatives, and internal economic constraints will weigh more heavily than the ideological legacies of the Cold War.

Brahim Ghali, or the Art of Governing an Invisible Republic 5354

Aziz Daouda, 1 mon.
- World Politics - Politics -
2.1 min read.
Some letters must be read to grasp how painfully detached from reality those who long ago chose to flee it can be. The two-page letter Brahim Ghali sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 10 May 2026, in the English we all know, belongs to that fantastic strain of political literature that rewrites the world with the disarming conviction of someone who still believes the 1970s never ended. In this “solemn document,” dated from “Bir Lahlou”, a mythic location used more as an epistolary backdrop than as a real diplomatic capital, the Polisario leader denounces almost everyone. No one is spared: Morocco, the great powers, the Kingdom’s international supporters, the media, resolutions interpreted to suit his purposes, and probably tomorrow the Earth’s rotation around the Sun. What’s most striking about this “revolutionary” prose is the unfailing ability to speak as if the Polisario stood at the center of the world. It revives the old rhetorical reflexes of Third-Worldist movements preserved in ideological formalin: “occupation,” “colonialism,” “aggression,” “open war,” “international crime”… All that’s missing are a few Castro references, a Che quotation on a clandestine radio, and the clack of Soviet typewriters. Meanwhile, the real world keeps moving. Countries are recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara or openly backing Morocco’s autonomy plan. Even states that were traditionally cautious are taking positions with growing pragmatism. Major capitals now speak of investment, Atlantic corridors, regional stability and energy security. Yet in Tindouf, communiqués continue to be written as if the Berlin Wall were still standing. The text turns unintentionally comic when it accuses Morocco of “disinformation” while describing an almost planetary war that apparently only the Polisario’s authors, or their back office 1,824 kilometers away, can see. A war so intense that tourists are flocking to Dakhla, investments are booming in Laâyoune, and foreign consulates keep opening in the southern provinces. The contrast is striking. On one side, a Morocco building ports, roads, infrastructure, industrial zones and pursuing Atlantic ambitions. On the other, a separatist leadership still dispatching indignant letters to the UN in hopes of rebooting a diplomatic software even its former backers have started to uninstall. The most revealing passage may be where Brahim Ghali speaks of an “open war” while simultaneously calling for a return to a ceasefire his movement has repeatedly declared defunct since 2020. It’s circular logic worthy of the best absurdist sketches: the ceasefire is dead, yet we must return to what no longer exists so we can denounce who destroyed it, all while proclaiming we continue the war, a war that has not altered a single balance of power on the ground. In this letter, the Polisario resembles those ruined aristocrats who keep signing checks from an abandoned chateau with no funds. The tone is grandiose and the accusations thunderous, but behind the stagecraft lies a brutal fact: the political exhaustion of an apparatus that survives by diplomatic inertia rather than historical momentum. And then there is the constant obsession with Morocco. Everything revolves around the Kingdom. The Polisario lives against Morocco, speaks of Morocco, thinks of Morocco, accuses Morocco, dreams Morocco. While Rabat talks globalization, Atlantic Africa, the 2030 World Cup and economic integration, separatist leaders keep composing letters like forgotten resistants of a “revolution” History has already archived. That is, assuming Ghali actually wrote the letter, which he is incapable of doing. Everyone knows that too. The cruelest thing for Brahim Ghali may not be that the world proves him wrong. It is that the world is gradually, simply, stopping listening. That must be hard for him and his people... so let us pity these lost souls and laugh rather than condemn. If Nabyl Lahlou were still with us and had read these two pages, he would likely have imagined a play titled: Brahim Ghali, or the Art of Governing an Invisible Republic from an Imaginary Geography. He had a knack for the absurd.

Smara, the Polisario, and a Risky Undertaking… 6078

Aziz Daouda, 1 mon.
- World Politics -
3.3 min read.
Once again Smara, an emblematic city in southern Morocco, was targeted. Once again, projectiles fired by the Polisario served as a reminder that behind the fixed diplomatic rhetoric in the region there remains a far harsher reality: a state and an armed movement that refuse to move the Sahara issue toward a realistic, definitive political solution. Why Smara in particular? It is probably for symbolic reasons. It is a center of Moroccan Sufism and it is where the region’s tribes pledged allegiance to the sultans of the Sharifian Empire. It is also the starting point of the new road link to Mauritania. That road is set to play an important role in the region’s development and in opening up the Sahel. This time, however, something has changed. The world did not simply watch in silence as the Polisario engaged in reckless acts. Condemnations were swift, firm, and explicit. The United States, both through its mission at the UN and its embassy in Algiers, adopted a particularly harsh tone. France likewise condemned without ambiguity these attacks targeting a civilian area. Spain, the EU, the United Arab Emirates and dozens of other countries also expressed their displeasure. Meanwhile, Algiers has shut itself up in a telling silence… That silence is not neutral. It is political. For it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain that Algeria is “not party to the conflict” while hosting, arming, financing, and diplomatically protecting a movement that openly claims responsibility for terrorist operations against Morocco. The gap between Algeria’s official discourse and the geopolitical reality has become too visible to be credible. The attack on Smara comes at a particularly sensitive moment in the Sahara file. For several years now, international momentum has clearly shifted in Morocco’s favor. US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Southern Provinces opened a new diplomatic chapter. Spain has radically changed its position. France has progressively hardened its support for the autonomy plan and sees the region’s future only under Moroccan sovereignty. Several African, Arab and Latin American countries have consolidated their positions in favor of Rabat. And now Japan, a world power known for extreme diplomatic caution, has also joined the movement of states that now regard the Moroccan plan as the only serious and credible basis for resolving an artificial conflict that has gone on for too long. This is not a minor detail. When a country like Japan moves, it means that international balances have shifted profoundly. Faced with this dynamic, the Polisario finds itself trapped in a strategic dead end. Its “revolutionary” rhetoric without a revolution belongs to another era. Its capacity for international mobilization is eroding. Its Third-World narrative no longer attracts many in a context dominated by the imperatives of stability, economic integration and regional security. Increasingly, states realize the scam. Tindouf is not populated by nationals who fled Morocco. It is, rather, mostly people of various origins confined within a military zone without any rights, and a minority of Moroccans originally from the region in question. So what remains for the Polisario? Military tension. Not to win a war it knows it cannot win, but to try to influence future negotiations and above all the future of MINURSO. Because behind the sporadic attacks lies a precise political logic, likely not the idea of the Polisario alone: to prevent any definitive normalization of the issue and to keep alive the notion of an “open conflict” at least until the end of the Trump presidency. How delighted they would be in Tindouf and Algiers to see MINURSO’s mandate renewed! That would of course imply a conflict between equals, but above all the persistence of the buffer zone that Morocco has voluntarily made available to MINURSO, the strip the Polisario calls the liberated zone! However, with the new balance, the Polisario and its Algerian sponsor know perfectly well that over time the status quo favors their cause less and less. Paradoxically, they also know that a swift and definitive resolution of the conflict would consecrate their historic strategic failure. So they play for time, come what may. Making the conflict last has become Algeria’s main objective. Not to reach an outcome, but precisely to prevent a solution from imposing itself definitively around autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. Maintaining permanent tension allows Algeria to retain a geopolitical lever against Morocco, to fuel a rivalry that has become structural, and to divert attention from some of its own internal vulnerabilities. In this logic, every Moroccan diplomatic advance mechanically provokes a rise in tensions orchestrated by the Polisario. Every international opening toward Rabat prompts an attempt at political or security sabotage. The Americans are not fooled. As true masters of the game, they demand the immediate dismantling of the camps. The problem for Algiers is that the international context is no longer that of the 1970s or 1980s. They have just felt it in Ankara. Today the great powers view the Sahara through the prism of stability, the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, Atlantic trade routes and strategic African investments. Thus, they cannot count on either Russia or China, whose economic interests in Morocco are not negligible. And in this equation, Morocco increasingly appears as a pole of stability while the Polisario looks like a destabilizing actor. The attack on Smara therefore risks producing exactly the opposite of what was intended. Instead of reviving the Polisario’s diplomatic centrality, it accelerates its isolation. Instead of weakening Morocco, it reassures those who now believe that the Moroccan autonomy initiative represents the only credible way out. Diplomatic timing is now working against Algiers and its protégé. And that is precisely what makes the current period particularly dangerous. One cannot know what might happen in the heads of desperados who have lost 50 years of their lives and a pile of billions of dollars only to be told basta. The game is over. The proposal by Joe Wilson and Jimmy Panetta has gained a lot of support in Congress. They now have 12 co-sponsors. That will count for a lot in the near future. The attacks in Smara and Mali vindicate their position and lend them greater credibility.

Kingdom of Morocco: towards the recovery of a suspended, not lost, greatness. 8148

Aziz Daouda, 2 mon.
From the geopolitical rupture of the 18th century to the strategic recomposition of the 21st: the Kingdom of Morocco is waking up, finding itself, and asserting its place. Morocco’s history defies simplistic narratives of internal rise and decline; it reveals a deep continuity, interrupted only by imposed global shifts. The end of the 18th century did not mark a civilizational collapse, but rather a systemic marginalization caused by a missed turn toward industrialization and modernity, a project rejected by religious elites and a largely conservative society, exacerbated by internal struggles between dominant traditionalists and minority modernists. This impacted and slowed the country's evolution. This "fall" remains relative, stemming from global change rather than purely internal decline. Without tracing the history further back, under Moulay Ismaïl and his successors, Morocco radiated as a structuring power, controlling vital trans-Saharan routes, exercising influence in the Sahel, and capturing a significant share of trade toward Europe. Its embassies were everywhere, but the rise of industrial Europe disrupted this balance. Maritime dominance, the bypassing of Saharan caravans, and colonial pressure redrew the world on a scale the Kingdom could not control, did not foresee, or suffered helplessly. But Morocco did not decline; the world-system simply evolved without it. To weaken it durably, in an attempt to paralyze and handicap it forever, Morocco was sliced and divided between two colonial powers. It did not lose the last part of its historical, legitimate territory until the 1950s. Unlike the Ottoman or Persian empires, eaten away by internal weaknesses, Morocco remained coherent, ready to reinsert itself as soon as the balances shifted. Immediately upon its independence, it did not take long to begin a real struggle to reclaim its historical place, which was naturally its own. As an important sign of greatness, it was on its territory that the Allies sealed the pact for the final fight against the Nazis, in the presence of Sultan Mohamed Benyoussef and Moulay Elhassan, who thus met all the great figures of the time. The Franco-Spanish protectorate (1912-1956) disjointed the country’s traditional African networks and oriented the economy toward dependence. Yet, the Alaouite monarchy survived, the State remained structured, and the Sharifian legitimacy remained intact. This resilience, rare among colonized nations, preserved a unique historical continuity. The relationship between the people and the ruling dynasty is foolproof, forming the foundation of an inevitable reconquest. Today, an unprecedented convergence of internal and external factors is closing this parenthesis. Morocco is reactivating its imperial vocation in the geopolitical sense, not through domination, but through strategic cooperation. Since the enthronement of His Majesty Mohammed VI in 1999, the Kingdom has reversed the trend on three major fronts: - Return to Africa: Reviving ancestral roots, Morocco invests massively in West Africa (banks, telecoms, agriculture) and consolidates a religious diplomacy, positioning itself as a bridge to the continent. This ancestral role, held under the Alaouites, is reborn in a modern form based on cooperation and complementarity for shared development. - Diplomatic victories: The growing recognition of sovereignty over the Southern provinces by the United States (2020), Spain (2022), France (2024), nearly all Arab countries, and the majority of African and European nations, along with the opening of consulates in Laâyoune and Dakhla, have transformed a defensive posture into an offensive one. "The Sahara is the prism through which Morocco views its international environment," declared the sovereign on August 20, 2022. - Geostrategic centrality: Partnerships with the United States (major non-NATO ally status since 2004), European security cooperation, and African anchoring make it an Africa-Atlantic-Mediterranean pivot. Tanger Med, the 16th global logistics hub in 2025, is proof; Dakhla Atlantic, operational by 2027, will open the other Atlantic facade. The desire to recover one's fundamentals is not an illusion. The Kingdom possesses all the assets to assume what it is and what it intends to become, as it has for centuries, if not millennia. The country's internal foundations, historical and modern, are solid. It is the oldest nation-state in the world. Monarchical stability, institutional continuity, and flagship projects (FIFA World Cup, TGV, solar energy, efficient industrial ecosystem, high-ranking motorway network, and port infrastructure) forge a true base for development. This credible and accelerated renaissance relies on three converging dynamics: - Shift toward Africa: The continent's explosive demography (2.5 billion inhabitants by 2050), natural resources, and emerging markets confirm and explain Morocco's choice, where it is already a leader with 1,200 investment projects. - Crisis of rivals: Sahelian instability and Algerian ideological failures (gas dependence, diplomatic isolation) isolate competitors, while Morocco offers a credible, stable, and pragmatic alternative. - Historical continuity: The kingdom is not "becoming" a power; it is becoming, once again, a political center, commercial hub, and investment catalyst, as it has always been in the past. This is a total historical alignment, supported by a clear vision and resources mobilized toward the development of the region and, consequently, the continent of the future that is Africa. Speaking of "lost greatness" is a mistake; it was slowed by global mutations, frozen by colonization, and contained by externally imposed regional balances. Today, the international context, internal stability, and external strategy are aligning for the first time since at least the 1800s. Morocco is not returning to the stage of history; it is simply emerging from a moment when history was written without it. It now intends to reclaim its natural place with a perspective of co-development for the benefit of Africans wherever they are.

