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Guterres snobe Attaf à Luanda : l’ONU rompt avec l’impolitesse algérienne sur le Sahara 204

Lors du sommet Afrique-Europe tenu à Luanda, un incident filmé et diffusé, avec en scène, António Guterres, Secrétaire Général de l’ONU, et Ahmed Attaf, ministre algérien des Affaires étrangères, a mis en lumière de manière spectaculaire une tension diplomatique profonde. Une vidéo montrant ce moment est rapidement devenue virale sur les réseaux sociaux, suscitant un vif débat et plein de moqueries. Le geste brusque de Guterres, qui a adressé un salut formel et froid avant de tourner précipitamment le dos à Attaf, alors que ce dernier tentait désespérément d’échanger avec lui, dépasse la simple maladresse protocolaire. Le geste est parfaitement volontaire. Il symbolise de façon frappante une relation conflictuelle, chargée d'agacement entre l’ONU et l’Algérie, le Secrétaire Général affichant ainsi une posture claire de l’institution; on ne peut plus officielle. À un niveau diplomatique aussi élevé, les gestes ne sont jamais anodins ni improvisés. Guterres, en fin de mandat, n’a plus de temps ni de patience pour tolérer certains comportements, y compris ceux d’un ministre des Affaires étrangères d'un pays à l'insistance harcelante, éreintante, assommante. Politiquement, ce refus de l’échange public ne peut s’interpréter comme un simple accident ou hasard. Il s’agit d’une manifestation explicite d’exaspération face à la posture adoptée par l’Algérie. Il montre aussi que le Ministre n'a sans doute pas réussi à avoir une entrevue avec le Secrétaire Général. Le contexte est lourd : la question du Sahara marocain anime une dynamique tendue par une Algérie poursuivant une stratégie offensive et systématique de contestation des rapports et résolutions onusiens, accusant l’ONU de partialité. Alger adopte un discours de soi-disant neutralité, qui masque maladroitement la réalité. C'est elle qui entretient le conflit et l'alimente depuis qu'elle l'a engendré avec la Libye de Kadhafi voilà un demi-siècle déjà. Et ça tout le monde le sait... Le pouvoir algérien ne cesse de critiquer l’ONU dans ses médias officiels, usant fréquemment d’invectives parfois surprenantes en diplomatie. Aucun des pays, ayant reconnu la marocanité du Sahara ex espagnol, ni leurs dirigeants, de Donald Trump à Pedro Sánchez, en passant par Emmanuel Macron jusqu’au Cheikh Mohammed ben Zayed, n’a échappé à ces attaques acerbes et aux insultes des médias officiels et acolytes d'Alger. Israël et le sionisme aussi y sont mêlés, comme par magie. Tout est bon pour faire bomber le torse au vaillant peuple algérien, auquel on fait croire à son rôle de gardien du temple de la liberté et de la démocratie, en attendant qu'arrivent sur les étals: huile, semoule, lentilles et haricots. Une telle débauche d’impolitesse politique est inédite au niveau international. Le discours de Amar Bendjama, représentant de l'Algérie, après le vote de la résolution 2797 était dans ce texte, particulièrement révélateur, mêlant mimique dédaigneuse et propos irrespectueux envers le Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU. Ce climat de tensions répétitives a engendré un véritable blocage diplomatique pour Alger, cherchant désespérément à influencer les mécanismes des Nations Unies par des pressions publiques répétées, en rupture avec les usages traditionnels de la diplomatie. Alger s'est faite avoir à son propre jeu. Le geste de Guterres peut être lu comme un signal politique fort, un rejet tacite d’une posture jugée déstabilisante et