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Législatives 2026 au Maroc : un défi démocratique sous impulsion royale... 2383

Sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI a officiellement chargé le ministère de l’Intérieur de préparer les élections législatives de 2026. Cette décision, annoncée dans le 26ᵉ discours du Trône, constitue à la fois une directive solennelle et une marque de confiance particulière envers ce ministère. Avant la fin de l’année, le ministère devra alors avoir finalisé le cadre juridique et organisationnel du scrutin. Dans la foulée, M. Abdelouafi Laftit a convoqué les principaux partis politiques à des consultations inclusives visant à garantir « une élection exemplaire », transparente et crédible, en conformité avec les instructions royales. Cette démarche témoigne d’une volonté claire de renforcer l’organisation des élections en l’éloignant de l’influence directe du gouvernement, notamment celle de son chef, M. Aziz Akhannouch, également président du RNI. Ce parti est perçu comme ayant une influence conséquente sur le processus électoral. Confier cette mission au ministère de l’Intérieur, reconnu pour son rôle d’arbitre institutionnel, vise à limiter les interférences politiques directes et à prévenir toute tentative de captation du scrutin par certains acteurs en place. Le ministre, lors de la réunion, a insisté sur la nécessité que les élections soient « exemplaires » et a laissé entendre qu’un effort significatif serait déployé pour répondre aux attentes démocratiques et institutionnelles, sous-entendu que tout sera mis en œuvre pour une implémentation stricte de la volonté royale, à distance de toutes les factions politiques. Un nouveau Code électoral spécifique à la Chambre des représentants est donc en préparation, avec une adoption envisagée avant la fin 2025. Les réflexions et discussions en cours portent sur plusieurs axes essentiels : la mise à jour ou la simplification des listes électorales, avec le recours à la seule carte d’identité pour identifier les électeurs ; la moralisation et la régulation du financement des campagnes par un contrôle renforcé, voire un plafonnement des dépenses des candidats et des partis. Une meilleure transparence ainsi que la révision du découpage électoral fondée sur le dernier recensement sont également à l’ordre du jour. La question du nombre de bureaux de vote, qui dépassait 40 000 lors du dernier scrutin, devrait aussi être abordée, tout comme la représentation des quelque 6 millions de Marocains résidant à l’étranger. Le mode de scrutin actuel, basé sur la proportionnelle par listes, pourrait aussi être remis en question afin de remédier aux insuffisances constatées en 2021, notamment la propension à favoriser les «faiseurs» de députés et les clientélismes locaux, souvent nourris par l’argent. Dans la sphère politique, c’est plutôt silence radio. L’impression est que les partis politiques sont soit blasés, soit simplement stratégiquement attentifs. C’est donc chez les chroniqueurs et autres auteurs que se déroule le débat et foisonnent les idées. Le sentiment, tout de même partagé, est que les choses doivent changer si l’on veut redonner un sens à la vie politique. C’est ce que veut Sa Majesté. L’introduction d’un scrutin uninominal à deux tours est l’une des idées qui ressort souvent comme une piste possible pour réduire l’emprise de l’argent et des réseaux traditionnels d'influence. Ce mode de scrutin, jamais expérimenté au Maroc, favoriserait un vote davantage axé sur les individus plutôt que sur les listes de partis, renforçant ainsi la démocratie par une meilleure mobilisation citoyenne et une représentativité accrue. Jusqu’ici, les citoyens ont souvent été surpris par des alliances contre nature formées après le scrutin, dès lors que l’électeur n’a plus d’emprise sur la configuration finale. Le scrutin à deux tours a pour avantage que toute négociation ou alliance entre partis se fait entre les deux tours, donc à un moment où le citoyen peut encore intervenir par un second vote. Cette réforme électorale de fond pourrait répondre à un défi majeur : le désintérêt des citoyens pour la politique, manifesté par des taux élevés d’abstention, phénomène alimenté par une perception d’un renouvellement insuffisant, d’une faible efficacité des partis et, partant, des instances élues. Pour réussir, la réforme doit aller de pair avec un effort des partis pour renouveler leurs approches, attirer une jeunesse en quête d’alternatives et raviver l’intérêt populaire pour le vote. Les partis politiques marocains ont historiquement une relation ambiguë avec les électeurs en dehors de leurs bases traditionnelles acquises. Il semble même qu’ils découragent l’adhésion massive au processus électoral, de peur que leurs effectifs, souvent anecdotiques par rapport à la masse électorale statutaire, ne soient dilués. Le PJD a pris les rênes du pays avec seulement 1,3 million de voix, soit environ un dixième du nombre d’électeurs potentiels. Certains partis disposent de groupes parlementaires alors qu’ils n’ont obtenu que quelques 200 000 voix, voire moins. Les partis sont parfois perçus comme peu représentatifs et entachés d’accusations de corruption. Ils ont néanmoins un intérêt pragmatique à mobiliser leurs noyaux d’électeurs pour conserver leur poids politique et leur financement public. La perspective d’une campagne électorale dynamique semble aujourd’hui limitée par une certaine apathie des acteurs politiques, freinant l’élan démocratique attendu. Concernant le scrutin uninominal à deux tours, bien qu’il puisse structurer le paysage politique autour de deux grands pôles et favoriser des alliances plus claires, il ne saurait à lui seul neutraliser les influences de l’argent, les réseaux liés aux chefs communaux ou les clientélismes. Ce système peut même accentuer une bipolarisation artificielle, marginaliser les petits partis et laisser perdurer des alliances occultes entre grands partis, nuisant à la transparence et à la légitimité démocratique. Par ailleurs, des risques subsistent concernant la baisse de la participation entre les deux tours et la complexité du changement d’opinions des électeurs, pouvant ouvrir la voie à des manipulations stratégiques. Ainsi, des réformes complémentaires sont indispensables, notamment en matière de transparence du financement des campagnes, de moralisation du processus électoral et de contrôle des clientélismes locaux, pour garantir une compétition politique plus juste et plus crédible. La décision royale de confier au ministère de l’Intérieur la gestion du scrutin, le dialogue inclusif avec les partis, et la volonté affichée de moraliser le processus témoignent d’une ambition forte de réforme profonde pour une élection plus juste, équitable et digne de confiance. Le mode de scrutin reste au cœur des débats, mais la réussite des législatives de 2026 dépendra aussi de la capacité à réinventer un système électoral et politique capable de mobiliser les citoyens et d’instaurer la confiance dans la démocratie marocaine. Les citoyens aussi, sont appelés a davantage d'honnêteté et de responsabilité.
Aziz Daouda Aziz Daouda