A Secretary-General at the Mercy of the Powers: Between Displayed Transparency and Real Veto... 8044

Aziz Daouda, 2 mon.
- World Politics -
3 min read.
As the 2027 deadline looms, the race to succeed António Guterres is firmly entrenched in the global diplomatic agenda. Behind a modernized staging, with public hearings and strong rhetoric around transparency, unfolds a competition ruthlessly dictated by power dynamics among major powers. This apparent openness poorly masks a structural truth. The Secretary-General position remains a geopolitical trophy, where democratic lightness gives way to strategic calculations by veto-holders. Officially, the Secretary-General is elected by the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council, in a two-step procedure outlined in the UN Charter. In practice, the permanent members of the Security Council, United States, China, Russia, France, and United Kingdom, share the final decision, often relying on an implicit geographic rotation rather than a strictly meritocratic contest. Four candidacies have emerged in recent weeks, embodying a deliberately calculated diversity. Michelle Bachelet, former High Commissioner for Human Rights, represents a progressive Latin American profile, strongly identified with human rights struggles. Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is presented as the nuclear expert par excellence, adept at managing tensions between major powers. Rebeca Grynspan, Deputy Secretary-General of the UNDP, is a Central American voice on sustainable development and inequality reduction. Macky Sall, former President of Senegal, is a champion of regional governance and continental diplomacy in Africa. These profiles blend political experience, technocracy, and multilateralism, reflecting a sought-after geographic balance: Latin America and Africa at the forefront, within a rotation logic to appease Global South claims. Yet, it is the candidates' acceptability to major powers, far more than their expertise, that will ultimately matter. The flagship innovation of the 2026–2027 process lies in public hearings before the General Assembly, inspired by criticisms from previous selections. During Guterres's selection, these debates had already revealed their limits, notably with Russia's veto against certain Eastern European candidacies deemed too close to NATO. Today, the hearings allow candidates to present their visions on climate, conflicts, UN reform, and human rights protection, in an unprecedented exercise of accountability. This transparency remains largely cosmetic. It primarily engages public opinion and smaller states, but in no way undermines the decision-making power of the Security Council's five permanent members. The hearings cannot replace the indispensable recommendation vote. Behind the scenes, the Security Council remains the sole effective arbiter of the process. The candidacies carry a deeply geopolitical dimension. The 2016 example, where Bulgarian Irina Bokova was sidelined by Russia for geostrategic reasons, illustrates this. A candidate's personality matters less than their relationship with Moscow, Washington, Beijing, Paris, or London. Each contender is thus scrutinized not only for their competencies. Rafael Grossi will be judged on his ability to manage nuclear tensions without ruffling Moscow, while Macky Sall must reassure Paris, Beijing, and Washington alike on his neutrality in the Sino-American rivalry. Candidates' speeches on UN reform, strengthening multilateralism, or better crisis management make headlines, and then fade. Bachelet emphasizes human rights defense, Grynspan fights against inequalities and for sustainable development, Sall pushes for a stronger African voice in international bodies. These are carefully calibrated rhetorical positions designed to seduce. Yet, the Secretary-General wields only moral and diplomatic power. He is not the head of the UN, but the head of its administration, tasked with implementing members' decisions. Guterres's repeated calls for Security Council reform have repeatedly hit a wall of opposition from veto-holders, despite the urgency of crises. Renewal clashes with a structure frozen by the 1945 Charter. Multilateralism, battered by Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin's discourses, limits the Secretary-General to a facilitator role, not a reformer. The designation of the next Secretary-General must, in theory, balance explosive political variables: **Geographic rotation:** After an Asian (Ban Ki-moon) and a European (Guterres), logic dictates a Latin American or African candidate to respond to G77 claims. **Gender question:** A woman for the first time? Michelle Bachelet embodies this possibility, reigniting debate on parity and women's representation at the highest levels of UN diplomacy. **Global power dynamics:** Sino-American rivalry structures the game. Beijing has every interest in neutral profiles like Grossi, while Moscow will seek to block any candidate too close to NATO. **Regional games:** Africa, via the African Union, claims greater weight in global governance. Macky Sall positions himself as the symbol of this push, amid strong Chinese (Belt and Road) and American (Prosper Africa) competition. In practice, reality is more ambiguous. To date, Sall lacks clear African Union support or a mandate from his own country, Senegal, weakening his candidacy from the start. In this setup, the ideal candidate is not necessarily the most visionary, but the one who crystallizes minimal consensus among actors with divergent interests. The next Secretary-General will be less the product of a transformative program than of a diplomatic compromise. Their room for maneuver will depend less on their agenda than on their ability to skillfully navigate a fragmented international environment, as Guterres did with the Covid-19 pandemic or the Ukraine conflict. More than ever, the position reflects a precarious mediator function, tasked with maintaining a fragile balance among powers, rather than strong global leadership. The upcoming election should thus be read not as the emergence of a world authority, but as the designation of a constrained referee, essential to the survival of multilateralism on life support. In this arena, transparency is but a veil. Major powers decide; others applaud. The Secretary-General will remain, for a long time yet, the one who governs the world system... without truly leading it.

April 2026 or the Certain Confirmation of the Moroccan Victory... 10011

Aziz Daouda, 3 mon.
- World Politics - History -
3 min read.
We are entering a decisive month of April. The international dynamic is shifting even further in Morocco's favor on the Sahara issue. April once again promises to be a pivotal moment in the international handling of the Moroccan Sahara question. This structuring diplomatic ritual corresponds to the presentation of the annual report by the UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy to the Security Council. But this year, the context is profoundly different. The lines have shifted, balances have been redrawn, and a new dynamic is taking hold, clearly favorable to Morocco, a logical follow-up to the adoption of Resolution 2797, with strong structuring potential. The adoption of this resolution marks an essential milestone. It goes beyond simply renewing the existing framework. It consolidates a political direction initiated over several years, by enshrining the preeminence of a realistic, pragmatic, and sustainable political solution, centered exclusively on the Moroccan autonomy initiative. This resolution fits into a strategic continuity that progressively marginalizes unrealistic options, those that long relied on outdated or inapplicable references in the current geopolitical context. It also increases pressure on the parties to engage in a credible political process under the exclusive auspices of the United Nations, but in reality under strong American pressure. The United States has directly engaged in favor of the Kingdom, with the return of roundtables in Madrid and then Washington as key pivots. These meetings have confirmed a diplomatic reality that is now hard to contest. The format of the gatherings, including Morocco, Mauritania, the Polisario Front, and Algeria despite itself, is the only relevant framework for progress. It implicitly enshrines Algeria's central role, long eager to present itself as a mere observer. Its active participation, even forced, places it at the heart of the dispute, profoundly altering the reading of the conflict and redistributing political responsibilities. Madrid and Washington are not insignificant venues. They reflect the growing involvement of Western powers in seeking a resolution, with increasing convergence around the Moroccan proposal. One of the expected developments this month concerns the future of MINURSO. The time has come to redefine the mission. From its inception, it has never fulfilled the role for which it was established. A major evolution is likely emerging in support of implementing autonomy in the southern provinces within the framework of the Kingdom's sovereignty. Long confined to monitoring the ceasefire, the mission will see its name change and its mandate evolve to adapt to on-the-ground realities and the demands of a renewed political process. Such a change would be highly significant. It would mark the end of UN inertia and reflect the international community's will to move from managing the status quo to an active and definitive resolution logic. Much to the dismay of those who, for 50 years, have done everything to perpetuate the conflict through their proxy; the latter is increasingly suffering from the shifting landscape. Washington has toughened its tone and put the Polisario in its sights. Algeria is evidently feeling the effects. The introduction in the US Congress of a proposal to designate the Polisario as a terrorist organization represents a potentially major turning point. If successful, such a designation would have considerable political, financial, and diplomatic consequences. It would further isolate the movement, weaken its supporters, and reshape the balance of power. Above all, it would reinforce the security reading of the dossier, in a Sahel-Saharan context marked by rising transnational threats. This adds to a Security Council increasingly aligned with the Moroccan position. The Council's current composition clearly leans in favor of Moroccan positions. Several influential members explicitly or implicitly support the autonomy initiative, seen as the most serious and credible basis for settlement. This shift is no accident. It results from active, coherent, and consistent Moroccan diplomacy, which has successfully embedded the Sahara issue within logics of regional stability, counter-terrorism, and economic development. Algeria, for its part, faces its contradictions. In this context, the Algerian regime appears increasingly beleaguered. Its positioning, long structured around ideological rhetoric and systematic opposition to Morocco, now seems out of step with international system evolutions. Algiers' relative diplomatic isolation, including in its Sahelian environment, contrasts with its regional ambitions. Internally, economic and social challenges exacerbate tensions in a country with considerable resources but unevenly distributed benefits. Algerian populations suffer from much injustice and lack the essentials. The Sahara issue, instrumentalized for decades as a lever for foreign policy and internal cohesion, thus reveals the limits of a politically exhausted model. The trend thus confirms a historic turning point depriving the Algerian regime of its artificial political rent. All elements converge toward one conclusion: April 2026 could mark a decisive step in the evolution of the Moroccan Sahara dossier. Without prejudging an immediate outcome, current dynamics are progressively narrowing the space for blocking positions. More than ever, resolving this conflict seems to hinge on recognizing geopolitical realities and adhering to a pragmatic political solution. In this perspective, Morocco appears in a position of strength, bolstered by growing legitimacy and increasingly assertive international support. The question remains whether other actors, particularly Algeria, will adapt to this new reality or choose to oppose it at the risk of greater isolation in a world where balances of power evolve rapidly. There will undoubtedly be a before and after April 2026, and above all, the consolidation of a Moroccan position oriented toward further development of the southern provinces. The Security Council's output is awaited in this direction.

The Strategic Prudence of Gulf Monarchies: A Vital Calculus in the Face of Iran and American Uncertainties... 9173

Aziz Daouda, 3 mon.
- World Politics - Business -
2.6 min read.
The Gulf monarchies: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, or Kuwait, embody a glaring strategic vulnerability. Their shallow territorial depth and narrow demographics expose vital infrastructure: airports, ports, refineries, gas terminals, headquarters of major companies, to rapid strikes by potential enemies from the region and beyond. Iran, for instance, with its arsenal of ballistic missiles, drones, and asymmetric naval forces, coupled with the belligerent philosophy of its regime, could paralyze them in the blink of an eye. The 2019 attack on Aramco's oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais provides irrefutable proof: Saudi production had then plummeted by half. To the Saudis' surprise, the Americans remained evasive and barely retaliated, at least not in a clear and direct manner. For Riyadh, this silence was a telling signal: allies are no longer infallible. Signed agreements can remain dead letters at the whim of one party, depending of course on the interests of the moment and changing circumstances. A growing, though undeclared, distrust of Washington had then taken hold. Commitments, agreements, and promises only bind those who believe in them. Over the past two decades, trust in the United States among Gulf capitals has eroded a little more each day. The 2011 withdrawal from Iraq, the lack of a strong response after the 2019 attacks, and the Afghan chaos of 2021 have ingrained a lesson that those concerned have fully internalized: Washington disengages when the cost rises. This uncertainty thus encourages prudence in the face of open war with Tehran. It will likely be the case again today, as the specter of a long and destructive war occupies all minds. The risks of a prolonged conflict are more than probable. A direct confrontation would quickly degenerate into a prolonged regional conflict, akin to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), which killed over a million people and ruined both belligerents. Today, the stakes would be worse: destruction of energy infrastructure, closure of the Strait of Hormuz, collapse of foreign investments, and capital flight from the area. Gulf leaders, haunted by these scenarios, prioritize stability and intelligently bow their heads. For a long time, they have chosen to prioritize economic development, a choice now put to a severe test. The monarchies have pivoted toward transforming their respective economies: Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, diversification in the UAE, Qatari global investments, and other manifestations of universal scope. This requires confidence, for it must not be forgotten that these economies fundamentally rest on trust. A prolonged war would threaten tourism, megaprojects like NEOM or smart cities. For the Gulf monarchies, the doctrine is clear: regional stability trumps ideological confrontations. This shift is embodied in the China-mediated reconciliation of 2023 between Riyadh and Tehran, aimed at reducing tensions and sparing Gulf territories, which refuse to become indirect battlefields. Today, though threatened, bombed, and provoked, the Gulf monarchies intelligently demonstrate their refusal to be dragged into a conflict they did not choose. At least for now, as everything could tip at any moment. Despite discreet security cooperations, Gulf countries refuse to be drawn into a conflict for Israel's benefit. The latter enjoys military and nuclear superiority, but Iranian retaliations strike primarily, and above all, Arab bases, economic, and civilian infrastructure. The costs fall on the Arabs, not Tel Aviv. The leaders of the countries concerned have learned the lesson. They have seen what became of Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen, where proxy wars between powers left states bloodless, highlighting the fatal traps that ignition inevitably brings. In these dynamics, Morocco, a strategic ally and highly regarded voice among Gulf countries, emerges as a de-escalation actor. Under King Mohammed VI's impetus, Morocco's moderating voice advocates regional stability, diplomatic solutions, and South-South cooperation to foster political reconstruction and economic exchanges. It is in this context that one must appreciate His Majesty's permanent contacts with the sultans and emirs of the region. This is indeed a lucid calculus, as Morocco is one of the rare countries in the region to have voluntarily severed all ties with the Mullahs long ago. The prudence of Gulf states transcends mere distrust of the United States. It stems from a perspicacious calculus that factors in vulnerability to Iran, uncertain American reliability, the risk of a ruinous war, and the primacy of development. Their mantra? Avoid at all costs becoming the theater of confrontations between regional powers and distant others. This is how their reserve and refusal to retaliate impulsively must be understood. Having nerves on edge is not what's needed. However, things could change if Iran does not come to its senses and leaves a region that, even ideologically hostile, will never go so far as to attack it alone. It lacks the means without potential allies and has no interest in doing so with others' help. Such a situation would be ruinous for the entire region, including Iran, an outcome no one should wish for, apparently.

