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Histoire et géographie : piliers incontournables de la politique marocaine... 1496

La politique ne peut être dissociée de l’histoire ni de la géographie. Elle consiste en un ensemble d’actions et de décisions visant à organiser une société sur le plan interne, mais également dans ses relations avec le reste du monde. Elle s’inscrit toujours dans un contexte façonné par les deux dimensions fondamentales que sont l’histoire et la géographie, qui ne sont nullement de simples arrière-plans, mais offrent bien la trame sur laquelle s’articulent projets, conflits et évolutions politiques. Elle peut être influencée par une idéologie, née d’une philosophie, ou simplement forgée à partir d’un contexte donné mais cela ne dure guère. L’histoire joue un rôle fondamental dans la compréhension des phénomènes politiques. Institutions, lois et valeurs d’un pays s’ancrent dans sa mémoire collective, héritage constitué d’événements majeurs, de ruptures ou de continuités avec le passé. Ainsi, les frontières, par exemple, sont fréquemment tracées à la suite de guerres ou de traités, résultant de conflits anciens ou récents. Elles restent les marques visibles de rivalités, de défaites, de victoires et de compromis du passé. Les relations, qu’elles soient de solidarité ou de rivalité entre nations, régions ou communautés, s’expliquent à la lumière d’histoires partagées ou divergentes. Le Royaume du Maroc actuel ne saurait être compris sans référence à sa genèse millénaire, à l’Empire chérifien pluriséculaire ni aux dynasties successives qui ont façonné son rapport aux religions, à l’allégeance ou à la centralisation du pouvoir, selon les époques. De la même façon, la géographie influence considérablement les choix et contraintes des politiques publiques. La répartition des ressources naturelles conditionne le développement économique, l’organisation territoriale et les rapports de force. Le relief, le climat ou l’accès aux voies maritimes déterminent les possibilités d’urbanisation, d’agriculture, de communication ou de défense. Les situations frontalières imposent des politiques diplomatiques et sécuritaires spécifiques, tandis que les espaces enclavés ou insulaires requièrent des stratégies adaptées. Certains auteurs n’hésitent pas à qualifier le Maroc de “pays insulaire” du fait de sa configuration géographique. Il est donc inconcevable de penser une politique efficace ou légitime sans tenir compte de l’histoire et de la géographie. Chaque choix, chaque réforme, chaque ambition politique doit s’appuyer sur une compréhension approfondie du territoire et de la mémoire collective ; ignorer l’un ou l’autre, c’est s’exposer à l’illusion, à l’incompréhension, voire à l’échec. Au sujet du Sahara appelé « occidental », la géographie de cette région se situe indéniablement dans le prolongement du Maroc, tant sur le plan physique, démographique qu’historique : les populations sahariennes ont largement contribué à l’évolution du pays. Son histoire s’est écrite au fil des allégeances successives de ses tribus aux sultans du Maroc, et le royaume chérifien constitue, de fait, un État-nation institué bien avant la période contemporaine. Affaibli pour avoir raté le virage fondamental de la révolution industrielle, l’Empire chérifien sera dépecé du sud vers le nord, mais aussi à partir de l’est. Le Sahara dit occidental fut annexé par l’Espagne, qui y exerça un contrôle colonial de 1884 à 1975. Cette situation a favorisé la mainmise de la France