contre-productive, d'Alger. Par ce geste, le Secrétaire Général envoie un message clair au ministre algérien : « ça suffit ». Gageons qu'il n'en tiendra pas compte. L'entêtement est génétique en Algérie. Mais jusqu'à quand peut on se questionner. Cet épisode s’inscrit dans un contexte géopolitique plus large, où les divisions autour de questions clés affaiblissent la capacité de l’ONU à jouer son rôle d’arbitre crédible. Pour une fois que le Conseil de Sécurité arrive à voter à la quasi unanimité un texte sur un conflit qui n'a que trop durer, il est difficile d'accepter encore les tribulations d'un pays dont les agissements coutent cher à toute une région depuis trop longtemps. L’Algérie, quasi-exclusive défenseure internationale de ce qu’elle appelle « le peuple sahraoui », entité contestée hors de son propre lexique, se retrouve de plus en plus isolée sur la scène mondiale. L’image d’un ministre algérien ignoré dans un sommet d’une telle envergure illustre bien l’affaiblissement du poids politique d’Alger dans ces enceintes multilatérales. Pendant ce temps, le Maroc renforce son influence diplomatique à la fois régionale et globale. Enfin, ce geste dépasse la seule dimension individuelle : il traduit une rupture symbolique dans les relations entre Alger et l’ONU, exacerbée par la récente résolution onusienne mentionnant clairement les quatre parties au différend du Sahara marocain. Après un effort d’Alger pour minimiser et déformer cette résolution, sa réaction souvent véhémente ainsi que ses critiques publiques ont fini par irriter certains hauts responsables onusiens, ce qui explique en partie la brusquerie de Guterres. Alger n'a plus aucun choix sinon que celui de s'assoir à la table des négociations. Son nom est explicitement cité aux cotés de son rejeton le polisario, de la Mauritanie et du Maroc. A l'ordre du jour une seule solution, celle de l'autonomie sous souveraineté marocaine. Difficile à digérer pour Alger qui même à l'occasion du sommet du G20, n'est point arrivé à piper mot sur le Sahara Marocain. Pourtant le sommet se tenait en Afrique du Sud, véritable soutien d'Alger pour encore quelques temps. Au-delà de ce seul incident, cet épisode rappelle les limites de la diplomatie informelle dans les grands forums internationaux, où l’insistance hors protocole d’un acteur jugé agressif se heurte à la nécessité d’équilibre et de rigueur des interactions. Par ce geste, Guterres lance non seulement un avertissement diplomatique, mais également un rejet politique clair, témoignant de l’irritation croissante autour du dossier du Sahara Marocain, d’autant plus que les grandes puissances ont décidé publiquement de mettre fin à ce qu’elles considèrent comme un caprice algérien. Pendant longtemps elles ont tolérés les agissements hors sol des gouvernants algériens sans doute dans l'attente d'une prise de conscience de ces derniers, de leur bêtise. Ils se sont montrés incapables de raison malgré les appels répétés à la réconciliation du Souverain Marocain. Les enjeux géopolitiques en Méditerranée et en Afrique sont trop importants pour que la communauté internationale continue à tolérer les agissements d’un pays qui a fait de la déstabilisation régionale sa doctrine. L'Algérie n’aura réussi, au final, qu’une terminologie nouvelle: celle de «Sahara occidental». C’est justement, aujourd'hui, ce qui a ravivé la question du «Sahara oriental». De plus en plus, les jeunes puisent dans l’histoire et publient les preuves de la marocanité de ces territoires rattachés par la France à sa colonie d’alors...
Aziz Daouda Aziz Daouda