AI development has reached a limit and it is not hardware 10424

Tariq Daouda, 3 mon.
There is a shortage of GPUs, there is a shortage of RAM, there is a shortage of electricity. Still, none of the above is the real limiting factor: it's a skill and research issue. For more than a decade now, the AI world has been dominated by an open-source arms race whose effect has been a near total focus on engineering to the detriment of research and meaningful developments. The result has been over engineered proof-of-concepts, chief amongst them being Transformers. The original paper mostly demonstrated that if you put attention over everything, and several of them, you can beat LSTMs. Is it a surprising result, not so much. This is somewhat morally similar to Res-nets, that showed that the more you connect layers the better the results. That's also not very surprising. Both significantly increased the size of models. These are mostly engineering innovations. Although they did open interesting theoretical questions, they did not come from strong theoretical foundations. They come from trial and errors copy-pasting existing technologies and connecting them in new ways. And then, these technologies got themselves copy-pasted and reconnected. Fast forward today we have massive behemoths that are draining the computational ressources of the world. Even AI curricula followed this trend. Today, most only very quickly skim over the mathematical and theoretical foundations. Focusing more and more on building pieces of increasing complexity while dodging explanations of their inner workings. This has culminated in today's "AI builders" trend, where fully trained LLM assembly lines are stringed together. Here is the true limitation of AI. This mindset has been pushed so far that we have reached a physical limit. Now we can either build a much bigger Nvidia, produce a 100X more RAM, lower the price of KW/h to unseen levels. Or, go back to the theory and design models that are more optimal. Optimal not because they are distilled, not because they use lower precision, but because they don't rely on Transformers, nor diffusion, or any of the very costly paradigms currently use, in the shape and form are currently used. Just like physical computers have been shrinked to sit in the palm of your hand. Immaterial AI models can also be made smaller.

Christopher Ross or Diplomacy Against the Current 10030

Aziz Daouda, 3 mon.
It sometimes happens that diplomats, once their mission is complete, opt for the discretion demanded by their former status. Others prefer to continue intervening in debates they themselves helped complicate. Christopher Ross clearly belongs to this second category. In a recent article, the former envoy for the Moroccan Sahara has once again taken a stance on this sensitive issue. With the benefit of hindsight, his analysis has gained neither nuance nor critical distance. Reading his text suggests quite the opposite: the same interpretive framework, the same assumptions, and above all, the same indulgence toward Algiers. This persistence raises a fundamental question: what is Ross seeking today by intervening again in a dossier where he was one of the most contested mediators? Appointed in 2009 by Ban Ki-moon, he succeeded a series of envoys who had faced the same difficulty: breaking out of a diplomatic impasse inherited from the Cold War. This conflict indeed traces its roots to the geopolitical upheavals of the 1970s. Morocco consolidated its historical sovereignty over the region in 1975, prompting Spain's withdrawal, while the Polisario, backed politically, financially, and militarily by Algeria and Libya, claimed the creation of an independent state. The dossier took on an international dimension with the creation, in 1991, of the MINURSO, tasked with supervising a referendum; an idea proposed by the late Hassan II in a speech delivered in Nairobi at an OAU summit. Very quickly, the obstacles created by the Polisario, particularly regarding voter identification, made this project nearly impossible, and the process stalled. It was then that Morocco proposed, in 2007, a major political initiative: a plan for broad autonomy for the southern provinces under Moroccan sovereignty. The project was presented to the Security Council as a realistic and pragmatic solution and garnered growing international support, described as "serious and credible" in several resolutions. It marked a true turning point in diplomatic realism. Since then, the diplomatic landscape around the Sahara has profoundly evolved. Numerous states now view Morocco's autonomy plan as the most credible basis for a lasting political solution. In 2020, the Trump administration officially announced recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over the Sahara, a major turning point in the dossier's diplomatic balance. In its wake, several Western powers reaffirmed their support for the autonomy plan, while Arab, European, and African countries opened consulates in Laâyoune or Dakhla, de facto recognizing Moroccan administration of the territory. Within the UN, the terminology used in Security Council resolutions has also evolved: the notion of a "realistic, pragmatic, and durable political solution" has become the guiding principle of the process. This shift toward a pragmatic approach reflects a simple reality: the referendum envisioned in the 1990s is no longer seen as a viable option. It is precisely this diplomatic turning point that Ross, still prisoner to an outdated vision, seems to refuse to integrate. In his recent statements, he continues to defend an interpretation of the conflict harking back to a bygone era, clinging to diplomatic frameworks long surpassed by geopolitical realities. This stance even calls into question the man's integrity. During his tenure, the Kingdom had already expressed serious reservations about his impartiality and officially demanded his replacement in 2012, as trust had been gravely undermined. A mediator, by definition, must maintain equitable distance between the parties. When that distance vanishes, mediation loses its credibility. In fact, Ross never truly dispelled suspicions of closeness to the Algerian position. Algeria's role in this conflict is central. One of the most controversial points in his discourse concerns precisely Algiers' place in the dossier. For fifty years, Algeria has officially claimed to be merely an "observing country" in this conflict. The diplomatic and strategic reality is entirely different. Algiers hosts, arms, and finances the Polisario, and shelters thousands of refugees in Tindouf, a significant portion of whom are not even from the territory in question. There is little doubt that the conflict is primarily a dispute pitting Algeria against Morocco, an analysis now widely shared by the main international actors. No lasting solution can emerge without Algiers' direct involvement in the negotiations. In this context, Ross's repeated positions appear anachronistic and undermine his credibility. By continuing, in effect, to align with Algeria and the Polisario, he gives the impression of prolonging a political fight rather than illuminating the debate. The responsibility of former international mediators is thus in question. When a former UN representative speaks out so trenchantly in public, he indirectly engages the image of the institution he served. Yet the credibility of international diplomacy rests precisely on the neutrality of its intermediaries. The diplomatic history of the Sahara is dotted with mediation attempts, successive plans, and failed initiatives. Before Ross, other envoys had tried to unblock the situation, notably James Baker, who proposed a transition plan in the early 2000s that was ultimately rejected. Each attempt has recalled a fundamental truth: without regional political will, no framework can succeed. This is precisely why current international diplomacy favors a realistic solution based on autonomy and regional cooperation, rather than maximalist constructs inherited from the Cold War. In essence, the question is not whether Ross has the right to express an opinion. Like any former diplomat, he can, of course, participate in the debate. But when he persists in defending a vision that ignores major geopolitical shifts, his discourse takes on the appearance of a rearguard battle. The world has changed, as have regional balances. The Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty is no longer merely a decolonization issue: it now lies at the heart of a strategic reconfiguration of the Atlantic and North Africa. Faced with these transformations, international diplomacy seems to have chosen pragmatism. Christopher Ross, by contrast, appears to have chosen nostalgia for a bygone paradigm. In international affairs, history shows that those who cling to past paradigms almost always end up swimming against the current of present realities.

Iran Facing the Reality Test: The End of a Regional Myth? 11019

Aziz Daouda, 4 mon.
Another major sequence of tensions in the Middle East highlights the deep fragilities of the Iranian regime. Since its advent in 1979, the Islamic Republic has built itself on a political narrative of revolutionary power in direct opposition to the "Great Satan" the USA, unwavering defender of the Palestinian cause and Jerusalem's liberation. **This ideological positioning allowed Tehran to gain relays in parts of the Arab world, particularly among movements hostile to Israel. It developed an influence strategy based on creating, funding, and arming affiliated groups: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, support for the Syrian regime, Houthis in Yemen, forming what it presents as the "axis of resistance." It surely finances other movements in many other countries, with an unnatural connivance with Sunni Islamists. An expansion strategy with destabilizing effects.** Where Iran has extended its influence, its footprint is inseparable from increased militarization and state fragmentation. The projection relies less on state-building than on the rise of parallel politico-military networks challenging national institutions. This has certainly enabled Tehran to hold leverage over its adversaries and position itself as the champion of "resistance" to the US-dominated regional order and its allies. But it has also prolonged conflicts, weakened already fragile state institutions, and exacerbated sectarian fractures. In the long term, the human and economic cost of this "strategy" is considerable for the affected countries and for Iran itself, subjected to severe sanctions and persistent international isolation. *The Palestinian cause is in fact more instrumentalized than defended, for nearly half a century, while the Iranian regime claims it as a central pillar of its diplomacy and revolutionary legitimacy.* Tehran has forged ties with armed Palestinian actors like Hamas or Islamic Jihad, presenting them as extensions of its own "resistance." Yet it must be acknowledged that Palestinians' situation has in no way improved: rampant occupation, colonization, and blockade continue, while cycles of violence recur without credible political prospects. Palestine has lost vast territory, lives, and even sympathy within the Arab world itself. Palestinian internal divisions, locking the cause into an essentially militarized logic absent diplomatic horizons, question the real effectiveness of this posture. Like the Gamal Abdel Nasser era marked by imprudent pan-Arabism, the current period has brought no progress. Iran has, in part, supplanted certain Arab leadership on the dossier without producing tangible results for a lasting settlement—nor concrete improvements in Palestinians' lives, quite the contrary. **Beyond geopolitics, the regime faces profound internal contestation. Recent protest movements, and those triggered after Jina Mahsa Amini's death in September 2022, revealed a major fracture between part of Iranian society and its leaders. Repression, as the sole response, resulted in thousands of deaths and arrests, documented by international organizations and UN mechanisms.** The rigidity of security and ideology contrasts with the aspirations of a connected youth seeking civic and individual freedoms. Today's Iran is no longer that of 1979: society has transformed, the regime has not. The gap between revolutionary discourse, promises of social justice, and socio-economic reality: inflation, unemployment, precarity, brain drain, corruption, diplomatic isolation—fuels disillusionment that undermines state legitimacy. Morocco officially severed ties with Iran in 2018, as Tehran supported the Polisario Front via Hezbollah and its embassy in Algiers, with Algeria's backing. Rabat holds evidence of arms deliveries and Polisario cadre training. Morocco's rupture appears as a strategic decision to prevent any perception of interference in its vital interests, particularly in the Sahara. It also fits into a broader realignment of regional alliances, marked by Rabat's rapprochement with certain Gulf partners and the USA, amid growing rivalries with the Iran-Algeria axis. Recent military and diplomatic developments highlight a troubling reality for Tehran: Iran often seems to react urgently rather than master the strategic tempo. The multiplication of peripheral fronts, from Lebanon to Gaza, Iraq to Yemen, occurs as its regional relays face growing pressures, sanctions, and targeted eliminations eroding "axis of resistance" cohesion. This situation can appear as much an admission of fragility. The ease with which the USA and Israel neutralize leaders even questions state competence. That said, announcing the regime's imminent collapse would be reckless. The security apparatus remains powerful, regional influence networks active. But will the regime once again demonstrate resilience, even at the cost of increased internal violence and harsh contestation management? **The regime must be clearly distinguished from the Iranian people, caught in a vise. Heir to a millennial civilization and rich intellectual tradition, it should not be reduced to the politico-religious elite's choices. Sanctions, repression, and isolation's sufferings weigh first on ordinary citizens, including those aspiring to peaceful change and the country's reintegration into the international community.** *History teaches much in identical situations. Transitions demand lucidity, responsibility, and an inclusive vision of the future. Regional stability will not arise from ideological escalation or destruction, but from rebalancing based on law, sovereignty, collective security, cooperation, and trust, today sorely eroded.* In this troubled sequence, solidarity first goes to the region's peoples, caught in dynamics beyond them. The mullahs will sooner or later answer to history—and to a simple but decisive question: did they serve the people, or sacrifice them to a political myth that time has made increasingly hard to sustain?