Aziz Daouda

Directeur Technique et du Développement de la Confédération Africaine d'Athlétisme. Passionné du Maroc, passionné d'Afrique. Concerné par ce qui se passe, formulant mon point de vue quand j'en ai un. Humaniste, j'essaye de l'être, humain je veux l'être. Mon histoire est intimement liée à l'athlétisme marocain et mondial. J'ai eu le privilège de participer à la gloire de mon pays .


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Paradoxical Ramadan: Piety, Irritability, Overconsumption and Slumping Productivity... 845

Every year, Ramadan settles in Morocco as a form of collective breathing space. Daily rhythms change or are inverted, habits are reorganized or fall apart, nights come alive and days slow down. A sacred month par excellence, it is first and foremost a time of fasting, contemplation, piety and solidarity. But it is also, increasingly, a national paradox: intense spiritual fervor coexists with heightened social irritability, massive food waste and a noticeable drop in productivity. Ramadan, as it is prescribed and recommended, is a time of inner discipline. Fasting is not just abstaining from food; it is self‑control, restraint, patience. Religious scholars and schoolteachers insist on the moral dimension of fasting: refraining from anger, insults and injustice. In short, putting aside all forms of deceitfulness. Yet in contemporary Moroccan reality, the holy month sometimes seems to produce the opposite effect. It becomes the month of unjustified social tension. In large cities such as Casablanca, Rabat or Marrakech, if the mornings are relatively calm, late afternoon turns into a critical moment. Traffic is saturated, impatience is palpable, and road altercations become more frequent. Emergency services and police stations traditionally observe an increase in minor conflicts and aggressive behavior at the end of the day. There is also a rise in cases handled by gastro‑enterology and other specialties… People eat too much, and poorly. Fasting, combined with lack of sleep due to long evenings after iftar and waking up for suhoor, among other things, affects physiological balance. Irritability, reduced concentration and chronic fatigue become commonplace. In a country where emotional regulation is already under strain in everyday life, Ramadan acts as an amplifier. This nervousness is by no means a religious inevitability; it is a sociological consequence of how the month is organized, in a way that has gradually drifted away from its original spirit of moderation, self‑mastery and day‑and‑night contemplation. The immediate consequence is a slump in productivity. On the economic front, the impact is tangible. Administrative working hours are reduced, offices empty out in the afternoon without valid reasons, and construction sites run in slow motion. In some sectors, the drop in activity is accepted; in others, it causes structural delays. Ramadan excuses and explains everything. People shift the burden of their disengagement onto the community without the slightest embarrassment. Morocco aspires to accelerate its growth, attract investment and improve its competitiveness. Yet for nearly one month every year, the economy runs in degraded mode. The private sector adapts, but at what cost? The drop in productivity is not only quantitative; it is also qualitative: decisions are postponed, meetings cut short, projects delayed. The public administration and its staff amplify all this. It would be caricatural to place the blame on religion. The problem is not Ramadan; it is the absence of a culture of performance that is compatible with spiritual requirements. Output and accountability ought to be part of the values of the holy month. Another major contradiction is the paradox of food waste. While fasting is supposed to remind us of the hunger of the poorest, iftar tables are overloaded. Multiple soups, an abundance of pastries, redundant dishes. Markets are booming, food spending rises sharply, and a significant part of what is bought ends up in the trash. Wallets empty out and suffer. This phenomenon reveals a cultural transformation that may be surprising: Ramadan has partly become a social and consumerist event. Large retailers post their best figures, advertising intensifies, and TV channels compete with special programming to capture a deliberately captive nocturnal audience. At the start of the month, national channels record more than 70% of total viewership, a share they are far from reaching under normal circumstances, as Moroccans are very fond of foreign channels. The