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Sénégal- Le Conseil constitutionnel en train de valider la commande du régime, rejette la candidature de l’opposant Ousmane Sonko 2366

Le Conseil constitutionnel rejette la candidature de l’opposant Ousmane Sonko Consacrant la commande du régime en place, le Conseil constitutionnel, sous la présidence du magistrat Badio Camara, vient de rejeter, vendredi 05 janvier 2024, la candidature de l’opposant Ousmane Sonko à l’élection présidentielle du Sénégal, prévue le 25 février 2024. Daouda MBaye, Journaliste En décidant de rejeter la candidature de l’opposant Ousmane Sonko, de la coalition Président Sonko 2024, ce vendredi 05 février 2024, pour le motif de dossier incomplet, le Conseil constitutionnel (CC) jette un pavé dans la mare ! Rappelons que ce candidat, président du parti PASTEF (Parti des africains du Sénégal pour le travail, l’éthique et la fraternité dissout depuis juin 2023), actuellement en détention à la prison du Cap Manuel, est victime d’un acharnement qui dure depuis bientôt 4 ans. Son seul tort est de proposer des solutions, basées sur la lutte contre la corruption et la concussion, l’industrialisation du pays et un développement inclusif, qui pourraient sortir le Sénégal de son statut de PMA et de PPTE. Accusé de viols répétés, avec menaces de mort sur la masseuse Adji Sarr, il fut finalement condamné par contumace pour corruption de la jeunesse, un délit qui n’a pas été enrôlé au début du procès. Ousmane Sonko ne s’était pas présenté au tribunal parce que plus d’une fois, le pouvoir en place a joué la provocation, lui imposant un itinéraire, gazant son cortège, allant jusqu’à briser la vitre de sa voiture sur lui… pour le conduire de force au tribunal ou l’extirper de son véhicule pour le ramener chez lui. Un peuple, resté sourd aux appels des lanceurs d’alerte Dans un autre procès pour diffamation, intenté contre lui par Mame Mbaye Kane Niang, actuel ministre du Tourisme, sur les fonds alloués au PRODAC (Programme de développement des domaines agricoles communautaires), sur un montant de 49 milliards f CFA (29 + 20 milliards f CFA), les procédures ont été accélérées pour avoir une condamnation définitive qui exclurait cet opposant de la compétition. Notons que tout ce cirque se déroule, en dépit d’un rapport existant du Commissaire aux Comptes du Cabinet Alliance Audit & Conseils (voir visuel ci-dessous) et la parution en 2019 du livre du Coordonnateur de la Société civile, Brahim Seck, « Lettre au peuple : PRODAC, un festin de 36 milliards f CFA ». A valeur d’aujourd’hui, les résultats des DAC sont loin des objectifs de départ (30 000 emplois jeunes générés, regain de la production agroalimentaire…). D’ailleurs, au Sénégal, on parle maintenant de cœurs de DAC, dont certains restent chimériques et le Sénégal importe des légumes du Maroc, notamment l’oignon, du poisson et que les pénuries de riz, de gaz s’annoncent… La loi du plus fort Malheureusement, tour à tour, tous les pièges que le pouvoir finissant du président Macky Sall avait mis en place, se sont effondrés un à un. D’abord, la contumace a été anéantie, lorsqu’il a été appréhendé de force de chez lui, après un blocus de 55 jours de sa villa au quartier Cité Keur Gorgui à Dakar, pour vol de téléphone portable, après qu’un agent en civil le filmait sans son consentement… Après deux grèves de la faim, il a finalement été placé dans une geôle au Cap Manuel à Dakar. Ensuite, la condamnation à 6 mois de prison avec sursis et 200 millions f CFA de dommages et intérêts, après l’appel du plaignant qui pourtant s’était empressé, à la fin de la première manche, de se satisfaire de ce premier verdict, clamant un honneur sauf, ne le rendait pas inéligible- l’Article L29 du Code électoral est explicite : ne sont exclus que les condamnés pour le cas d’espèces à une peine supérieure à 6 mois !!! Il fallait se rabattre sur une administration aux ordres, notamment la DGE (Direction générale des élections) pour lui refuser ses fiches de parrainage, la CENA (Commission électorale nationale autonome dont la composition a été modifiée récemment après que l’ex-président Doudou Ndir ait fait injonction à la DGE pour la remise de ces fiches, la CDC (Caisse de dépôts et consignations) qui a refusé de lui remettre l’attestation de dépôt de la caution même si le quitus était entre les mains de son mandataire l’honorable député Ayib Daffé, et un Conseil constitutionnel, dont les membres sont nommés par le président de la république. L’équipe de la Coalition Sonko Président prit soin de faire constater ces refus respectifs par huissier. Aujourd’hui, le CC a refusé de compulser le dossier d’Ousmane Sonko qui avait opté pour le parrainage des parlementaires (au nombre de 13), pour le motif de dossier incomplet (il faut 9 pièces) … Me Ciré Clédor Ly, son mandataire, a évoqué une farce électorale en gestation, d’autant plus que la commission électorale, qui comprend, selon la loi, le mandataire, s’est tenue en son absence… De façon rédhibitoire, le président du CC lui a signifié que cette candidature est incomplète… Le pool d'avocats, qui défend l'opposant Ousmane Sonko, a d'ores et déjà introduit un rabat d'arrêt et annonce que son client est plus éligible que jamais.
Boursine Mbaye Boursine Mbaye