South Africa’s Democratic Model Under Scrutiny: Who Really Decides? 10851

Aziz Daouda, 4 mon.
- World Politics - History -
2.9 min read.
South Africa prides itself on being one of Africa's democratic models.Heir to a transition celebrated worldwide after apartheid, it claims solid institutions, a respected Constitution, and vigorous public debate.Yet recent developments raise a troubling question: can the country be so disorganized in conducting its strategic affairs, particularly African ones? The question "Who really decides?" is not purely rhetorical: several recent episodes highlight a genuine discipline problem at the top of the South African military, particularly around naval cooperation with Iran. The general staff allegedly ignored clear instructions from Cyril Ramaphosa to exclude Tehran from naval exercises off the country's coast in early 2026. Iran was nevertheless present and visible. Beyond official statements, therefore, a question persists: who really decides in South Africa when it comes to sensitive diplomatic positions or major geopolitical dossiers? Can this be extrapolated to the Moroccan Sahara issue? Does the country have a multi-voiced diplomacy? A military exercise is no trivial matter, especially when it involves a country like Iran... Officially, South Africa's foreign policy falls under the executive power, embodied by the president and his government. Under Cyril Ramaphosa's presidency, the country claims to defend the principles of international law, peoples' self-determination, and multilateralism. But when military or security actors seem to take initiatives that don't clearly align with the stated line of elected authorities, institutional coherence comes into question. Can a mature democracy tolerate military officials adopting positions or making decisions that indirectly engage foreign policy without explicit political validation? In any consolidated democracy, the army's subordination to civilian power is a cardinal principle. Yet any impression of strategic autonomy by the military, especially on sensitive diplomatic dossiers, sends a worrying signal. These internal ambiguities don't go unnoticed internationally. In the United States, President Donald Trump had already expressed dissatisfaction with certain South African orientations in the past. In a global geopolitical context marked by polarization, every diplomatic, and here military, gesture is scrutinized. If South Africa projects the image of a country with fuzzy decision-making centers, where the diplomatic line can be circumvented or opportunistically interpreted, it weakens its credibility. Washington's gaze then becomes an aggravating factor. A democracy perceived as disorganized becomes vulnerable to external pressures. It loses its influence capacity and sees its status as an African power erode. *One is entitled here to question South Africa's position on the Sahara dossier in recent years. Is it a matter of coherence or simply an ideological posture?* **The African National Congress (ANC), the ruling party, has historically adopted a position aligned with Algiers, supporting the Polisario in the name of self-determination. This line fits into an ideological tradition inherited from liberation struggles. During apartheid, the ANC had ideological and militant ties with other liberation movements, including the Polisario, notably via Algeria and the Tindouf camps. After 1994, democratic Pretoria consolidated this line and officially recognized the SADR in 2004, in keeping with a commitment made by Mandela.** But today, the African context has evolved. Many states on the continent have strengthened relations with Morocco, recognizing de facto or explicitly its sovereignty over its southern provinces. Moroccan diplomacy, both active and economic, has established itself as a structuring actor in Africa. In this framework, South Africa's position deserves debate: is it the fruit of a maturely considered national strategy based on recent developments, validated by all elected institutions, or the result of specific internal influences—ideological, partisan, or security-related? **The question becomes even more sensitive when proximity to the Algerian regime is mentioned, marked by strong military presence in the decision-making sphere. Algeria remains the central actor in the Saharan dossier and maintains historic relations with Pretoria.** If South African military officials act with significant autonomy, this can fuel the idea of connivance between security apparatuses beyond classical diplomatic channels. Even if this perception isn't entirely founded, it can impose itself in international analyses. The boundary between military impunity and strategic affinities easily erodes here. Yet in foreign policy, perception counts as much as reality. *South Africa remains incontestably an institutional democracy, with competitive elections, free press, and dynamic civil society. But a regime's solidity isn't measured solely by its constitutional texts; it's also judged by the clarity of its decision-making chain and the discipline of its institutions.* If decisions with diplomatic or strategic reach seem to escape direct political control, this undermines the image of a unified state. And in a world where geopolitical balances are rapidly redrawing, any ambiguity can be exploited. The question therefore isn't to deny South Africa's democratic nature, but to ask: is this democracy fully coherent in its exercise of power, particularly on sensitive African affairs? And above all, who really speaks for Pretoria when stakes cross national borders? Or further, who dictates decisions, and based on what interest? For once again, how to explain that the president says one thing and his army does another? That's precisely the case here. South Africa's position on the Moroccan Sahara could, who knows, stem from connivances between Pretoria's and Algiers' militaries rather than the explicit will of Pretoria's political authorities. *These interrogations, far from hostile, fit into a legitimate debate on the institutional maturity of a continental power called to play a major role in Africa. In any case, regarding the Moroccan Sahara, these days, it would be time for South Africa to re-examine itself, or rather, redeem itself.*

Le Monde and Morocco: Old Grudges and Media Neocolonialism from a Parisian Prosecutor... 11898

Aziz Daouda, 4 mon.
A certain Alexandre Aublanc recently penned a long article in Le Monde, the Parisian newspaper, with the evocative title: "Mohammed VI's Unfulfilled Democratic Promises." Nothing less. The tone is set: that of the self-proclaimed prosecutor, handing out good and bad marks to a sovereign state, as if the Moroccan monarchy had personally sworn an oath to him or the valiant Moroccan people had requested an audit from him. Pretentious and ridiculous. This exercise is nothing new. For decades, a segment of the French press, particularly the Parisian variety and especially this one, has maintained an ambiguous relationship with the Kingdom: fascination, condescension, and resentment. The impression is one of mourning a lost eldorado where everyone would have loved to live, but under a republic, probably the French kind. Indeed, the country is beautiful, the people welcoming, but they want neither a republic nor France. It's good living in Marrakech or strolling through the streets and fine avenues of Rabat, perfectly under a monarchy. For over 360 years, Moroccans have been attached to the world's oldest reigning dynasty. They love their King and the royal family, and this affection is perfectly and singularly reciprocal. It's a deliberate choice, and no one from abroad has the right to question it. Already under Hassan II, the Kingdom was regularly portrayed as the "troublesome pupil" of Western democracy, which they were desperate to impose on it. Today, it's Mohammed VI's turn to be summoned to account not to his people, but to a certain nostalgic Parisian intelligentsia. The posture here is neocolonial, barely veiled. One must recall a historical fact: the French protectorate ended in 1956. Morocco is no longer under tutelage, neither political nor moral. The recent years, before President Macron's visit to Rabat, are perfect proof for those who might have forgotten. The idea that a French editorialist could position himself as the guarantor of a foreign sovereign's "democratic promises" reeks of nostalgia for influence. That's called interference, and interference is unacceptable, as Jean-Noël Barrot was pleased to remind the Americans. He was beside himself: a close ally of President Trump had dared to comment on the murder of Quentin Deranque by far-left militants. Rest assured, this doesn't concern Moroccans. French affairs are for the French. Emmanuel Macron, for his part, will launch "To each his own, and the sheep will be well guarded"; France had just been criticized by Giorgia Meloni over the same affair. Charles de Gaulle, in founding the Fifth Republic amid decolonization, had sealed the end of an era. Yet some media discourses, particularly those in Le Monde, seem not to have fully freed themselves from this inherited moral verticality. It was the General himself who created Le Monde, need we remind you. It's not criticism that's the problem. It's legitimate. What raises questions is the lens: a partial, decontextualized reading that deliberately ignores the extraordinary institutional, social, and economic developments Morocco has experienced since 1999. A host of facts and achievements, simply extraordinary in the region under Mohammed VI's reign, are conveniently omitted: The 2011 constitutional reform, adopted by referendum, strengthening the head of government's powers and enshrining fundamental freedoms and rights. The establishment of governance and regulatory bodies: National Human Rights Council, National Integrity Authority, etc. An ambitious infrastructure policy. Unique social development indicators in the region. A structured African strategy, cemented by Morocco's return to the African Union in 2017. Nothing is perfect, no one claims otherwise. Morocco is a country in transformation, facing complex social, economic, and geopolitical challenges. But reducing 25 years of reforms to a curt formula of "unfulfilled promises" is more pamphlet than analysis. Let's call it folly. It's always delicate to hand out democracy certificates from a country itself racked by major social tensions: crisis after crisis, record distrust of institutions, rise of extremes, controversies over police violence or freedom of expression, unpopularity of institutions and leaders. Democracy isn't a patent one awards to others. It's a process, imperfect everywhere—and certainly in France. But here, regarding this article, it's just another manifestation of a recurrent Moroccan obsession. Le Monde, since its creation, has maintained a particular relationship with the Moroccan monarchy. Hassan II was long a central figure, often described with a mix of fascination and gratuitous severity. Today, the target changes, but the tone remains. The repetition of these attacks sometimes gives the impression of a frozen interpretive grid: Morocco is eternally summoned to "catch up" to a standard defined elsewhere, precisely in Paris, without acknowledging its own historical and institutional path. The author and his ilk are truly unaware of their own decadent system, the drift of their "democracy," yet still seek to export it. The line between legitimate criticism and ridiculous caricature is razor-thin. What shocks about the article in question isn't the existence of a debate on Moroccan governance. That's healthy. What raises questions is the accumulation of approximations, omissions, and shortcuts that end up sketching a tasteless caricature. Morocco is neither a frozen dictatorship nor a Scandinavian democracy, nor will it ever be. Morocco has its own personality, and its people don't want to resemble anyone, not even France or the French. It's a country in mutation, with its traditions, contradictions, advances, and delays. But it belongs first to Moroccans to debate it, judge it, and decide it. By insisting on speaking "in the name of" the Kingdom's democratic promises, certain editorialists mostly give the impression of speaking for Moroccans. And in 2026, that sounds singularly dated. Francophone Moroccan readers, for their part, read, compare, analyze, and often smile at these lessons dispensed from afar. Not out of blindness, but because they know a country's reality can never be reduced to the columns, however prestigious, of a Parisian daily. As for Mr. Aublanc, he'll have to learn to sweep in front of his own door before looking elsewhere. French-style democracy is hardly an ideal on this side of the Mediterranean.

Moroccan Sahara: The Algerian Lock Under American Pressure... 12284

Aziz Daouda, 4 mon.
For half a century, Algeria's military power has sought neither to definitively end the Sahara conflict nor to truly satisfy the Polisario's claims. The central goal is perpetuating a *controlled status quo*, sufficiently conflictual to remain useful but well-contained to avoid escalation. **In this logic, the Polisario is not an end in itself, but an instrument: a regional pressure proxy, activated or muted according to Algiers' strategic needs. Its leaders are mere officials on a mission, and the detainees in the camps no more than accomplices.**The aim is neither to build a viable state in the south nor to secure a total diplomatic victory, but to maintain low-level permanent destabilization in the region. A cynicism all too evident in a "frozen" yet profitable conflict for the Algerian regime. It sustains permanent strategic tension with Morocco, effectively blocking any real Maghreb integration. It justifies ongoing militarization and massive defense budgets in the name of a lasting threat. It nurtures the narrative of an external enemy, useful for diverting attention from internal economic, social, and political blockages. *In this framework, Morocco becomes a "structural enemy," not because it poses an objective existential threat, but because the Algerian system needs a designated adversary to cement internal cohesion and channel popular frustrations. The imaginary enemy as a method of governance.* The image of an expansionist and aggressive Morocco forms one of the pillars of Algeria's official discourse. It installs constant psychological pressure: externally, a neighbor portrayed as threatening; internally, the proclaimed need for strong power and an omnipresent security apparatus. This setup is not conjunctural; it is inherent to the regime's nature. In this political architecture, full and complete normalization with Rabat would be counterproductive, as it would deprive the military power of a central lever of legitimation. Some consider it suicidal for the regime. Thus, even when a "managed freeze" seems to settle in, as recently described by former Mauritanian Foreign Minister Ould Bellal, it is not a step toward peace, but a modality for managing the conflict. The status quo is adjusted, modulated, never abandoned. **This is where Washington becomes a true accelerator of the dossier. President Trump having made conflict resolution the nodal point of his term.** The Mauritanian reading is lucid on one point: the dossier only moves when Washington gets directly involved. Ould Bellal, a seasoned observer, emphasizes that "the direct American presence in recent meetings" marks a notable evolution from mere principled support for the UN process. The US has broken with its former posture. This dynamic confirms a strategic reality: the conflict's center of gravity is neither in Tindouf, nor in Laâyoune, nor even in Nouakchott, but in Algiers. This is what American officials have fully grasped. The repeated visits by Massad Boulos to Algiers, along with his firm yet coded statements, systematically recall the American line: support for a realistic political solution affirming Moroccan sovereignty over the territories; insistence on regional stability and Algiers' involvement as a stakeholder. *The implicit message is clear: without constructive engagement from the Algerian power, no lasting progress is possible, regardless of the UN framework or negotiation format.* What of Mauritania, between neutrality and vulnerability? It too is a stakeholder in the talks. Ould Bellal recalls that his country is "objectively concerned" by the conflict's outcomes, particularly due to the Lagouira area and the security and economic stakes linked to Nouadhibou. Lagouira indeed emerges as a strategic lock, both for Mauritania's security depth and for the configuration of Atlantic trade corridors. His proposal to organize an international conference aimed at clarifying and legalizing Mauritania's "positive neutrality" reflects acute awareness of the risks: a prolonged and instrumentalized conflict weakens the entire Sahelo-Maghreb continuum. Nouakchott knows the Algerian status quo is not neutral; it shapes regional balances and can turn into a factor of diffuse destabilization. It has been since 1976. If there is a lock here, it is indeed Algerian. At the end of the current sequence, the diagnosis is clear: the central problem is in Algiers, and a decisive part of the solution as well. As long as Algeria's military power views the Sahara as a lever for internal management and regional projection, no purely UN dynamic will suffice; the Polisario will remain a tool, not a sovereign decision-making actor. Under these conditions, only sustained, coherent, and if necessary coercive American pressure can alter Algiers' strategic calculus. Otherwise, the "managed freeze" evoked by Ould Bellal risks turning into diplomatic eternity, where the process's form changes, but the blocking logic persists. A kind of near-mathematical constancy. **The status quo is not an accidental impasse: it is an assumed policy. And as long as this policy remains profitable for Algiers, the conflict will stay suspended, not for lack of a solution, but for lack of will from the true decision-maker.** To break the lock, Washington is multiplying pressures on Algiers. *The latest is appointing a chargé d'affaires in Algiers, not an ambassador.* The chargé d'affaires status allows marking a form of "under-calibration" of representation, which can be interpreted as reflecting tensions over sensitive dossiers: Sahara, rapprochement with Moscow, counterterrorism; without escalating to open crisis. It is a signal from Washington showing that the relationship with Algiers is important, but not to the point of immediately dedicating a full ambassador while certain political adjustments are not made. Chevron will certainly do business with Sonatrach, but in politics, that is not enough. Algiers must move to earn American diplomatic trust: Trump's order. **In essence, the conflict is not a matter of maps or revolutionary slogans. It boils down to a simple equation: Algiers feeds on the status quo, but under President Trump's impetus, the "Sahara problem" will cease to be a historical drama to become what it should always have been: a settled dossier. The lock is about to break.**

Patrice Motsepe: A CAF Presidency Undermined by Opacity and Conflicts of Interest... 11435