month of frugality paradoxically turns into a month of overconsumption. One can then ask: is this authentic spirituality, or a social ritualization? It would be unfair to reduce Moroccan Ramadan to its excesses. Thousands of solidarity initiatives emerge. Associations, mosques and volunteers distribute meals and aid to the most vulnerable. Families come together, intergenerational ties are strengthened. The mosque regains a vibrant centrality. The issue, therefore, is not to criticize Ramadan, but to question its contemporary practice. Are we faithful to its spirit, or prisoners of cultural habits that distort its meaning? If the holy month becomes synonymous with chronic fatigue, road rage, weakened productivity and waste, then there is a gap between the spiritual principle and its social translation. It is certainly time to advocate for a Ramadan of responsibility. A calm national debate is needed: how can we reconcile spiritual requirements with collective performance? How can we preserve the sacredness of the month while maintaining the efficiency of institutions? How can we turn fasting into a lever for self‑discipline rather than a pretext for slackness? Ramadan could be a laboratory for positive transformation: learning self‑control, optimizing time, rationalizing consumption, structuring solidarity. It could become a month of moral and professional excellence. Morocco, a country of deep religious tradition and clear economic ambition, has every interest in taking up this challenge. Because beyond productivity statistics or scenes of urban irritation, the real question is this: are we turning Ramadan into a simple collective ritual, or into a genuine exercise in inner and social reform? The answer, each year, is played out in the streets, offices and homes, and above all in each person’s conscience. We have a little less than two weeks left to think about it… seriously.

Thelema 1572

Thelema is a spiritual philosophy and religious system established by Aleister Crowley (1875–1947) in the early twentieth century. The system is based on the teachings found in The Book of the Law, which Crowley believed was revealed to him by a spiritual entity named Aiwass in Cairo in 1904. The name Thelema comes from a Greek word meaning “will.” At the heart of the philosophy is the concept of True Will, which Crowley described as the unique purpose or direction of each individual’s life. The central teaching of the tradition is expressed in the phrase: “Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law.” In Thelemic philosophy this statement does not mean simple freedom to do anything one desires. Instead, it refers to discovering and fulfilling one’s True Will, which represents the natural path of a person within the larger order of the universe. According to Crowley, suffering and conflict often arise when people live in ways that are not aligned with their true nature. Another key phrase in Thelema is: “Love is the law, love under will.” This statement suggests that love and harmony should guide human actions, but that these expressions of love must be consistent with one’s deeper purpose. Crowley believed that human spiritual history unfolds through different Aeons, or epochs of consciousness. He proposed that humanity had recently entered the Aeon of Horus, a new era in which individuals would move beyond the authoritarian religious structures of the past and instead seek spiritual knowledge through personal discovery and self-realization. Thelema integrates ideas from many sources, including Hermetic philosophy, the Kabbalah, ceremonial magick, astrology, alchemy, and Eastern spiritual practices such as yoga and meditation. These traditions are used as practical systems of spiritual training designed to transform consciousness rather than merely a belief system. Practitioners of Thelema often use rituals, meditation, symbolic study, and magickal exercises to better understand themselves and align with their True Will. Crowley also established magickal orders to help organize and transmit these teachings, including the A∴A∴ and his later leadership within Ordo Templi Orientis. Today Thelema continues to influence modern ceremonial magick, occult philosophy, and spiritual movements that emphasize self-discovery, personal freedom, and conscious evolution. While interpretations vary among practitioners, the core idea remains the same: each individual has a unique role in the universe, and spiritual growth comes from discovering and fulfilling that role with clarity, discipline, and awareness.