sur les territoires regroupés dans l’Afrique occidentale française, dont une partie allait former la Mauritanie. La France s’appropria aussi l’est de l’Empire chérifien, annexé de facto à ses départements conquis sur l’Empire ottoman et appelés Algérie française. Le reste sera placé sous protectorat français, tandis que le nord du Maroc passait sous domination espagnole. L’indépendance obtenue en 1956 et la décolonisation progressive de Sidi Ifni et Tarfaya n’ont concerné d’autres régions que plus tard. Le 28 novembre 1960, la France autorise la proclamation de l’indépendance de la Mauritanie, région revendiquée alors par le Maroc, tout comme les territoires sous contrôle espagnol, considérés comme siens. À cette époque, il y eu un ministère marocain dénommé « des Affaires mauritaniennes et sahariennes » fut confié à Mohammed Fal Ould Oumeir, représentant de ces territoires. Dès 1963, le royaume porta la question du Sahara espagnol devant la commission de décolonisation. La situation se compliqua lorsque la Mauritanie nouvellement créée revendiqua également ce territoire, notamment pour exercer une pression sur le Maroc, qui ne reconnaîtra l’indépendance mauritanienne qu’en 1969, soit neuf ans après sa proclamation. Le Maroc continua de revendiquer pacifiquement le Sahara espagnol, empêchant l’Armée de libération de poursuivre ses actions militaires dans la région. En 1973, la création du Front Polisario (Front populaire de libération de la Saguia el Hamra et du Rio de Oro) marqua une nouvelle étape. Ce mouvement visait initialement à rattacher le territoire saharien à la “mère patrie”. Mais dans un contexte de rivalités régionales et de tensions idéologiques, la question saharienne fut instrumentalisée par divers acteurs. La Libye de Mouammar Kadhafi joua notamment un rôle décisif dans la montée en puissance du Polisario indépendantiste, soutenant et armant le mouvement dans une logique “révolutionnaire” et panarabiste, tout en cherchant à déstabiliser la monarchie marocaine. Plus tard, Kadhafi admettra lui-même avoir commis une “erreur” stratégique en soutenant ce groupe, qui demeure aujourd’hui encore un facteur de déstabilisation dans la région. En 1975, un tournant pacifique se produisit : fort de l’avis de la Cour internationale de justice reconnaissant des liens d’allégeance entre les tribus sahariennes et les sultans marocains, feu SM Hassan II lança la Marche verte à la surprise générale. Cette mobilisation poussa l’Espagne à se retirer de Laâyoune au profit du Maroc, qui reprit immédiatement possession du territoire. La Mauritanie, bien qu’ayant occupé des zones limitrophes, finit par se retirer, laissant le Maroc seul face au Front Polisario, soutenu activement par l’Algérie qui hébergea, arma, finança et érigea le mouvement en “république”. L’Algérie de Houari Boumédiène exploita la situation pour affaiblir son voisin marocain, n’hésitant pas à qualifier le dossier saharien de “caillou dans la chaussure du Maroc”, façon de se venger de la défaite cuisante de 1963. Ce contentieux a souvent masqué l’histoire profonde des liens entre le Maroc et ces territoires sous autorité chérifienne bien avant l’ère coloniale. Pour le Maroc, l’intégrité territoriale repose solidement sur les constantes que sont l’histoire et la géographie; des arguments majeurs. Le reste n’est qu’une construction éphémère sans fondement, vouée à s’effacer dans l’oubli dans un futur proche. Les Marocains le savent très bien...Peut être pas les autres...
Aziz Daouda Aziz Daouda