Aziz Daouda, 4 mon.
Elected in March 2021 to head the Confederation of African Football (CAF) during the General Assembly held in Rabat, Morocco, or should we remind you?, South African billionaire Patrice Motsepe promised a radical break from a past riddled with scandals and mismanagement. Absolute transparency, financial rigor, modernization of practices: these were the hallmarks of his campaign. Four years later, those commitments ring hollow. The institution languishes between smooth reform rhetoric and glaring opacities, amid internal tensions, refereeing controversies, and recurring suspicions of collusion between power and personal interests. The businessman's profile lies at the heart of a blatant conflict of interest. Owner of the South African club Mamelodi Sundowns, which he has entrusted to his son with FIFA's approval, Motsepe embodies the image of a thriving "corporate" manager, backed by colossal financial capital and international connections. But this profile reveals a major flaw: the virtually nonexistent boundary between his CAF presidency and his private interests. The CAF oversees the awarding of Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) tournaments, interclub competitions, and World Cup qualifiers, wielding immense power over Africa's 54 federations. Motsepe thus navigates an ecosystem where every decision can favor his economic alliances or his club. This porosity fuels doubts: does he primarily serve African football, or is he consolidating a network of opaque personal influences for his business gain? The CAF is no ordinary administrative body. It generates hundreds of millions of viewers per AFCON, negotiating with governments, broadcasters, and sponsors. Yet under Motsepe, sports diplomacy remains a minefield of murky alliances, where decisions seem dictated by political balances and criteria tied to the president himself. His style increasingly relies on governance by ambiguity, masking inaction with a "strategy of permanent consensus." Structural decisions are endlessly deferred; signals of listening, profuse compliments, and radiant smiles everywhere conceal deliberate indifference. Federations, zonal unions, partners, and politicians struggle to grasp the man or discern any genuine policy for development and fairness. The result: chronic inability to decide. Refereeing controversies, organizational disputes, and contested awards pile up without public clarifications. Commissions are seized, reports announced... but nothing concrete or educational emerges. This technico-political dilution perpetuates opacity, shielding the presidency from direct accountability. In short, a facade of democracy and a dilution of reckoning. On paper, the Executive Committee, specialized commissions, and statutory votes promise modern governance. In practice, these bodies serve as a smokescreen. By referring sensitive files to commissions, Motsepe positions himself "above the fray," invoking "collective responsibility" to dodge criticism. His goal: emerge unscathed from every scandal or misstep, and there are many. No one is identifiable, no one is held accountable. Such a culture of impunity is incompatible with a serious sports institution, especially when the president combines private business with executive power. He keeps both the cabbage and the goat safe. Since 2021, fragilities have exploded: administrative tensions, complaints against executives, internal probes into mismanagement. The case of Secretary General Véron Mosengo-Omba, involving a Swiss investigation and internal audits, exemplifies this amateurism. The CAF touts a compliance department and "zero tolerance," but responses remain minimal: laconic press releases, no detailed public reports. No catharsis, no acknowledgment of flaws, no lessons learned or imposed reforms. Suspicions persist, fueled by presumed ties between the presidency and economic interests. This scandal highlights enduring opacities, where crises are handled in a closed circle, stoking doubts about governance and equity. Administratively, the CAF survives: competitions launched, sponsors reassured. But on the ground, the fiasco is evident. Vague rules, non-independent refereeing: these ills breed resentment among aggrieved federations, furious clubs, and disillusioned fans. The latest statement from the head of refereeing perfectly illustrates the situation following the scandal of the last AFCON final. This structural instability undermines the commercial and sporting credibility of continental football. The facade of balance conceals real frustrations; leadership is seen everywhere as complicit in the regrettable status quo. Motsepe has the network and influence to reform. Instead, his obsession with compromise preserves balances at the expense of the rupture promised in Rabat in March 2021: codifying transparency, publishing decisions, strictly framing conflicts of interest, starting with his own. By placating all sides, he satisfies none, nurturing toxic distrust. A deliberate behavior. In globalized football, where trust equals revenue, this drifting presidency risks costing Africa dearly. *Let's connect this to what happened in Morocco. The Kingdom promises grand things to Africa and delivers. It is rewarded in the worst way: its party is ruined, with no respect for the country, its efforts, or football itself. A pitiful image of African football circles the world. The responsible person, the one who must decide, remains indifferent as usual in such situations.* What does Motsepe do? He expresses discontent and promises reforms. More hollow promises. Has he truly kept a single one since 2021? Here too, he keeps the cabbage and the goat: business oblige, he sympathizes with Morocco, and everyone knows why, but says nothing about what must be done. He sails in his obsessive neutrality. He has still managed to disgust Moroccan citizens—and not only them. Many now demand turning their backs on the CAF. **A majority protests no longer want the Women's AFCON in Morocco or other competitions on national soil. Motsepe's response: the Women's AFCON will take place as scheduled. Some read this as a threat...** Moroccans are kind, welcoming, generous, *but above all not naive.* They are fed up with the man's and his institution's hypocrisy, and demand justice. He responds half-heartedly: "Go to the CAS if you want justice..." The lack of courage is blatant. The CAF under Motsepe is adrift.

Under Attaf's Eyes, Ghali Begs for His "Peace Bill" in Madrid... 11063

Aziz Daouda, 4 mon.
It took guts. Ibrahim Ghali had them. From the Tindouf camps, this lawless, timeless no-man's-land, the Polisario leader saw fit to announce his willingness to "share the peace bill" with Morocco. Context is key to grasping the ploy. The statement came the day before his trip to Madrid, where the U.S. embassy would host a meeting this Sunday, with Morocco presenting its self-determination plan for the southern provinces. Worth noting: Mauritania would attend... and Algeria too. This Algeria, which had told itself it wasn't involved in the talks, is represented by the very same foreign minister who once wouldn't even entertain the idea... The declaration is so grotesque it deserves a direct spot in the museum of contemporary diplomatic absurdities. Let's get serious: How do you share a bill when you've never paid a dime? How do you talk peace when you've built your entire political existence on systematically rejecting every solution? How do you invoke compromise when you're surviving on financial, political, and security life support from your host country, incapable of the slightest autonomous move? Ibrahim Ghali isn't a peace actor. He is the cost, accumulated over nearly half a century. The most pathetic part of this outburst isn't its content, but what it reveals: a movement running on fumes, reduced to recycling technocratic jargon for lack of any credible ideology left. After the fantasized "armed struggle," after hollow threats of total war, after hundreds of martial communiqués drafted to sustain the illusion for a captive audience, here comes the era of political begging dressed up as responsibility. The Polisario liberates nothing, builds nothing, proposes nothing. It blocks, delays, confiscates. And now, it wants to bill. But bill for what? Exactly what "peace bill" is Ghali talking about? The decades of sequestering Sahrawi populations, deprived of basic rights? The diverted international humanitarian aid, resold and conveniently reinvested far from Tindouf? The human capital sacrificed on the altar of an obsolete separatism? Or the artificial survival of a politico-military apparatus that only exists because others prop it up? Those others now gasping for air themselves. It takes supreme cynicism to talk peace after living, or at least believing in, even a fictional war for fifty years. Ghali's sudden conversion to the language of moderation isn't some moral epiphany, obviously. It's dictated by panic. Panic at the dossier's irreversible evolution. Panic at the international realignment. Panic at the increasingly clear U.S. signals. Panic, above all, at the growing recognition of an obvious truth that even the Polisario's traditional backers no longer dare contest openly: the separatist project is dead, drained of all credibility. Its death certificate will be signed in Madrid this weekend, in the presence of its godfather. Yesterday, Ghali promised escalation. Today, he begs for talks. This isn't strategy—it's a survival reflex. When he claims the Polisario "won't substitute itself for the Sahrawis," the hypocrisy hits new heights. Who has spoken in their name without ever consulting them? Who confiscated their future under the pretext of representing them? Who turned entire generations into diplomatic bargaining chips? Certainly not Morocco, which invests, develops, and integrates. But a frozen apparatus, churning out nothing but outdated slogans dictated by its sponsor's services. **As for the ritual invocation of "international legality," it's now pure Pavlovian reflex. A magic formula mechanically repeated by a structure with no legal, political, or historical grounding anymore and likely no credibility left among the sequestered. The world has changed, international law evolves, and the Polisario keeps waving resolutions like relics, hoping for a miracle.** Reality is brutal: Morocco has no "peace bill" to share with the Polisario. It has already paid, and keeps paying, in investments, stability, political vision, and diplomatic credibility. The autonomy plan under Moroccan sovereignty isn't a concession: it's the solution. Everything else is ideological folklore. The Polisario, for its part, has nothing to offer. No territory. No project. No renewed legitimacy. Just political, moral, and human debts to the sequestered it's clumsily trying to offload onto others. Let Ibrahim Ghali keep his bills. Let him send them to those who host him, fund him, and still dictate his outbursts. The process marches on, reality asserts itself, and history's train doesn't stop for clandestine passengers waving expired tickets. Welcome to Madrid, Mr. Attaf but beware, neither Morocco nor the U.S. have time to waste. They have far better things to do than listen to you and put up with the idiocy. In Madrid, Morocco is represented by Nasser Bourita, Algeria by Ahmed Attaf, Mauritania by Mohamed Salem Ould Merzoug. Mohamed Yeslem Beissat will be there for the Polisario and listen like a good student to the dictation. In diplomatic precaution, lest anyone forget the UN's involvement, the UN Secretary-General's personal envoy, Staffan de Mistura, is invited. But no one's fooled: it's the U.S. steering the ship, with one agenda item: the autonomy plan under Moroccan sovereignty, and nothing else. Morocco has fleshed it out, expanding from the initial 5-page project to about forty pages today, no more.

Immigration: Spain Wins, Europe Shoots Itself in the Foot... 11368

Aziz Daouda, 4 mon.
Spain under Pedro Sánchez has adopted a pro-immigration policy in stark contrast to the hardening observed in most European countries. While Europe as a whole tightens the screws on migrants and pins all its weaknesses and dysfunctions on them, Madrid bets on their integration through work, reaping in return the continent's strongest economic growth in 2025. Most European nations base their migration policies on restriction and expulsion. The European Union is even considering return hubs outside its borders to speed up deportations and more harshly punish refusals to leave, under pressure from far-right forces. Countries like Germany, France, and Italy have tightened quotas and procedures in 2025, wrongly perceiving migrants as a source of social and economic tensions. Isn't this a real long-term economic and social suicide... Pedro Sánchez, for his part, reaffirms that legal immigration is an economic asset and a demographic necessity, with migrants already making up 13% of the country's workforce. In May 2025, a reform of the foreigners' regulations expanded corridors for agriculture, construction, tech, and healthcare, fast-tracking permits for graduates and startups. At the end of January 2026, the government announced the regularization of 500,000 undocumented migrants who arrived before the end of 2025, via an expedited procedure for those without criminal records. In 2025, Spain recorded +2.8% GDP growth, twice that of the eurozone, boosted by tourism, household consumption, and falling unemployment. Foreigners drove 80% of the increase in the active population from 2022-2024, offsetting the decline in native workers. A report forecasts a continued positive impact through 2026, with +0.5 points of GDP thanks to migratory inflows. Madrid is betting on integration through employment rather than exclusion. Sánchez presents this model as a blueprint for an aging Europe, highlighting the economic rationale of managed migration. Direct consequence: Spain enjoys a full-throttle economy despite internal criticism and tensions stirred by various right-wing forces. For 2026, Spain plans to digitize permit renewals and boost industrialization with foreign talent. This isolated choice strengthens its dynamism but exposes it to internal political tensions, while sparking a continental debate on the virtues of managed immigration. In contrast, restrictive Europe is paying a heavy price for its anti-immigration choices. While Spain prospers thanks to its openness, countries that have toughened their migration policies: Germany, France, Italy, face glaring labor shortages in vital sectors: agriculture, construction, healthcare, logistics, and hospitality. These essential jobs, unattractive to nationals, remain under strain, mechanically hampering economic growth due to a lack of hands and brains. The decline in fertility worsens this demographic impasse. With rates below 1.5 children per woman in most European countries, the active population is inexorably contracting, leading to more retirees to support, fewer young people to produce and contribute. Germany, for example, forecasts a shortfall of 7 million workers by 2035, while France sees its hospitals and fields suffering from staff shortages. Result: anemic growth, around 1% in the eurozone in 2025, far from Spain's 2.8%. How to reverse the trend? Options are dwindling: forced retirement age increases, which anger unions; timid natalist incentives, ineffective in the short term; or partial automation, costly and unsuited to manual jobs. Without regulated migratory inflows, these aging nations risk stagnation that can only lead to decline. Spain thus shows the way for those who want to integrate through work to turn a constraint into an engine. In these troubled times, proponents of the "great replacement" theory, this apocalyptic vision of a submerged Europe, unfortunately find growing popular echo, fueled by fears and also by the failures of restrictive policies. Yet the facts speak for themselves: it's the refusal of managed immigration that is suffocating economies, not reasoned welcoming. In reality, the various right-wing factions and their ideologues are against certain immigration, not others; except that the countries once suppliers of workers have changed. They are richer, industrializing, and facing birth rate deficits themselves. Sánchez, isolated but visionary, is in fact openly inviting Europe to a pragmatic awakening before it's too late.