Boursine Mbaye

Sénégalais, âgé de 61 ans, Daouda MBaye est Journaliste, spécialisé dans la Presse écrite, notamment sur les questions économiques et financières. Il a derrière lui une expérience de plus de 20 ans dans ce métier pour lequel il a été tour à tour Chef de rubriques puis Rédacteur en chef de plusieurs supports marocains ou internationaux.


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A Historical Triptych: How Morocco, Spain, and Portugal are Forging the Success of the 2030 World Cup 202

The assignment of the 2030 FIFA World Cup hosting rights to the unprecedented trio of Morocco, Portugal, and Spain marks the opening of a new chapter in the history of international and sporting relations. The joint organization of this event confirms an unparalleled dynamic, engaging the three nations in a triangular cooperation whose efficiency will be the decisive marker of this global event's success. This trilateral partnership transcends mere logistical collaboration to become a true lever for strategic development. The question is no longer whether bilateral relations are ready, but how their integration into a strengthened trilateral framework will guarantee the success of a mega-event poised to connect, for the first time, two continents through the medium of sport. Historical ties and geographical proximity provide a fertile ground for a remarkable intensification of relations between these three partners. The announcement of their tripartite bid has, in fact, elevated the need for harmonized coordination in the logistical, economic, and security domains to the level of a strategic imperative. I. The Political and Economic Foundations of Enhanced Cooperation The alignment around the 2030 project is not fortuitous; it is rooted in deep political and economic considerations that mutualize the interests of the three countries. •⁠ ⁠The Imperative of Convergence suffers no ambivalence: Spain and Portugal, while operating within the structural framework of the European Union, recognize Morocco as an essential strategic partner, a genuine gateway and pivot to the African continent. This dynamic is not unilateral; the Kingdom is consolidating its Euro-African anchor with heightened clarity through this same alliance. The World Cup deadline, far from being a simple calendar constraint, acts as a powerful lever, forcing the acceleration—often judged too slow—of regulatory, customs, and security convergence processes among the three capitals. Crucially, the political will displayed at the highest level—symbolized by the direct monitoring of Moroccan commitments by His Majesty King Mohammed VI—stands as a decisive catalyst, ensuring the establishment of a unified and enduring policy line, even in the face of contingencies and fluctuations in political majorities within the allied states. •⁠ ⁠Mutualization of Investments and Benefits: On the economic front, the World Cup represents an unprecedented opportunity to boost trade and investment. The trilateral agreements directly influence the planning of major works: the goal is no longer to build isolated infrastructures, but integrated networks (ports, air links, potential high-speed rail connections) designed for interoperability. The harmonization of tourism offerings and incentivizing fiscal regimes for sponsors and investors is crucial to maximize shared benefits. The success of coordination in the logistical, economic, and security domains will not be merely a performance indicator; it will be the symbol of a collective capacity to manage a complex event on a transcontinental scale. II. Managing Complexities: The Challenges of Co-Development An event of this magnitude, operated by three sovereign states, naturally generates frictions and coordination challenges that require first-rate diplomatic and technical management. •⁠ ⁠The Challenge of Global Security and Integrated Transport: The primary obstacle is the creation of a unified security space for the millions of supporters on the move. This demands real-time information sharing, coordination of law enforcement agencies, and the harmonization of emergency protocols. Concurrently, the transport system must be conceived as a single network. The transit of teams and supporters between Europe and Africa must be fluid, reliable, and ecological, necessitating targeted investments in airport capacity and maritime services. •⁠ ⁠The Cultural and Civilizational Vector: Beyond sport, the World Cup is a diplomatic platform. The secondary, but fundamental, challenge is to move beyond simple technical organization to present an ideal model of intercultural coexistence. Morocco, Spain, and Portugal must invest in promoting their cross-cultural heritages, consolidating the values of peace and mutual respect. This involves qualifying national institutions not only in logistics but also in public management and global media interaction, to avoid the pitfalls of fragmented or sensationalist coverage. III. The Structuring Influence of Bilateral Agreements on Logistics The influence of existing agreements between the three countries is vital for infrastructure development. The current stage is characterized by high anticipation from the private sectors and sports observers, who are watching for the concrete acceleration of construction projects. The overall efficiency of the operation—whether considering the pre-event phase, execution during the tournament, or the post-realization legacy—rests entirely on the solidity of the triangular commitment. The transformation of infrastructures, from stadiums to training centers and reception areas, must be carried out in a spirit of normative alignment. In conclusion, the 2030 World Cup is not merely the sum of three national organizations; it is a project of strategic co-development. The strong historical relations uniting the Kingdom of Morocco, Portugal, and Spain, amplified by a constant and high-level political will, constitute the decisive element for transforming this bid into a resounding success, offering the world a precedent of successful integration between two shores.