Aziz Daouda

Directeur Technique et du Développement de la Confédération Africaine d'Athlétisme. Passionné du Maroc, passionné d'Afrique. Concerné par ce qui se passe, formulant mon point de vue quand j'en ai un. Humaniste, j'essaye de l'être, humain je veux l'être. Mon histoire est intimement liée à l'athlétisme marocain et mondial. J'ai eu le privilège de participer à la gloire de mon pays .


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FIFA World Cup 2026: risk of a tournament reserved for the wealthiest? An unprecedented inflation... 125

The 2026 World Cup, jointly organized by the **États-Unis, le Canada et le Mexique**, promises to be an extraordinary event: an expanded format with 48 teams, 104 matches, state-of-the-art facilities, and what is expected to be the most massive media coverage in sports history. However, as initial details about ticketing and logistical costs emerge, growing concern is palpable among fans: **the North American World Cup could become the most expensive World Cup ever organized**, to the point of calling into question the very accessibility of the event. At the heart of this concern is the American model of *dynamic pricing*, a system where prices are never fixed. They fluctuate according to demand, the volume of online requests, the status of the match, and even algorithmic parameters beyond the consumer’s control. For example, a hotel room normally priced around 200 USD might not be offered for less than 500 or even 600 USD, probably more for late bookers. This mechanism, common in American professional sports, could turn World Cup ticket purchases into a frenzied and even unfair race. Some final tickets are already priced between $5,000 and $20,000, a completely unprecedented level. Group stage tickets could see daily price swings, making financial planning nearly impossible for foreign fans. American supporters, already used to high prices in the NBA, NFL, or MLB, seem better equipped to navigate this system. Conversely, for Moroccan, Brazilian, Senegalese, Egyptian, or Indonesian fans, this model represents an almost insurmountable barrier. Adding to this cloudy scenario is the question of the official resale platform: **FIFA Official Ticket Resale Platform**. Ideally, it prevents black-market sales and secures transactions. But in a market dominated by speculative logic, it could become a playground for actors seeking to maximize profits, especially since FIFA takes a commission. FIFA has not yet communicated safeguards it plans to implement. Without strict regulation, resale could amplify price volatility, particularly for highly sought-after matches: final rounds, games involving teams with strong diasporas, as well as the opening match and final. One of the most puzzling aspects of this World Cup is the early sale of tickets without specific match assignments. In the USA, out of the **6 millions de billets prévus**, nearly **2 millions ont déjà trouvé preneur**, while buyers do not yet know which matches they paid for. This reflects several dynamics: - Total confidence from the American public in the event's organization; - The high purchasing power of an audience willing to invest heavily in sports experiences; - A structural asymmetry between American supporters and international fans, the latter compelled to wait for match assignments to plan trips and budgets. This situation fuels fears that stadiums will be largely filled with local spectators, to the detriment of fans supporting their teams from abroad. The USA ranks among the world’s most expensive hotel markets, and the selected cities are no exception: **New York, Los Angeles, Miami, Seattle, Dallas ou encore San Francisco** regularly top lists of the priciest destinations. A genuine inflation is expected across the hotel sector. During major sporting events, room prices can double or triple. For a month-long World Cup, projections are even more alarming: some operators are already talking about "prices never seen before." Fans should expect: - Massive hikes in hotel prices; - Predictable saturation of alternative accommodations; - Very high internal transport costs, since distances between host cities often require air travel. All these factors raise a central question: who will the 2026 World Cup really serve? The 250 million registered football players worldwide may feel somewhat frustrated. Their sport is slipping away. The North American model, dominated by commercial logic and speculative mechanisms, seems incompatible with football’s tradition as a popular sport. We might witness the emergence of a two-speed World Cup: - A premium World Cup, largely attended by North American audiences and wealthier supporters; - A remote World Cup for millions of international fans who must content themselves with televised broadcasts due to insufficient means to attend. For supporters from countries where median income is far lower than in the United States, be they African, Latin American, Asian, or even European nations, the experience could become inaccessible. FIFA clearly faces a strategic dilemma. Sooner or later, it will have to address this issue. Certainly, the choice of the United States guarantees top-level infrastructure, record revenues, a colossal advertising market, and a logistics organization of rare reliability. But this financial logic could directly contradict football’s social and symbolic mission: to bring people together, unite, and include. If the 2026 World Cup turns into an elitist event, it risks leaving a lasting negative impression in public opinion. Modern football, already criticized for its commercial drift, could face increased pushback from fans—the very fans who keep the sport alive—especially as FIFA’s revenues rise from $7.5 billion to $13 billion. The World Cup is thus under tension. In 2026, it will likely be spectacular both sportingly and organizationally. But it could also mark a turning point in World Cup history: when the event stops being a popular and accessible gathering and turns into a premium product for a privileged audience. Between ticket inflation, skyrocketing hotel prices, logistical distances, and the American economic model, the real risk exists that this edition will go down as the most exclusive, most expensive, and least accessible. FIFA, the organizers, and host cities will have to find ways to mitigate this dynamic to preserve football’s very essence: a universal sport that belongs to everyone. Could the proximity between Gianni Infantino and Donald Trump, even their friendship, help in any way?