AFCON’s Transition to a Quadrennial Cycle: Between Global Prestige and Endogenous Development 11370

Imad Khater, 4 mon.
The structural landscape of African continental football is currently navigating a period of significant strategic turbulence. At the heart of the discourse lies the proposed shift of the Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) from a biennial to a quadrennial frequency. This is far from a mere scheduling adjustment; it represents a profound reconfiguration of the continent’s sports political economy. This transition, oscillating between a desire for alignment with international standards and the preservation of regional specificities, raises a pivotal question: is CAF embarking on a vital modernization, or is it yielding to globalized hegemonic pressures? The Economics of Scarcity: Pursuing the "Premium" Model Proponents of a four-year cycle primarily argue through the logic of asset appreciation via scarcity. Until now, the biennial frequency—while generating consistent cash flow—has tended to dilute the competition’s symbolic and commercial prestige. By opting for an extended cycle, CAF is adopting a "premiumization" strategy modeled after the UEFA Euros or the FIFA World Cup. The Moroccan experience serves as a clear precedent: it demonstrated that top-tier infrastructure, coupled with sophisticated marketing engineering, can capture global investment far more effectively than a succession of editions with inconsistent standards. The objective is to transform a recurring event into a historical landmark, thereby driving up international broadcasting bids and attracting blue-chip commercial partners. Sports Diplomacy and Talent Emancipation The second pillar of this reform is inextricably linked to the power dynamics with European football. The biennial calendar has long been a theater of conflicting loyalties for athletes. For the continent’s elite players, departing mid-season posed a systemic risk to their physical integrity and remained a constant source of friction with their clubs. An AFCON held every four years, ideally synchronized with global summer windows, would serve as a diplomatic de-escalation tool. Players would no longer be perceived as a "liability" or an uncertainty by European scouts during transfer windows, thus bolstering their market value and securing their ascent within the global elite without scheduling impediments. The Downside: Historical Inertia and Structural Depletion However, a comprehensive analysis must account for the risks this shift poses to the continent’s internal dynamics. The Specter of Invisibility and Stalled Progression: In a biennial system, failing to qualify is merely a temporary setback. Under a quadrennial rhythm, missing a single edition condemns a nation to an eight-year absence. For a generation of talent, this often means an entire international career spent without the exposure of a major tournament. Furthermore, this slowdown freezes the record books; dominant nations see their hegemony "sanctified" by time, making it nearly impossible for emerging nations to bridge the historical gap within a human timeframe. Impact on Development and Solidarity: Historically, AFCON has functioned in Africa as a catalyst for public infrastructure projects (stadiums, roads, telecommunications). Spacing out the tournaments inevitably slows this pace of modernization. Moreover, the biennial frequency allowed CAF to redistribute vital funds more regularly to "smaller" federations. A four-year cycle risks drying up these financial flows, which are essential for the survival of grassroots football in less affluent countries, potentially widening the chasm between major nations and the rest. The Shadow of FIFA: Toward a Globalized Order In reality, this mutation aligns with a vision driven by Zurich. FIFA’s role in this transition is decisive, operating through three main levers: Calendar Harmonization: FIFA is pushing for a cycle mirrored on the European model to mitigate friction with employing clubs. Financial Substitution: Through the "FIFA Forward" program, the global body is replacing the event-based financial dependence of African federations with a direct institutional dependence. Format Diversification: Support for new competitions, such as an African Nations League, aims to fill the commercial void left by the AFCON’s spacing, maintaining the continent under permanent structural oversight. The Gamble of Qualitative Sovereignty Ultimately, the move to a four-year cycle is a bold bet on quality over quantity. While this choice may appear as a concession to European leagues and FIFA pressure, it also represents a necessary move upmarket to solidify CAF’s global credibility. However, for this revolution to succeed, Africa must transform the record-breaking revenues of a "Premium" AFCON into robust financial equalization mechanisms. The stakes are critical: ensuring that the excellence of the sporting showcase does not result in the abandonment of local foundations or the marginalization of the continent's most vulnerable footballing nations.

When Compliments Turn Suspicious: Morocco Doesn't Need FIFA's Praises... 10501

Aziz Daouda, 5 mon.
The recent statement from the FIFA president praising Morocco for its football development might, at first glance, seem like legitimate recognition of the Kingdom's efforts. Modern infrastructure, successful organization of major events, continental and World Cup performances, seven finals won out of ten played: Morocco has indeed established itself as a central player in African and global football. But behind this flattering discourse, a disturbing question arises: who really benefits from this communication operation, and what is it trying to make us forget? No one can seriously dispute the progress made by Moroccan football in recent years. Structured training centers, massive public investments in stadiums and academies, a continental outreach strategy, organization of CAF competitions and soon FIFA ones: Morocco has become a model often cited in Africa. Yet, it is precisely because these advances are real that they don't need to be buried under layers of dithyrambic discourse. Sporting and structural merit is measured on the pitch, in the stands, in governance not in opportunistic declarations. When the FIFA president multiplies praises, he doesn't just "recognize" progress; he also tries to shape public perception, frame the narrative to his advantage, turning a political and economic relationship into a consensual success story. The timing of these statements is not neutral. They come amid a climate still charged by the incidents during the CAN final, events that deeply shocked Moroccan public opinion and left a sense of injustice and frustration. Yet, in response to these, the CAF and by extension, the politico-sporting ecosystem it belongs to gave answers deemed at best lax, ambiguous, even unjust and complacent. In this context, FIFA's effusive compliments ring like an attempt at "psychological crowd management": stroking egos to help the bitter pill go down. It reminds Morocco that it is an essential partner, admired, "exemplary," hoping the positive emotion from recognition will erase the resentment from how certain files were handled in Africa. Moroccans expect institutions to be exemplary, as Morocco has been sufficiently so. This kind of excessive discourse also creates fertile ground for envy, if not jealousy, on a continent where sporting rivalries are often amplified by political stakes. By recurrently placing Morocco on a public pedestal, FIFA inevitably stirs the sensitivities of neighbors or regional competitors, fueling belligerent actions on and off the pitch under the guise of healthy competition. Rather than easing tensions, these praises exacerbate divides, turning football into a geopolitical battlefield. This type of strategy is not new: when sports institutions are called out, they rarely respond with self-questioning or transparency, preferring communication, storytelling, subtle flattery, and symbolism. Morocco then becomes less a country to respect than a public to calm, an actor to appease with words, without necessarily taking actions that would truly restore trust. In essence, the president's statement commits to nothing. It costs little, repairs nothing, and corrects no dysfunction. It doesn't revisit the controversial handling of the CAN final, question responsibilities, or propose improvements to decision-making or sanction mechanisms. It simply celebrates Morocco as a "good student" in world football, without daring to confront the system's dark spots. This speech is thus devoid of real political weight. It resembles a symbolic gift offered to the Moroccan public to better divert attention from more sensitive questions: the credibility of governing bodies, the fairness of decisions, power dynamics within the CAF and FIFA, and how certain states are favored or penalized based on interests beyond the strictly sporting realm. Didn't Morocco deserve the Doha final? In other words, Morocco is given a compliment meant to soothe, while what its supporters, leaders, and football actors expect are concrete actions, clarifications, and truly fair, transparent treatment. This type of communication also reveals a paternalistic view of African public opinions. As if a football-passionate people could be reassured or "bought" with a few flattering phrases, as if addressing an emotional mass ready to forget serious incidents as soon as a flattering image is reflected back. Yet, the Moroccan public today is informed, connected, politicized in its relationship to football. It understands governance stakes, spots inconsistencies, dissects suspicious decisions. It knows the difference between sincere recognition and a communication ploy aimed at cushioning a shock or protecting an institution's image. It is not gullible. By continuing to favor flattery over responsibility, football's major institutions maintain a disconnect with the maturity of supporters. They persist in believing a compliment suffices to make people forget an injustice, that a handshake will erase a humiliation witnessed live by millions of viewers. Moroccan football does not demand praises: it wants respect, respect for rules, procedures, commitments, equity, and transparency principles. For FIFA to recognize its development is a reality, almost a given. But this recognition only makes sense if paired with coherent behavior when Morocco, or any other country, suffers damaging incidents, especially in major competitions like the CAN. An institution's true value is measured less by what it says in calm times than by what it does in moments of crisis. As long as responses to serious incidents remain timid, ambiguous, or lax, fiery declarations about the "Moroccan example" will ring hollow. Morocco has no need for inconsequential compliments. What it demands, like all peoples who take sport seriously, is football governance worthy of its sacrifices, investments, and passion. Words fade; decisions endure. And it is on those that FIFA and the CAF will be judged.

We Must Save the African Games... 9335

Aziz Daouda, 5 mon.
Let it be quickly noted that the title is not mine but the one chosen by David Ojong, Secretary General of the Cameroonian Olympic and Sports Committee, for a book he has just published and which is available on Amazon. David Ojong, a dear friend, honored me by asking me to write the postface for this book, which he recently presented at a solemn event in Yaoundé. Along with David and many others, we share the conviction that the African Games, the continent's flagship event, are in peril. Faced with deep structural, institutional, and cultural challenges, they struggle to fulfill their original mission: to unite Africa around Olympic values enriched with a distinct identity. In his book, the author advocates for a renovation of the African Games by clearly posing the question of what role for ACNOA in continental sports leadership?* Today, the Games are torn between the African Union, supported by an organization lacking stature or competence: the UCSA (Union of African Sports Confederations) and ACNOA (the Association of African Olympic Committees), which itself displays chronic weakness. In this particularly African context, David Ojong provides a lucid assessment of the situation and proposes concrete pathways for renewal. This major contribution challenges all actors in the African sports movement, from the African Union to the Association of African National Olympic Committees (ACNOA), amid institutional tensions that dangerously undermine the event. He highlights the latent frictions among stakeholders. ACNOA, meant to play a pivotal role, suffers from flawed governance that erodes the regularity and quality of the Games. Past editions have revealed recurring issues: organizational delays, lack of stable funding, and poorly managed competition with other continental bodies. The author analyzes these dysfunctions through a rigorous methodological framework, legal, sociopolitical, and comparative, to demonstrate that without profound restructuring, the Games risk losing their luster and disappearing altogether. At the heart of these challenges lies leadership. ACNOA must strategically reposition itself, assuming a strong coordination role. Ojong advocates integrating traditional African sports to reconcile the event with its cultural roots and boost its appeal. This approach is no gimmick; it aims to transform the Games into a platform for soft power, promoting African unity on the international stage, including an innovative proposal: creating AOSA. Faced with these challenges, the author advances a bold idea: the creation of an African Olympic and Sports Association (AOSA). This new entity would bring together all vital forcesO, lympic Committees, African Confederations via CASOL (Association of African Confederations of Olympic Sports, recently created under the presidency of Hamad Kalkaba Malboum, president of the African Athletics Confederation), states, and international partners, in an inclusive and forward-looking vision. AOSA would enable unified governance, free from petty quarrels, and pave the way for optimal athlete preparation with known and fixed timelines for the Games. In this context, ACNOA must support African athletes in their preparation to enable a more impactful and effective African participation in the Olympic Games. This vision aligns with proven, low-cost pragmatic initiatives. As I argued in the book's postface, ACNOA should invest in specialized training groups housed in African sports centers. Funded by Olympic Solidarity, these programs would fill the gap left by under-resourced clubs, universities, and federations, especially in the continent's least favored countries. The result? Enhanced performances at the Olympic Games and a daily ACNOA presence among African youth, fostering sustainable development through sport. The book is, in essence, a plea for the future of African sport. Beyond the technical aspects, David Ojong issues a passionate call to all the continent's vital forces for greater vision and seriousness. The African Games are more than a competition; they embody identity-building, an economic and social lever. In a world where regional specificities are gaining recognition, Africa must forge innovative sports leadership. Ojong asks the right questions: How to turn tensions into synergies? How to mobilize Olympic funds for continental excellence? This book is not an end in itself but a starting point. It invites decision-makers, leaders, researchers, and athletes to constructive dialogue. Through his rigor and passion, David Ojong charts a clear path. It is up to the African sports community to follow it, so that the Games once again become the radiant mirror of our dynamism and unity. The renewal of the African Games is a strategic imperative for Africa: David Ojong's call for unified, representative, and effective leadership comes at the perfect time given their current lamentable state.