Law 30-09: A “Tree with Bitter Fruits” Hindering the Development of Moroccan Sports 203

While Morocco’s recent performances on the international stage—particularly in football—demonstrate its growing dynamism, the legal framework governing the sports sector seems unable to keep pace with this evolution. Conceived in the wake of the 2008 Royal Letter and enacted in 2010, Law No. 30-09, which was meant to modernize the national sports system, now reveals—fifteen years after its delayed implementation—serious limitations. Marked by internal inconsistencies, deficient enforcement, and pervasive state interference, the law ultimately undermines its original purpose: to professionalize Moroccan sport and align it with international standards. I. Excessive Requirements and Forgotten Sanctions Born from a clear political will to reform Moroccan sport and provide it with a modern legal framework, Law 30-09 has quickly become a rigid and impractical instrument. One of its most emblematic—and controversial—provisions is the obligation imposed on certain sports associations to establish sports corporations (Sociétés Anonymes). While the intent was to ensure sound governance, fiscal transparency, and executive accountability, practice has revealed the limits of this approach. •⁠ ⁠A disproportionate constraint. Most associations lack the financial and organizational capacity to comply with such structural obligations. •⁠ ⁠A flawed and inapplicable framework. The law establishes three non-cumulative conditions triggering the obligation to form a sports company. Only the first has been clarified by regulation, while the other two—relating to turnover and payroll—were never defined by governmental decree. As a result, the rule remains largely inoperative, especially since the penalties for non-compliance are systematically ignored. •⁠ ⁠An unfinished reform. Even among the few clubs that have complied, the parent association still holds the majority of the share capital. This structural lock prevents the opening of capital to private investors, thus maintaining dependency on the old associative model rather than promoting professionalization. II. The Persistent Shadow of the State: An Interference Contrary to Autonomy Principles By its very nature, sport is a sphere of autonomy, an ethos enshrined in the Moroccan Constitution and in the regulations of international organizations such as FIFA. Yet Law 30-09 establishes the supervising ministry as the true guardian of the sector, concentrating significant and often excessive powers: •⁠ ⁠An extensive right of scrutiny. The ministry approves statutes, grants accreditation, and confers authorization to national federations. •⁠ ⁠A pronounced power of interference. The administration may impose standard contracts and, more seriously, revoke authorization or dissolve a federation in the event of a “serious violation.” Such prerogatives contradict the spirit of the Constitution, which reserves this power to the judiciary. •⁠ ⁠Institutional omnipresence. A state representative must sit within the governing bodies of both the national federations and the Moroccan National Olympic Committee (CNOM), reinforcing state oversight at the expense of autonomy. This predominant executive control contradicts the principles of independence that underpin both national constitutional law and the global sports governance model. III. The Ambiguous Status of Athletes: The Law’s Major Omission Beyond institutional deficiencies, Law 30-09 exposes a serious legal vacuum regarding the status of athletes. The professional athlete’s contract is treated as an ordinary employment contract—an assimilation that raises significant difficulties. •⁠ ⁠The legislator had to create several exceptions to the Labour Code (five-year fixed-term contracts, exclusivity clauses, conditions for unilateral termination), resulting in an incoherent hybrid regime. •⁠ ⁠Although classified as “employees,” professional athletes do not enjoy the social protection and retirement benefits normally afforded to workers. •⁠ ⁠As for amateur athletes, their status remains completely unaddressed by the law. The provisions aimed at supporting athlete training and post-career reconversion are equally deficient. They are neither mandatory nor widely implemented, few training centers exist, and many athletes lack the educational background needed to benefit from such programs. IV. The Need for a Moroccan Sports Code Faced with these structural weaknesses, a piecemeal revision of the law is no longer adequate. The codification of sports law—through the adoption of a comprehensive Moroccan Sports Code—is now an imperative step toward supporting the country’s international ambition. Drawing inspiration from the French model, such a reform would serve several key purposes: 1.⁠ ⁠Clarifying and consolidating the dispersed legal texts, regulations, and case law to facilitate specialization among legal practitioners. 2.⁠ ⁠Correcting inconsistencies by redefining the jurisdictional competences of the State and creating a sui generis legal status for professional and amateur athletes. 3.⁠ ⁠Modernizing the legal framework by integrating fiscal and social regimes specific to sports entities and individuals. Despite its initial promise of modernization, Law 30-09 has become a “tree with bitter fruits.” Instead of fostering professionalism, it has constrained the sector and amplified its institutional fragility. Only a complete codification—reflecting Morocco’s socio-economic realities and the principles of good governance—can ensure a coherent, autonomous, and sustainable framework for the country’s sports development.