CAN 2025 in Morocco: Reflection of a Major Probable Migratory and Social Transformation... 195

Three weeks before the Africa Cup of Nations in Morocco, it seems appropriate to revisit key insights from the 2024 General Population and Housing Census (RGPH 2024). This event will undoubtedly have a powerful impact on the country's perception, through the positive images it is already broadcasting and, consequently, on future demographic data. The census shows that out of 36.8 million recorded inhabitants, 148,152 people are foreign nationals, representing nearly 0.4% of the total population, an increase of over 76% compared to 2014. Behind this relatively modest figure lies a structural transformation: the rise of Sub-Saharan African migrants, partial feminization of flows, strong urban concentration, and increasingly qualified profiles. Morocco's geographical position and economic evolution have, in a relatively short time, transformed it from a country of emigration into a space of settlement and transit for migrants with varied profiles. The National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum (SNIA), adopted in 2013, along with the regularization campaigns of 2014 and 2017, have established a more inclusive approach in Morocco and better statistical knowledge of the populations concerned. Sub-Saharan African nationals now represent nearly 60% of migrants, compared to about 27% in 2014. The share of Europeans has declined to just over 20%. That of MENA region nationals is only 7%. Morocco's continental anchoring is thus confirmed. In terms of nationalities, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire account for more than one-third of foreigners, ahead of France, which remains the leading European nationality with nearly 14% of foreign residents. Other countries like Guinea, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon, or Syria complete this panorama. Foreign residents in Morocco are mostly recent arrivals: more than half report arriving since 2021, and more than one-third between 2011 and 2020, testifying to a very recent acceleration of arrivals. A majority of this population will fill the stands during the CAN. Economic motives overwhelmingly dominate: more than 53% of migrants cite work as the main reason, confirming Morocco's role as a regional attraction pole in sectors such as construction, services, agriculture, and the informal economy. Family reasons follow (a little over 20%), reflecting the growing weight of family reunification and medium- to long-term settlement projects, then studies and post-graduation (about 14%), a sign of the country's academic attractiveness to Sub-Saharan students. Humanitarian motives, flight from conflicts, insecurity, racism, or climate change effects—remain numerically minor. Morocco thus appears as a hybrid space where labor migrations, student mobility, family reunifications, and international protection needs coexist. The vast majority of foreign residents live in cities: nearly 95% are settled in urban areas, confirming the role of major agglomerations as entry points and integration spaces. Two regions clearly dominate: Casablanca-Settat, which hosts more than 43% of foreigners, and Rabat-Salé-Kénitra with a little over 19%, though the latter's share has declined compared to 2014 in favor of Casablanca. Nearly 56% of this population are men, but feminization is progressing, particularly among certain nationalities like Ivorian women and Filipinos, who are very present in personal services and domestic work. More than 80% of foreign residents are between 15 and 64 years old, making them essentially a working-age group, with a non-negligible presence of children and a minority of elderly people. Nearly half of people aged 15 and over are single, while a little over 45% are married, showing the coexistence of individual mobility trajectories and stabilized family projects. The education level appears generally high: nearly 39% hold a higher diploma and 28% have reached secondary level. Employed workers are mostly private sector employees, while a minority work as independents, employers, or public sector employees, highlighting the diversity of professional integration modes. The relatively limited share of unemployed may mask forms of underemployment or precariousness in the informal sector. In 2024, more than 71,000 households include at least one foreign resident. About 31% are exclusively composed of foreigners, while about 69% are mixed households combining Moroccans and foreigners, a proportion sharply up from 2014. This rise in mixed households reflects a deepening of residential and social integration, through mixed marriages, welcoming relatives, or shared cohabitations linked to work and studies. In terms of housing, the majority of foreign households live in apartments, followed by modern Moroccan houses, reflecting integration into the ordinary urban fabric rather than segregated housing forms. Exclusively foreign households are overwhelmingly tenants, while mixed households are more often owners or co-owners, highlighting differentiated settlement trajectories based on household composition. The RGPH 2024 results confirm that the foreign presence in Morocco, though numerically limited, now constitutes a structural and lasting fact of society. The youth, the high proportion of active workers, the rise of family and mixed households, as well as the diversification of educational profiles, call for greater coordination between migration policies, urban, social, and educational policies.The major challenges concern valuing the economic and demographic potential of this population, access to education, health, housing, and decent work, and combating discrimination in a context of cultural pluralization. The SNIA mechanisms to meet Morocco's regional and international commitments in migration governance must also evolve. However, these figures and data will likely undergo real evolution in the coming years: the African media focus on the CAN, and later on the World Cup in Morocco, will reveal the country's assets and increase its attractiveness. These two events, through their combined media weight and the impressions reported by the thousands of expected spectators, should play a promotional role for the country. Deep Africa will discover Morocco and the multiple opportunities it offers, both economically and for studies.