Europe Has Finally Chosen Rabat for the Future... 9496

Aziz Daouda, 5 mon.
The European Union (EU) adopted a common position at the end of January 2026 on the Moroccan Sahara issue, explicitly supporting the Moroccan autonomy plan under its sovereignty over these provinces. The Union formally recognizes that the Moroccan solution is realistic and definitive to the artificial Sahara dispute, formerly occupied by Spain at the expense of the Sharifian Empire. This was no surprise given the already established positions of major European powers. However, this unanimous consensus of the 27 member states marks a major diplomatic breakthrough for the Sharifian Kingdom, driven by international momentum and crowned by UN Security Council Resolution 2797 in October 2025, which explicitly calls for negotiations exclusively on the basis of the autonomy plan put forward by Morocco. This position, aligned with those of many European countries expressed separately such as France, Spain, and Germany, strengthens the international legitimacy of the Moroccan plan. It opens prospects for reinforced strategic partnerships with the Union, particularly in economic matters through increased trade agreements, and in security, amid managing migratory flows and combating terrorism threats in the Sahel region. For Rabat, this recognition consolidates the effective integration of the Sahara into the Kingdom, de facto achieved since 1976. It will inexorably accelerate investments in the country's southern provinces, fostering unprecedented inclusive development in the region: road infrastructure, the Dakhla Atlantique port, renewable energy with over 1,000 MW, and modern universities. Confident in its historical and geographical rights, backed by unassailable national unity, Morocco has not waited for this support to act. For nearly 20 years, a rigorous development strategy, including the New Development Model (NDM), has transformed the regions in question, rendering any solution other than Moroccan sovereignty obsolete. Day by day, the Kingdom's arguments have gained echo and credibility, its proposal proving just and logical. Europe, just 14 km from Morocco's northern coasts, gains diplomatic coherence and benefits from North African stability embodied by the Sharifian Kingdom. The new resolution thus facilitates major trade agreements, such as the EU-Morocco fishing agreement extended in 2024 despite ludicrous challenges. Morocco, moreover, serves as the reliable pivot that stopped over 45,000 irregular crossings in 2024, according to Frontex, unlike other countries in the region. These are extremely costly operations for the Kingdom. European gains and regional momentum are therefore consolidated here. Beyond that, the new resolution spurs inclusive North African economic integration, provided Algeria returns to the long-hoped-for pragmatism and aligns with the course of history. Nothing is less certain for the moment. The context is that Morocco is emerging as a high-performing regional hub. It is now connected to West Africa and the Sahel via its highway network and the Tiznit-Dakhla expressway, the port of Tanger Med (Africa's number one), and the deep-water port of Dakhla, nearing final completion. Its trade with the region is growing, particularly with exponentially rising exports to sub-Saharan Africa. Arab unanimity in favor of the Moroccanness of the southern provinces and the African alignment that is tending to generalize, except for a few ideological exceptions or those under the influence of millions of dollars, accelerate this continental dynamic. In contrast, Algeria is increasingly isolating itself, mocked by a global consensus rejecting its far-fetched theses. Heir to a bygone military-political regime, Algiers feeds on low-intensity conflicts to legitimize the omnipotence of an army contested by an oppressed people, stifled by repression, as evidenced by the Hirak protests crushed since 2019. Any hint of change is nipped in the bud. The art of exporting crises has reached its peak there and is now running out of steam. Sahel countries: Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, are increasingly openly criticizing Algeria's actions, seen as destabilizing through support for the Polisario, among other things. It is proven that the latter maintains more than relations with terrorist organizations plundering the region. It is in this environment that the intensification of U.S. pressure for direct Morocco-Algeria dialogue fits, a dialogue always advocated without complex by Rabat. Algiers seems to struggle to digest this European debacle, compounded by the UN resolution and the fact that Morocco was invited by President Trump to join the new Peace Council as a founding member. Algerian media, usually loquacious and venomous, maintain a deafening silence or at most a statement attributed to a Sahrawi organization of dubious existence, calling on Europe to comply with a European Court decision, for lack of room to maneuver. Growing Russo-Chinese neutrality, the retreat of Iran, whose Revolutionary Guards and proxies are now classified as terrorist organizations by the United States and this same Europe, drastically weaken Algerian theses and reduce its margins for maneuver. The Polisario, the Saharan proxy artificially maintained by Algiers and covertly supported by Iran, risks eventual moral and logistical collapse. Its representatives, who recently went to the USA thinking they were negotiators, were relegated to the rank of "thugs" after undergoing a tough interrogation, particularly on their ties to Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Algiers' berets, losing influence and facing internal tensions, consequently have nothing left to hope for without aligning with the international community. Supplying gas and oil is no longer enough to weigh in or impose oneself. Price fluctuations, the broad diversification of suppliers, and embargoes envisioned against recalcitrants turn it into a vulnerability rather than an asset. Algiers will have to understand this, and quickly. The European position on the Moroccan Sahara is the final nail in the coffin of the Algerian Trojan horse, for those who can read the geopolitical fault lines.

AFCON 2025: When Realpolitik and Institutional Influence Overpower the Rule of Law 9608

Imad Khater, 5 mon.
The ruling issued by CAF on January 29, 2026, regarding the tumultuous conclusion of the Morocco-Senegal final, transcends mere sporting arbitration. It signals the emergence of a structural denial of justice where Realpolitik has effectively superseded codified norms. By delivering this verdict of convenience, CAF has squandered a pivotal historical opportunity. Legal recourse through the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) now stands as the sole remaining avenue to restore the primacy of law over political maneuvering. This step is essential to transform a denial of justice into a redemptive legislative precedent, capable of dismantling the impunity of those who believe they can subvert the system through "pitch-side sedition." Tactical Obstruction and the Legal Grey Zone Contrary to the radical interpretations circulated in the heat of the moment, the Senegalese squad never executed an irreversible physical withdrawal from the field. By remaining within the technical perimeter, the actors de facto neutralized the application of Article 82 of the CAF regulations. However, this technical distinction does not diminish the gravity of the events. We witnessed a strategic "hostage-taking" of the match. By instrumentalizing the pitch's grey zones, Senegal exerted overwhelming psychological and administrative pressure on the officiating crew, paralyzing the natural flow of the game. This "perimeter sedition" constitutes a major breach of sporting ethics: a manifestation of "might makes right" rather than the rule of law. By validating this conduct, CAF has effectively sanctioned the threat of withdrawal as a legitimate negotiating lever during a match. The Urgency of a Sui Generis Disciplinary Framework The current continental sporting law is trapped in an obsolete binarism: a match is either played or abandoned. In the face of such systemic obstruction, the existing legal regime resembles a "tree bearing bitter fruit." It is now imperative to establish a specific offense of obstruction. The law cannot remain silent when a team saturates the technical space to freeze the clock and coerce a favorable outcome. Future reforms must focus on intentionality: any refusal to resume play, even if the team remains on the sidelines, should result in an automatic forfeit. Without this "scientization" of sanctions, African football is condemned to permanent legal insecurity. Institutional "Entrisme" and the Shadow of Hard Power Analysis reveals a glaring asymmetry of power. While Morocco has invested in contributory "Soft Power," Senegal appears to have secured judicial "Hard Power." It is now evident that the Senegalese Federation is deeply embedded within the inner sanctums of CAF. The presence of a national figure at the helm of the Disciplinary Committee—notwithstanding any formal recusal—creates an insurmountable structural bias. This "Solomonic justice"—sacrificing a fuse (the coach) to protect the institution (the trophy)—is a calculated maneuver of Realpolitik designed to appease a federation whose institutional influence now dictates the tempo of verdicts at the expense of equity. The Referee’s Report: A Veil for Incompetence The Disciplinary Committee has retreated into willful blindness by relying exclusively on the reports of referees and officials, disregarding material, chronometric, and video evidence. The "Judge and Party" Conflict: The referee, whose loss of authority was the primary catalyst for the chaos, cannot be considered a legitimate or objective narrator of the facts. Administrative Distortion: By relying on these often laconic or biased minutes, the Commission deliberately prioritized administrative finality over the reality of the pitch. This creates a vicious cycle where officials are shielded to avoid applying the full rigor of the law against the champion. Conclusion: From Influence to Modernity For months, a complacent media narrative attempted to portray Fouzi Lekjaa as the "demiurge" of CAF. However, this verdict demonstrates that real power lies elsewhere. By prioritizing political stability over legal rigor, CAF has undermined its own credibility. Morocco, guided by the strategic vision of His Majesty the King, must now act as the champion of institutional modernity. A referral to the CAS is not merely a protest; it is a necessity to break the cycle of impunity and ensure that no entity can hijack the system through political leverage.

Africa of Narratives: The Media Silence That Handicaps Rabat... 9716

Aziz Daouda, 5 mon.
The press is never neutral and never will be.It doesn't just report facts: it ranks them, amplifies them, or stifles them. In Africa, where the battle for influence plays out as much in newsrooms as in chancelleries, media power is a central indicator of real leadership. In this game, the comparison between Morocco and Senegal, judged by the facts recorded during the CAN final, is brutal. It's a textbook case. It highlights a disturbing truth: Morocco acts massively across the continent but speaks little or goes unheard, while Senegal, with more limited means, imposes its voice. Senegal boasts an age-old media capital, forged by history, a culture of debate, and a press that has never fully abandoned its critical role. Dakar remains a nerve center for francophone African discourse. Its media transform a national event into a continental issue, a local controversy into a pan-African debate. They master the art of storytelling: giving meaning, creating emotion, shaping opinion. A quick look at *Le Soleil*, the historic state newspaper and circulation leader, or *Walfadjri*, a powerful, conservative, and critical group, is enough to gauge its reach. **Morocco presents a striking paradox. The country invests, finances, builds, trains, and advances by giant strides. It promotes win-win partnerships, positions itself as a major player in African development, and claims a deep continental strategic footprint. Yet this ambition runs up against a glaring weakness: the absence of a Moroccan press that is audible and influential on the African scale. Moroccan media abound, sometimes technically proficient, but remain confined to internal dialogue. Africa often appears there as diplomatic scenery, rarely as a living space for debate.** This shortfall carries a heavy political cost. Without powerful relays, the Moroccan narrative, when it exists—struggles to take hold. Its successes go unnoticed, its positions are poorly understood, its silences interpreted as admissions of weakness or lack of humility. While others seize the space, Morocco lets the battle for perceptions slip away. In Africa, those who don't tell their own story accept others telling it for them, with their biases and lies when bad faith enters the mix. The Sahara affair demonstrated this for decades, with persistent residues: the neighbor's narrative took root in many minds, peddling falsehoods, historical distortions, even geographical falsehoods. This absence of voice is also reflected in the silence of the elites. Moroccan ministers are discreet, if not absent, from African airwaves. Ambassadors shy away from major continental debates. Moroccan experts are invisible in pan-African media: Morocco is present physically and materially, but absent narratively. In contrast, Senegalese figures, political, diplomatic, or intellectual, flood the regional media space. They explain, justify, challenge, fully aware that influence is built through public discourse. Football, too often reduced to mere spectacle by shortsighted decision-makers, brutally exposes these imbalances. A heavy defeat can remain a minor incident or become a political and symbolic event. When a sports fact circulates in Africa, it's not the score that strikes but how it's told, commented on, debated. Things may go well on the pitch; what matters is the media narrative. The sanctions from the Confederation of African Football (CAF) confirm this reality. Their impact goes beyond sport: they become subjects of debate, tools of pressure, levers of influence. Where some media amplify, contextualize, and politicize the event, others suffer it, whine without convincing. Morocco too often adopts this defensive posture, lacking a press capable of imposing its reading of the facts and a solid narrative. Today, the impression prevails that the continent has ganged up against the Kingdom, seen as a corrupter of the system and absolute master of the CAF. In reality, we are far, very far from that. Yet try convincing a young African otherwise: some even view the sanctions against Senegal as unfair. *The problem is not quantitative but strategic. Morocco doesn't lack media; it lacks an African vision. Few correspondents on the continent, weak multilingual presence, absence of pan-African platforms: so many handicaps in a hyper-connected Africa. Add to that an editorial caution that stifles debate, while influence arises from clashing ideas.* The diagnosis is irrefutable. Morocco cannot sustainably claim a central role in Africa without investing the media field. It needs offensive, credible media capable of speaking to* Africa and with*Africa;* visible, assertive voices present in controversies and substantive debates. Modern power is no longer measured solely in kilometers of highways, banks, or signed agreements, but in the ability to impose a narrative. **Morocco must never forget the all-out war waged against it, including in the media. It must integrate this as a core component of its African policy.** As long as it leaves this terrain to others, those who, jealous and insecure, bet on disinformation, slander, and lies, its ambitions will remain fragile at best. **Good faith never wins alone: it advances alongside bad faith.** It's the swiftest, most composed, most persuasive, the one that hits back, that triumphs in the end.

Enough is Enough, Mr. Motsepe... 8834

Aziz Daouda, 5 mon.
Letter to Mr. Patrice Motsepe, President of the Confederation of African Football, in response to his statement following the decision of your disciplinary commission. No, Mr. President, you cannot shift onto a host country, in this case, Morocco, the burden of the CAF's chronic weaknesses and the hesitant governance of its disciplinary bodies. By endorsing sanctions perceived as harsh toward Morocco, while sparing those who spoiled a final meant to be the crowning glory of the 2025 AFCON, your discourse on "integrity" and "the image of African football" comes across less as a moral awakening than as a convenient reversal of responsibilities. It is not Morocco that has undermined the CAF's credibility: it is the decisions, the unspoken issues, the legal contradictions, and the off-kilter communication surrounding this dossier. Morocco is not an ordinary defendant before the CAF; it is one of its main pillars. While others shy away from organizational, logistical, and security demands, it is the Kingdom that opens its stadiums, airports, hotels, and cities to competitions that many refuse to risk hosting. The 2025 AFCON mobilized infrastructure upgraded at forced march, nine stadiums meeting international standards, smooth logistics, and security that was widely praised, delivering a tournament that no one disputes on organizational grounds. To now tell this same country that it must also absorb the symbolic and sporting bill for the CAF's regulatory inconsistencies is to punish the very actor who contributed most to the event's success. When Morocco is sanctioned, it is not just federation officials who are targeted; it is millions of Moroccans who feel aggrieved. They filled the stadiums, showcased the country's hospitality, turned this AFCON into a showcase for the continent—only to see their national team, already honored with a fair play award, caught up in a verdict deemed "incomprehensible" even in the international press. How do you explain to these citizens that an exemplary host country, organizationally speaking, is treated with such severity, while the legal qualification of the Senegalese team's temporary withdrawal or other behaviors that disrupted the final seems to have been handled with calculated leniency? The question at hand is one of coherence and proportionality. Many observers, including jurists and former CAF officials, highlight the inconsistencies in a decision where the displayed severity toward Morocco is not matched by equally firm and transparent treatment of all parties involved. The suspensions of Moroccan players and the fines imposed on the FRMF pile onto the rejection of the claim based on articles 82 and 84, while the handling of the opponent's behavior and the incidents that led to the match interruption, injuries to valiant stadium staff, and vandalized equipment leaves a sense of unfinished business. This imbalance fuels the perception that the CAF sought a "political balance" rather than clear sporting justice. Your statements, Mr. President, do announce a reform of the Disciplinary Code, more "appropriate and dissuasive" sanctions, and a commitment to protecting the integrity of African football. Your words thus confirm that what occurred during the final warrants heavy reprimand. Defending the integrity of African football should logically have started there, given the facts that the whole world deemed scandalous—except for your disciplinary commission, which openly encourages indiscipline. To millions of Moroccans, who have invested billions of dirhams in their infrastructure and staked their international image just a few years from a co-hosted 2030 World Cup, this sudden clarity comes too late and feels like a catch-up operation. Trust is not rebuilt with abstract promises, but with decisions that convey equal treatment, rigorous application of the rules, and respect for the sacrifices made by host countries. In reality, what is at stake goes far beyond a mere disciplinary dispute: it is the moral contract between the CAF and its most committed members that is in question. When a country that takes risks to host your competitions feels turned into a scapegoat to mask your own failings, the relationship turns toxic. And if Morocco were to say to you today: enough is enough. It cannot, it must not, pay for the legal ambiguities, political hesitations, and faltering governance of a confederation that hides behind the "independence" of its bodies while refusing to fully own the consequences of its choices. The CAF, under your leadership, has just taken another step toward perfidy against its star pupils, as if those working for the development of African football disturb someone somewhere... Are we not right in the midst of the red poppy syndrome, the one that stands out above the rest in the field? Yes, we are, Mr. President. Those who resent others' success because they cannot replicate it at home have triumphed. They threatened. They were heard. Morocco disturbs with its development, its unparalleled achievements, its diplomatic victories, its success in organizing and the quality it offered your confederation. It pays the price. The price of the naivety it has shown.