Aziz Daouda

Directeur Technique et du Développement de la Confédération Africaine d'Athlétisme. Passionné du Maroc, passionné d'Afrique. Concerné par ce qui se passe, formulant mon point de vue quand j'en ai un. Humaniste, j'essaye de l'être, humain je veux l'être. Mon histoire est intimement liée à l'athlétisme marocain et mondial. J'ai eu le privilège de participer à la gloire de mon pays .


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FIFA World Cup 2026: risk of a tournament reserved for the wealthiest? An unprecedented inflation... 192

The 2026 World Cup, jointly organized by the **États-Unis, le Canada et le Mexique**, promises to be an extraordinary event: an expanded format with 48 teams, 104 matches, state-of-the-art facilities, and what is expected to be the most massive media coverage in sports history. However, as initial details about ticketing and logistical costs emerge, growing concern is palpable among fans: **the North American World Cup could become the most expensive World Cup ever organized**, to the point of calling into question the very accessibility of the event. At the heart of this concern is the American model of *dynamic pricing*, a system where prices are never fixed. They fluctuate according to demand, the volume of online requests, the status of the match, and even algorithmic parameters beyond the consumer’s control. For example, a hotel room normally priced around 200 USD might not be offered for less than 500 or even 600 USD, probably more for late bookers. This mechanism, common in American professional sports, could turn World Cup ticket purchases into a frenzied and even unfair race. Some final tickets are already priced between $5,000 and $20,000, a completely unprecedented level. Group stage tickets could see daily price swings, making financial planning nearly impossible for foreign fans. American supporters, already used to high prices in the NBA, NFL, or MLB, seem better equipped to navigate this system. Conversely, for Moroccan, Brazilian, Senegalese, Egyptian, or Indonesian fans, this model represents an almost insurmountable barrier. Adding to this cloudy scenario is the question of the official resale platform: **FIFA Official Ticket Resale Platform**. Ideally, it prevents black-market sales and secures transactions. But in a market dominated by speculative logic, it could become a playground for actors seeking to maximize profits, especially since FIFA takes a commission. FIFA has not yet communicated safeguards it plans to implement. Without strict regulation, resale could amplify price volatility, particularly for highly sought-after matches: final rounds, games involving teams with strong diasporas, as well as the opening match and final. One of the most puzzling aspects of this World Cup is the early sale of tickets without specific match assignments. In the USA, out of the **6 millions de billets prévus**, nearly **2 millions ont déjà trouvé preneur**, while buyers do not yet know which matches they paid for. This reflects several dynamics: - Total confidence from the American public in the event's organization; - The high purchasing power of an audience willing to invest heavily in sports experiences; - A structural asymmetry between American supporters and international fans, the latter compelled to wait for match assignments to plan trips and budgets. This situation fuels fears that stadiums will be largely filled with local spectators, to the detriment of fans supporting their teams from abroad. The USA ranks among the world’s most expensive hotel markets, and the selected cities are no exception: **New York, Los Angeles, Miami, Seattle, Dallas ou encore San Francisco** regularly top lists of the priciest destinations. A genuine inflation is expected across the hotel sector. During major sporting events, room prices can double or triple. For a month-long World Cup, projections are even more alarming: some operators are already talking about "prices never seen before." Fans should expect: - Massive hikes in hotel prices; - Predictable saturation of alternative accommodations; - Very high internal transport costs, since distances between host cities often require air travel. All these factors raise a central question: who will the 2026 World Cup really serve? The 250 million registered football players worldwide may feel somewhat frustrated. Their sport is slipping away. The North American model, dominated by commercial logic and speculative mechanisms, seems incompatible with football’s tradition as a popular sport. We might witness the emergence of a two-speed World Cup: - A premium World Cup, largely attended by North American audiences and wealthier supporters; - A remote World Cup for millions of international fans who must content themselves with televised broadcasts due to insufficient means to attend. For supporters from countries where median income is far lower than in the United States, be they African, Latin American, Asian, or even European nations, the experience could become inaccessible. FIFA clearly faces a strategic dilemma. Sooner or later, it will have to address this issue. Certainly, the choice of the United States guarantees top-level infrastructure, record revenues, a colossal advertising market, and a logistics organization of rare reliability. But this financial logic could directly contradict football’s social and symbolic mission: to bring people together, unite, and include. If the 2026 World Cup turns into an elitist event, it risks leaving a lasting negative impression in public opinion. Modern football, already criticized for its commercial drift, could face increased pushback from fans—the very fans who keep the sport alive—especially as FIFA’s revenues rise from $7.5 billion to $13 billion. The World Cup is thus under tension. In 2026, it will likely be spectacular both sportingly and organizationally. But it could also mark a turning point in World Cup history: when the event stops being a popular and accessible gathering and turns into a premium product for a privileged audience. Between ticket inflation, skyrocketing hotel prices, logistical distances, and the American economic model, the real risk exists that this edition will go down as the most exclusive, most expensive, and least accessible. FIFA, the organizers, and host cities will have to find ways to mitigate this dynamic to preserve football’s very essence: a universal sport that belongs to everyone. Could the proximity between Gianni Infantino and Donald Trump, even their friendship, help in any way?

