But what is Gamal Abdel Nacer still doing in Conakry... 2981

Aziz Daouda, 2 y.

- Politics - History - Society -

3 min read.

What was my surprise when I was told that for my stay of only 3 nights in Conakry, I was going to stay at the « Hôtel de L'Université » which is in fact called Gamal Abdel Nacer University. We must return to both the recent and distant history of Guinea Conakry to understand what Gamal Abdel Nacer is doing, or rather was doing, in this region of Africa. The University is now some 60 years old. It has no less than 35,000 students and some 620 teachers. The students represent nearly twenty countries. It is a university that aims to be innovative and competitive in the service of socio-economic development and environmental balance in Guinea, in the region and in the world. Built with the support of the Soviet Union in 1962, it was known until 1984 as the Polytechnic Institute of Conakry. The University was then named in honor of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. It served for a long time to provide the country with its elites. Here Gamal is honored, elsewhere he was named Paper Tiger or even Tiger of Falouga, so much so that he puffed out his chest and suffered a series of defeats and disasters that his country continues to pay till today. An excess of "philosophical" vision undoubtedly misguided, meaningless slogans, based on an ideology without anchor, neither social nor even less cultural or historical, if not just a dream. The Officer who called himself free had, with a group of friends, overthrown the very young egyptian Monarchy as a Kingdom. Previously, Egypt had Sultans. Fouad II overthrown by Gamal and his barracks friends, acceded to the throne in July 1952, aged only 7 months and 10 days, after the abdication of his father Farouk. Farouk thought that by abdicating, leaving the throne to his baby with a regent who seemed to be accepted, he would calm the ardor of the officers and thus save his young monarchy. It didn't work. Farouk ended up leaving the country with honors, thus avoiding a bloodbath and confrontation between the military and pro-monarchist forces. The free officers will then name Mohammed Naguib president of the Arab Republic of Egypt in June 1953. An Arab Republic in Africa, heir to the greatest civilization that the African continent and the world had given birth to. Gamal was appointed prime minister in April 1954 but not for long...A few months later, on November 14, 1954, poor Naguib was kindly thanked and Gamal succeeded him quite naturally. Naguib born in Sudan will then go and write books...At the time it should be remembered, Sudan was part of Egypt but under shared sovereignty with the United Kingdom. Sudan will be declared an independent state in January 1956. The free officers of Egypt in fact, carried a project of national independence, believing that Egypt was not in fact free and that the English still had an ascendancy over the monarchy. There was also there, and above all an air of revenge of the common people, who were the young army officers, on a Cairo bourgeoisie or even nobility, speaking mostly in French, moreover, of Turkish or very close. The officers naively promised and no doubt dreamed of rapid economic development for the benefit of all...A somewhat special vision of communism and a socialism which was sought for a long time without ever succeeding, based on the doctrine of the Baathist Michel Aflak, a Syrian which skillfully combines socialism and pan-Arabism. Michel Aflak is a fan of secularism and freedom from Western interests. The Baath subtly opposed socialism to Marxism, a way of satisfying the deeply religious populations, predominantly Muslim and not only, and for whom Marxism was synonymous with atheism. We are here in the Middle East, the cradle and heart of all monotheistic religions... The Baath found in Gamal the ideal tribune. His inflammatory speeches met with an immense echo in Egypt and the Arab world: the army then appeared as the savior of an enlarged nation. The Arab Nation… Nacer's speeches mobilized and inflamed crowds at home and beyond. Its Cairo Radio, then received on short wave throughout the so-called Arab world, would play a capital role in propaganda that would restore pride to populations who had not yet emerged from the yoke of colonization in the region. Mohamed Abdelwahab will add a nice layer with the song Douae Echark (Call of the Orient) to the words of the great poet Mahmoud Hassan Ismail. It is undoubtedly one of the most beautiful pieces of music by the Egyptian virtuoso. Oum Kaltoum will do his part in 1964 with Ala Bab Masr (At the Gates of Egypt); words by Kamal Echanaoui and a composition once again by Mohamed Abdelwahab. She will also sing among others Ya Gamal ya Mital Alwatania (Gamal Example of nationalism or patriotism...). But the one who sang the most on the occasion of the July 23 celebrations was the young singer of that time, Abdel Halim Hafez, notably with his famous song Ihna Chaab (We the people). In fact, we are here faced with an extremely well-oiled system serving a cause that wanted to be pan-Arabist in the service of a military regime that wanted to be exportable to all countries with the Arabic language as the common denominator. The revolution was intended to be Egyptian but was to extend to the entire Arab world. It will succeed in overthrowing regimes almost everywhere, in Iraq, Libya, Syria... it will settle in Algeria and fail to make Hassan II of Morocco bend for example... The war of sands (Guerre des sables) was imposed to him but his solidity and his political sense will surprise them...

Between Ideology and Pragmatism: The Spanish Radical Left's Controversial Stance on Moroccan Sahara... 327

Aziz Daouda, 2 d.

- World Politics - Politics - History -

3 min read.