CAF Sanctions: Disciplinary Justice with Variable Geometry? 8698

Aziz Daouda, 5 mon.
The decisions by the Confederation of African Football (CAF) Disciplinary Commission regarding the incidents that marred the CAN final between Senegal and Morocco are now known. They were awaited, scrutinized, sometimes feared. But beyond their mere announcement, it is their **coherence, proportionality, and equity** that raise questions today. At first glance, the CAF sought to strike hard, giving the impression of sanctioning both parties to preserve a posture of balance. The CAF simply forgot that at its core, the conflict was squarely between Senegal and the referee, not with the Moroccan team, and thus, in the end, pitted Senegal against this very same CAF, responsible for the organization and officiating. Senegal and Morocco have thus, according to the commission's logic, presided over by a Senegalese, let us recall, been sanctioned to varying degrees. Yet, a close reading of the facts, confronted with the very content of the decisions rendered, reveals an **asymmetry that is hard to justify** between the severity of the acts observed and the weight of the sanctions imposed. The ridiculous is not far off. The central problem, namely, the officiating, has simply been swept aside. The most troubling element undoubtedly lies in the **total absence of any reference to the referee** in the Commission's ruling. As if he had never existed. Yet, the images and testimonies align: in the final moments, the referee displayed **manifest irresponsibility**. How can one justify resuming play when the minimum safety conditions were clearly not met? The stadium had been invaded by official Senegalese supporters, equipment had been vandalized, and tensions were at a boiling point. In such circumstances, the rules are clear: absolute priority must be given to the safety of players, officials, and the public. By ignoring this dimension, the Disciplinary Commission misses an **essential link in the chain of responsibilities**. They are, however, clearly identified. This is not to fully exonerate the Moroccan side. Reprehensible behaviors existed, and some hot-headed reactions could have been avoided. But the nature and gravity of these acts remain **incommensurable** with those attributable to the Senegalese delegation and its immediate environment. The most striking example remains the sanction imposed on Achraf Hakimi. Reproaching him for attempting to remove a towel belonging to the Senegalese goalkeeper—an object that, incidentally, had no business on the pitch—smacks more of a **search for artificial balance** than rigorous application of disciplinary principles. Can one seriously equate this gesture with outbursts involving pitch invasions and infrastructure damage? This harms the image of world football, beyond just African football. The inclusion of such an amalgam in the dossier and the proportionality of the sanctions are manifestly debatable. It is precisely on the terrain of proportionality that the CAF's decision falters. The sanctions imposed on the Moroccan camp appear **relatively heavy** given the facts reproached to them, especially when compared to those concerning the Senegalese side, which was linked to structurally far graver incidents. This disproportion undermines the narrative of those in Senegal and elsewhere who decried Morocco's supposed "stranglehold" on CAF bodies. If such influence truly existed, how to explain that Morocco itself ends up heavily sanctioned? Where is this alleged institutional protection when the disciplinary decisions, on the contrary, seem applied with particular rigor against it? One can only regret the missed opportunity for the CAF to show a new face of power and justice. The CAF Disciplinary Commission squandered a precious chance: to **clarify responsibilities, reaffirm the central role of officiating, and lay credible foundations** for managing crises in African competitions. By opting for punitive symmetry rather than a fine analysis of the facts, it perpetuates unease, fuels suspicions, and leaves the game's actors—players, officials, and fans, in a gray zone where perceived injustice becomes more damaging than the sanction itself. African football deserves better than disciplinary justice with variable geometry. It deserves an authority capable of owning its choices, naming responsibilities where they truly lie, and protecting the essentials: the integrity of the game and the safety of those who bring it to life. Today, some chuckle under their breath for escaping truly proportional sanctions for their misdeeds; others are stunned; still others conclude the immaturity of this African body, like other continental instances. A pitiful image for a continent whose youth aspires to development and a bright future, with football and footballers as role models. Has African football missed the chance to set an example? Did the CAF issue the wrong communiqué or target the wrong match? In any case, there is one clear winner slipping under the radar: the party at the origin of it all. Like a fugitive, the commission released its statement at an impossible hour... Funny, no? One wonders whether to hold out hope and pursue the process further, or resign oneself to admitting there is no hope for a just and credible African football body.

From Passion to Meaning: The CAN as a Test of Truth for Africanity... 8432

Aziz Daouda, 5 mon.
The Royal Cabinet's communiqué, published on January 22, 2026, following the CAN 2025 brilliantly hosted by Morocco, combines a call for calm after the Senegalese withdrawal episode with a celebration of an organizational success hailed across Africa and beyond. Through a measured and forward-looking tone, it transforms a sports tension into a demonstration of responsible continental leadership, faithful to a long-term vision for a united and prosperous Africa. Through the tone and content of the royal message, we understand that once the passion subsides, inter-African fraternity will naturally prevail: Morocco's success is also Africa's success. The CAN 2025 confirmed Morocco's ability to turn a continental tournament into a lever for development and influence. The smooth organization, modernized infrastructure, massive influx of supporters, and revitalization of key sectors such as tourism, transport, commerce, and services generated billions of dirhams in returns and around 100,000 direct and indirect jobs, with over 3,000 companies mobilized and some 500,000 supporters transported by Royal Air Maroc. The royal message places this success within a broader trajectory: that of a "great African country" which, in twenty-four months, has gained the equivalent of a decade of development in infrastructure and expertise, in service of its people and its continent. Without overlooking the "unfortunate" nature of the incidents in the Morocco-Senegal final, the communiqué opts for elevation over controversy. By recalling that once the passion has calmed, "inter-African fraternity will naturally prevail," it offers a mature reading of collective emotions and emphasizes that the Moroccan people "know how to put things in perspective" and reject resentment. The sports defeat thus turns into a symbolic and diplomatic victory: "hostile designs" and denigration are neutralized by strategic consistency, self-confidence, and the Kingdom's African anchoring. The Moroccan public in the stadium witnessed a grotesque tragedy, deliberately and premeditatedly staged, but was not fooled. They quickly understood, kept their calm and composure despite being deeply wounded. A noted and remarkable behavior that honors them and honors the Kingdom. In practice, as in history, Morocco-Senegal relations are imbued with a consolidated fraternity, strengthened on every occasion. The royal message thus takes on particular significance toward this brother country, with which relations are described as "exceptional and strategic," founded on shared memory, assumed African solidarity, deep religious fraternity, and strong economic convergences. The holding, on January 26 and 27 in Rabat, of the 15th Morocco-Senegal Joint High Commission, accompanied by an economic forum, gives concrete content to this resilient fraternity by relaunching investments, joint projects, and South-South cooperation in service of the two peoples and, by extension, all those in the region. Beyond the finalists, the communiqué addresses all African peoples by recalling that "nothing can alter the proximity cultivated over centuries" nor the "fruitful cooperation" forged with countries on the continent. It situates the CAN 2025 within a long-term strategy: capitalizing on intangible capital made of trust, visibility, and credibility, and using it as a springboard toward upcoming events, notably the 2030 World Cup, in an Africa that assumes its place on the world stage, seeks to establish it through continuity, and consolidate it. In this spirit, it is essential to reject deviations, racism, hate speech, media or ideological manipulations, from tarnishing our Africanity or denying its profound dignity. Being African means first sharing a geography, a history, cultures, struggles, and a common destiny, beyond borders, sports results, or political contingencies. We are not condemned to reproduce stupidity and hostility; on the contrary, we have the collective responsibility to make public space a place of encounter, listening, and fraternization, where intelligence, unconditional respect for human dignity, and curiosity about the other prevail over insult and stigmatization. In the straight line of the royal message, this CAN must remain a reminder: our African future will not be built in hatred or by imitating the worst reflexes, but in the ability to transform tensions into learning, competitions into bridges, and disagreements into opportunities for dialogue. We are Africans, together, through memory and through the future, and it is this shared consciousness that can make our stadiums, our cities, and our debates spaces of elevation rather than scenes of division. Attempts at destabilization orchestrated by some may, at best, cloud the horizon for the duration of a competition, but they cannot sustainably embed themselves in the consciousness of peoples. As facts emerge, they turn against their authors, now exposed to the world's gaze, unable to indefinitely mask their failures, the poverty of their mindset, and the pettiness of their designs. Where manipulation exhausts itself, truth always ends up prevailing, and with it the dignity of nations that bet on construction, fraternity, and the future rather than on intrigue and division.

African Football’s Leading Force: The Moroccan Model Amidst Regional Headwinds 8286

Imad Khater, 5 mon.
The curtain fell on AFCON 2025, leaving a trail of striking contrasts. While the event confirmed the Kingdom’s supremacy as a world-class logistical hub, the tensions witnessed during the final on January 18, 2026, in Rabat, served as a stark reminder of the contingencies still weighing on continental football. Between the seamlessness of the infrastructure and the archaic nature of certain disciplinary attitudes, a fundamental question emerges: how will the transition from CAF’s regulatory framework to that of FIFA in 2030 reshape the management of these organic crises? This shift represents more than a mere scaling up; it is a true paradigmatic rupture where technocratic neutrality will serve to sanctify Moroccan excellence. I. Moroccan Excellence: A Technological Showcase for Africa The massive investment deployed by the Kingdom—ranging from the deep modernization of sports complexes to the systemic integration of VAR—presented the world with the image of a modern, rigorous, and visionary Morocco. This material success, lauded by international observers, aimed to establish an African benchmark. However, this pursuit of perfection encountered a persistent psychological phenomenon: the "host country complex." In this configuration, organizational mastery is sometimes perceived by competitors not as shared progress, but as a lever of dominance, mechanically fueling theories of favoritism. The events of the final illustrate this at its peak. The disallowed goal for Ismaïla Sarr and the late-match penalty became, through the lens of regional suspicion, instruments of controversy rather than technically grounded officiating decisions. Yet, data from DM Sport reveals the opposite: Morocco was among the most penalized teams in the tournament. This discrepancy highlights a major flaw: technology is insufficient to validate a result unless it is protected by a jurisdictional authority perceived as exogenous. II. Solidary Leadership and the Diplomacy of Resentment It would be erroneous, however, to view this quest for excellence as a desire for isolation. On the contrary, Morocco maintains deep and unwavering historical ties with the majority of its sister nations across the continent. Faithful to its African roots, the Kingdom continues to actively promote continental football within CAF, offering its infrastructure and expertise to federations seeking professionalization. This "open-hand" policy ensures that Moroccan success translates into success for all of Africa. Nevertheless, such leadership breeds friction. A "diplomacy of resentment" has emerged from certain foreign media spheres—particularly in specific Arab and African countries—aiming to tarnish the prestige of the Moroccan organization. By framing Morocco as a favored "ogre," these narratives attempt to transform factual superiority into moral injustice. This media harassment specifically targets the emergence of a governance model that now aligns with the most demanding global standards. III. The Advent of "Cold Justice": Legal Sanctification The transition to FIFA’s aegis in 2030 will signal the end of the geographical proximity that fosters such smear campaigns. Unlike the continental framework, the globalization of officiating bodies will dismantle zonal rivalries. Where CAF must often navigate between diplomatic compromise and sporting imperatives, FIFA deploys a "cold justice"—purely procedural in nature. The chaos observed in Rabat would meet a surgical response in 2030. Article 10 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code is unequivocal: any refusal to resume play results in an automatic forfeit and severe sanctions. In 2030, the rule of law will act as a protective cleaver for the host, rendering victimhood narratives obsolete. IV. Technology and the "2030 Bloc": Toward an Indisputable Truth The 2030 edition, spearheaded by the Morocco-Spain-Portugal trio, will benefit from total judgment automation (Shadow VAR, semi-automated offside) and absolute transparency. The FIFA Hosting Agreement will prevail as a superior norm, guaranteeing impartiality. This legal framework will serve as a shield, preventing disciplinary incidents from being politically instrumentalized against the Kingdom. AFCON 2025 was a successful demonstration of organizational strength for Morocco, confirming its role as the driving force of African football. However, it also revealed that excellence remains vulnerable to peripheral noise. In 2030, the definitive anchoring in FIFA law will allow the Kingdom to transform its organizational prowess into a lasting institutional legacy. Sport, finally shielded from geopolitical dross, will align with the strategic vision of a Morocco turned toward the universal, making the rule of law the bedrock of its global legitimacy.