CAN 2025 in Morocco: Reflection of a Major Probable Migratory and Social Transformation... 249

Three weeks before the Africa Cup of Nations in Morocco, it seems appropriate to revisit key insights from the 2024 General Population and Housing Census (RGPH 2024). This event will undoubtedly have a powerful impact on the country's perception, through the positive images it is already broadcasting and, consequently, on future demographic data. The census shows that out of 36.8 million recorded inhabitants, 148,152 people are foreign nationals, representing nearly 0.4% of the total population, an increase of over 76% compared to 2014. Behind this relatively modest figure lies a structural transformation: the rise of Sub-Saharan African migrants, partial feminization of flows, strong urban concentration, and increasingly qualified profiles. Morocco's geographical position and economic evolution have, in a relatively short time, transformed it from a country of emigration into a space of settlement and transit for migrants with varied profiles. The National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum (SNIA), adopted in 2013, along with the regularization campaigns of 2014 and 2017, have established a more inclusive approach in Morocco and better statistical knowledge of the populations concerned. Sub-Saharan African nationals now represent nearly 60% of migrants, compared to about 27% in 2014. The share of Europeans has declined to just over 20%. That of MENA region nationals is only 7%. Morocco's continental anchoring is thus confirmed. In terms of nationalities, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire account for more than one-third of foreigners, ahead of France, which remains the leading European nationality with nearly 14% of foreign residents. Other countries like Guinea, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon, or Syria complete this panorama. Foreign residents in Morocco are mostly recent arrivals: more than half report arriving since 2021, and more than one-third between 2011 and 2020, testifying to a very recent acceleration of arrivals. A majority of this population will fill the stands during the CAN. Economic motives overwhelmingly dominate: more than 53% of migrants cite work as the main reason, confirming Morocco's role as a regional attraction pole in sectors such as construction, services, agriculture, and the informal economy. Family reasons follow (a little over 20%), reflecting the growing weight of family reunification and medium- to long-term settlement projects, then studies and post-graduation (about 14%), a sign of the country's academic attractiveness to Sub-Saharan students. Humanitarian motives, flight from conflicts, insecurity, racism, or climate change effects—remain numerically minor. Morocco thus appears as a hybrid space where labor migrations, student mobility, family reunifications, and international protection needs coexist. The vast majority of foreign residents live in cities: nearly 95% are settled in urban areas, confirming the role of major agglomerations as entry points and integration spaces. Two regions clearly dominate: Casablanca-Settat, which hosts more than 43% of foreigners, and Rabat-Salé-Kénitra with a little over 19%, though the latter's share has declined compared to 2014 in favor of Casablanca. Nearly 56% of this population are men, but feminization is progressing, particularly among certain nationalities like Ivorian women and Filipinos, who are very present in personal services and domestic work. More than 80% of foreign residents are between 15 and 64 years old, making them essentially a working-age group, with a non-negligible presence of children and a minority of elderly people. Nearly half of people aged 15 and over are single, while a little over 45% are married, showing the coexistence of individual mobility trajectories and stabilized family projects. The education level appears generally high: nearly 39% hold a higher diploma and 28% have reached secondary level. Employed workers are mostly private sector employees, while a minority work as independents, employers, or public sector employees, highlighting the diversity of professional integration modes. The relatively limited share of unemployed may mask forms of underemployment or precariousness in the informal sector. In 2024, more than 71,000 households include at least one foreign resident. About 31% are exclusively composed of foreigners, while about 69% are mixed households combining Moroccans and foreigners, a proportion sharply up from 2014. This rise in mixed households reflects a deepening of residential and social integration, through mixed marriages, welcoming relatives, or shared cohabitations linked to work and studies. In terms of housing, the majority of foreign households live in apartments, followed by modern Moroccan houses, reflecting integration into the ordinary urban fabric rather than segregated housing forms. Exclusively foreign households are overwhelmingly tenants, while mixed households are more often owners or co-owners, highlighting differentiated settlement trajectories based on household composition. The RGPH 2024 results confirm that the foreign presence in Morocco, though numerically limited, now constitutes a structural and lasting fact of society. The youth, the high proportion of active workers, the rise of family and mixed households, as well as the diversification of educational profiles, call for greater coordination between migration policies, urban, social, and educational policies.The major challenges concern valuing the economic and demographic potential of this population, access to education, health, housing, and decent work, and combating discrimination in a context of cultural pluralization. The SNIA mechanisms to meet Morocco's regional and international commitments in migration governance must also evolve. However, these figures and data will likely undergo real evolution in the coming years: the African media focus on the CAN, and later on the World Cup in Morocco, will reveal the country's assets and increase its attractiveness. These two events, through their combined media weight and the impressions reported by the thousands of expected spectators, should play a promotional role for the country. Deep Africa will discover Morocco and the multiple opportunities it offers, both economically and for studies.