I confess here that it was the writings of Si Lahcen Hadad that pushed me to take a closer interest in this Spanish left, which positions itself in opposition to the Sánchez government, which is itself left-wing. Not reading Spanish, I am therefore somewhat less inclined to pay attention to the repeated ignominies of this left, sick from not being able to access power, sick from its aborted history, sick from what it actually is. So, to exist, it invented a cause. Too bad if it understands nothing about it, too bad if it harms Spain’s interests, too bad if it distorts history, ignores geography and demography, too bad if its reasoning, if it is reasoning at all, is far from logical, too bad if it lies outrageously. The important thing is to exist and to appear to the Spanish public as the defender of the causes of the most deprived... No matter if those people harmed the Spanish people; no matter if they have Spanish blood on their hands. Manifest bad faith. In Spain, therefore, a significant part of the radical left, mainly represented by formations such as Unidas Podemos, an alliance between Podemos, Izquierda Unida, and other minority groups, maintains a posture—let’s say critical, if not belligerent—towards the Kingdom of Morocco. This contradictory position is fed by a historical prism marked by colonial memory, “anti-imperialist” struggles, but also by the question of the Sahara, called the "Spanish Sahara" until 1975, as it was a former territory under Spanish domination until the Green March in 1975. This radical left considers Morocco a belligerent and threatening actor. The debate is not limited to territorial disputes: it fits into an ideological vision where the Moroccan state is often presented as an authoritarian and repressive regime, described as a neocolonial power. This is what underpins the repeated support for the artificial Sahrawi cause, presented as an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist fight. Support for the Polisario Front thus seems embedded in the DNA of these “gauchos,” regardless of developments. Historically, several components of the Spanish left have expressed clear support for the Polisario Front, founded in 1973, which was nevertheless supported by Gaddafi, then hosted, supplied, and armed by the Algerian regime with the aim of harming Morocco’s interests. This support manifests itself in various forms: - Filing parliamentary motions in defense of the right to self-determination for this small part of the Sahara alone; - Participation in international pro-Polisario forums and associative networks that blindly support it, regardless of reports on the embezzlement of aid, rapes, and flagrant human rights abuses in Tindouf; - Pressure on the Spanish government and European institutions to recognize the political status of the Sahara, neglecting to mention that it was formerly occupied by their country, as a territory to be decolonized, in opposition to Morocco’s historical sovereignty. Even the autonomy proposal, well known in Spain, does not seem to satisfy them. However, it should be noted that this support comes in a context of strong internal contestation in Spain. Since the socialist government of Pedro Sánchez expressed its support in 2022 for the Moroccan autonomy plan, this radical position has somewhat fractured. This change reflects a pragmatic adaptation by some to the geopolitical, economic, and migratory realities that closely link the two countries. Faced with challenges related to managing migratory flows through the occupied enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as security and economic cooperation with the Kingdom of Morocco, the Spanish government has refocused its diplomacy. This has led to a gradual distancing of the left—but not the radical left—from the Polisario, thus marginalizing its influence on official policy. In this context, some voices within the radical left still try to persuade European institutions to keep pressure on Morocco, demanding that the so-called Western Sahara remain central to priorities to resolve an “unresolved colonial conflict.” Parliamentary groups and “pro-Sahrawi” NGOs continue to denounce bilateral agreements between Madrid and Rabat, refusing that the issue be sidelined in favor of a more “pragmatic” diplomacy. Spanish and European institutions, the theater of these ideological tensions, thus see the radical left forces seeking to have the question of the so-called Western Sahara recognized as a “state matter.” They denounce Moroccan control over this dossier and strongly contest the diplomatic normalization policies carried out by Madrid. This line reflects a deep political fracture, where post-colonial idealism and outdated self-determination claims clash head-on with political realism marked by the search for regional strategic balances. Support for the so-called Sahrawi cause is not without controversy. Activists, commentators, and victims have recalled that the Polisario Front was, in the past, involved in violent operations in Spanish territorial waters, causing the death of Spanish fishermen. These painful episodes resonate in Spanish public opinion and fuel a virulent critique of radical positions that support a movement with a past combining political struggle and violent actions. This memory weighs heavily in contemporary debate and is exploited by political forces opposed to these radical left positions, notably the Spanish right. The question of the Sahara, a territory that was Spanish for a time, remains an important point in relations between Spain and Morocco. However, current political, economic, and security realities push for pragmatic Spanish diplomacy, favorable to strengthened cooperation with Rabat, thus marginalizing the radical stance on both governmental and international stages. The historical legacy is here perfectly exploited for contemporary necessities in managing Ibero-Moroccan relations. Today, after consulting numerous articles and writings recounting the positions of this left of another era, I understand a little better Si Lahcen Hadad's fight on the subject, and even more so his sharp responses to the remarks of a certain Ignacio Cembrero, whom I now see only as a bland neurotic. Thank you, Si Lahcen. One question remains: why is the Moroccan left not more inclined to take a stand and strongly denounce the alienated stance of their Spanish counterparts?