Iran Facing the Reality Test: The End of a Regional Myth? 1771

Another major sequence of tensions in the Middle East highlights the deep fragilities of the Iranian regime. Since its advent in 1979, the Islamic Republic has built itself on a political narrative of revolutionary power in direct opposition to the "Great Satan" the USA, unwavering defender of the Palestinian cause and Jerusalem's liberation. **This ideological positioning allowed Tehran to gain relays in parts of the Arab world, particularly among movements hostile to Israel. It developed an influence strategy based on creating, funding, and arming affiliated groups: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, support for the Syrian regime, Houthis in Yemen, forming what it presents as the "axis of resistance." It surely finances other movements in many other countries, with an unnatural connivance with Sunni Islamists. An expansion strategy with destabilizing effects.** Where Iran has extended its influence, its footprint is inseparable from increased militarization and state fragmentation. The projection relies less on state-building than on the rise of parallel politico-military networks challenging national institutions. This has certainly enabled Tehran to hold leverage over its adversaries and position itself as the champion of "resistance" to the US-dominated regional order and its allies. But it has also prolonged conflicts, weakened already fragile state institutions, and exacerbated sectarian fractures. In the long term, the human and economic cost of this "strategy" is considerable for the affected countries and for Iran itself, subjected to severe sanctions and persistent international isolation. *The Palestinian cause is in fact more instrumentalized than defended, for nearly half a century, while the Iranian regime claims it as a central pillar of its diplomacy and revolutionary legitimacy.* Tehran has forged ties with armed Palestinian actors like Hamas or Islamic Jihad, presenting them as extensions of its own "resistance." Yet it must be acknowledged that Palestinians' situation has in no way improved: rampant occupation, colonization, and blockade continue, while cycles of violence recur without credible political prospects. Palestine has lost vast territory, lives, and even sympathy within the Arab world itself. Palestinian internal divisions, locking the cause into an essentially militarized logic absent diplomatic horizons, question the real effectiveness of this posture. Like the Gamal Abdel Nasser era marked by imprudent pan-Arabism, the current period has brought no progress. Iran has, in part, supplanted certain Arab leadership on the dossier without producing tangible results for a lasting settlement—nor concrete improvements in Palestinians' lives, quite the contrary. **Beyond geopolitics, the regime faces profound internal contestation. Recent protest movements, and those triggered after Jina Mahsa Amini's death in September 2022, revealed a major fracture between part of Iranian society and its leaders. Repression, as the sole response, resulted in thousands of deaths and arrests, documented by international organizations and UN mechanisms.** The rigidity of security and ideology contrasts with the aspirations of a connected youth seeking civic and individual freedoms. Today's Iran is no longer that of 1979: society has transformed, the regime has not. The gap between revolutionary discourse, promises of social justice, and socio-economic reality: inflation, unemployment, precarity, brain drain, corruption, diplomatic isolation—fuels disillusionment that undermines state legitimacy. Morocco officially severed ties with Iran in 2018, as Tehran supported the Polisario Front via Hezbollah and its embassy in Algiers, with Algeria's backing. Rabat holds evidence of arms deliveries and Polisario cadre training. Morocco's rupture appears as a strategic decision to prevent any perception of interference in its vital interests, particularly in the Sahara. It also fits into a broader realignment of regional alliances, marked by Rabat's rapprochement with certain Gulf partners and the USA, amid growing rivalries with the Iran-Algeria axis. Recent military and diplomatic developments highlight a troubling reality for Tehran: Iran often seems to react urgently rather than master the strategic tempo. The multiplication of peripheral fronts, from Lebanon to Gaza, Iraq to Yemen, occurs as its regional relays face growing pressures, sanctions, and targeted eliminations eroding "axis of resistance" cohesion. This situation can appear as much an admission of fragility. The ease with which the USA and Israel neutralize leaders even questions state competence. That said, announcing the regime's imminent collapse would be reckless. The security apparatus remains powerful, regional influence networks active. But will the regime once again demonstrate resilience, even at the cost of increased internal violence and harsh contestation management? **The regime must be clearly distinguished from the Iranian people, caught in a vise. Heir to a millennial civilization and rich intellectual tradition, it should not be reduced to the politico-religious elite's choices. Sanctions, repression, and isolation's sufferings weigh first on ordinary citizens, including those aspiring to peaceful change and the country's reintegration into the international community.** *History teaches much in identical situations. Transitions demand lucidity, responsibility, and an inclusive vision of the future. Regional stability will not arise from ideological escalation or destruction, but from rebalancing based on law, sovereignty, collective security, cooperation, and trust, today sorely eroded.* In this troubled sequence, solidarity first goes to the region's peoples, caught in dynamics beyond them. The mullahs will sooner or later answer to history—and to a simple but decisive question: did they serve the people, or sacrifice them to a political myth that time has made increasingly hard to sustain?